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Abstract
Levels of Visual Information Processing: Perception of
Dynamic Properties and Events
Objective: The here presented studies explore automatic and controlled per-
ceptual processes in two dynamic paradigms and support a rationale of a multi-
level approach to dynamic visual perception.
Method: I investigate diﬀerent perceptual levels of dynamic scenes, including
factors within the perceiver, within the objects, and within the environment.
Automatic processes are explored with a simple 3-D tracking task and an event
perception recognition task; controlled processes are observed in a modiﬁed
tracking task with speciﬁc object properties and an identiﬁcation task.
Results: Through analysis of tracking and report errors measured in the two
paradigms, I observed similarities in the automatic processing of artiﬁcial 3-D
tracking environments (Study 1: the scene-based relations are more important
than positions of individual objects) and real-life video clips (Study 2: core as-
pects are preferred over ﬁne details). Despite the assumption that tracking
is a cognitive-impenetrable mechanism, results of the modiﬁed tracking task
(Study 3) point towards the ability of participants to strategically weigh visual
information based on task-demands.
Conclusion: The results of this dissertation illustrate that the identiﬁcation
of inﬂuential internal and external factors is important to enhance our under-
standing of themultidimensional nature of perception – an understanding that
will eventually and hopefully bring research to move beyond questions of how
resources are limited, and start to focus on fundamental issues like how we can
use mental resources to our beneﬁt.
Keywords: Multiple Object Tracking, event perception, cognition, scene-based,
object based.
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Übersetzung
Ziel: Die hier präsentierten Studien untersuchen automatische und gesteuerte
Prozesse mit zwei dynamischen Paradigmen und unterstützen die Grundüber-
legung bezüglich einesMehr-Ebenen-Ansatzes zur dynamischenWahrnehmung.
Methode: Ich untersuche verschiedene perzeptuellen Ebenen von dynamis-
chen Szenen, darunter Faktoren innerhalb des Wahrnehmendens, innerhalb
derObjekte und innerhalb der Umgebung. Automatische Prozesse werden hier
mit einer simplen 3-D Tracking-Aufgabe sowie mit einer Wiedererkennungs-
aufgabe bei derGeschehenswahrnehmunguntersucht; gesteuerte Prozessewer-
den in einermodiﬁziertenTrackingaufgabemit speziﬁschenObjekteigenschaften
und einer Identiﬁkationsaufgabe beobachtet.
Ergebnisse: Durch eineAnalyse der Trackingfehler undder Fehler in derWieder-
erkennungsaufgabe in den beiden Paradigmen konnte ich gewisse Gleichar-
tigkeiten in der automatischen Verarbeitung von artiﬁziellen 3-D Tracking-
Umgebungen (Studie 1: die szenen-basierten Beziehung waren wichtiger als
die Positionen der einzelnen Objekte) und von realitätsnahen Videosequenzen
(Studie 2: Kernaspektewurden feinenDetails vorgezogen) feststellen. Ungeachtet
der Annahme, dass Tracking ein kognitiv-unzugänglicher Mechanismus sein
könnte, weisen die Ergebnisse von Studie 3 signiﬁkant darauf hin, dass Teil-
nehmer dazu in der Lage sind, die visuellen Informationen basierend auf den
Aufgabenanforderungen strategisch abzuwägen.
Fazit: Die Ergebnisse dieser Dissertation zeigen deutlich, dass die Ermittlung
von einﬂussreichen internalen und externalen Faktoren wichtig ist, um unser
Verständnis für die Vielschichtigkeit der visuellenWahrnehmung zu verbessern
– ein Verständnis das hoﬀentlich eines Tages dazu führt, dass die Forschung
über Fragen nach der Art der begrenzten mentalen Kapazität hinausgeht und
sich stattdessen fundamentaleren Fragen widmet, zum Beispiel wie wir unsere
mentale Kapazität bestmöglich nutzen können.
Schlüsselbegriﬀe: Multiple Object Tracking, Geschehenswahrnehmung, Kogni-
tion, szenenbasiert, objektbasiert.
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1Preface
Visual perception is the complex organization and interpretation of sensory
information. Perception is not only a passive processing of signals, but it is in-
ﬂuenced by attention, memory, expectation, and learning – thus, it operates
on diﬀerent processing levels. What we accept as our reality is shaped (and
sometimes distorted) by multiple factors including the perceiver (e.g. motives
or experience), the situation (e.g. dual-task constraints or setting), or the target
(e.g. proximity or similarity). Limiting the enormous amount of available sen-
sory input, for example with perceptual grouping or goal-directed attention, is
necessary to function in a complex and constantly moving world. The human
brain applies numerous ingenious tricks on such a regular basis that we do not
even notice the constant lack of information.
Research presented in the following dissertation covers diﬀerent perceptual
levels of dynamic scenes. However, this work cannot even come near to cover
the hybrid and multiform nature of perception in its entire complexity and will
focus on three factors that inﬂuence the perception of dynamic scenes: how
perception is shaped by factors within the perceiver (experience), within the
environment (task setting), and within the targets (frameworks and features).
Overall, this work provides further aspects on dynamic perception to under-
stand how dynamic visual stimuli are processed and interpreted.
PART I of this thesis will be concerned with the interplay of perception and vi-
sual memory. It will be discussed how a global (scene-based) organization and
experienced schemata inﬂuence the perception of interrupted dynamic stimuli
on a basic developmental level (tracking study) and on a more complex level
involving cognitive-perceptual expertise (event perception).
PART II will look at the more complex connection of perception and attention.
It will be discussed how changes in the attentional level could lead to a more
local (object-based) perceptual processing. Theoretical ideas will be supported
by a comprehensive study that shows how top-down control (task setting) in-
ﬂuences the allocation of attention in a dynamic environment (tracking study).
2 Preface
PART III reviews the results, presents them together with discussed literature
in a diagram, and puts the individual components into context with existing
approaches to visual perception. This work tried to shed light on perceptual
dynamic processes, however, especially tracking is often described as an at-
tentive process. Perception and attention are closely intertwined and hard to
diﬀerentiate which is why attention is sometimes mentioned as an equivalent
term without further explanation throughout the text. To reﬂect at least a little
bit on the complexity of attentional processes and their immense research liter-
ature, I devote a section to attentional processes (mainly connected to tracking
tasks) and describe theoretical accounts of attention in more detail.
3Practical information
Here, I provide practical information on the organization of the thesis,
my contribution to the three articles published, statistical analyses, and
paradigms. A few words on the statistics are needed because next to “stan-
dard” analyses, the underlying data sets and hypotheses of some of the
experiments presented here required less well-known approaches like gen-
eralized models and contrasts. I introduce the basic paradigms (multiple
object tracking and event completion). The speciﬁc modiﬁcations made
will be described in the corresponding articles/chapters.
General organization
Each chapter starts with a short summary of the most important points given
in an info text box (as done above). The thesis is divided into three parts:
Part 1 is concerned with perceptual processes based on global structuring and
schemata, Part 2 addresses perceptual processes enhanced by top-down atten-
tion allocation, and Part 3 provides an overall summary of the results and dis-
cusses them with regard to their novelty and value for existing research and
theories.
I published three articles as ﬁrst author during the doctoral phase of 3 years:
1. Viewpoint Matters: Exploring the Involvement of Reference Frames in
Multiple Object Tracking from a Developmental Perspective in Cognitive
Development,
2. Seeing the Unseen? Illusory Causal Fillings in FIFA Referees, Players, and
Novices in Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications, and
3. All Eyes On Relevance: Strategic Allocation Of Attention As A Result Of
Feature- Based Task Demands In Multiple Object Tracking in Attention,
Perception, and Psychophysics.
4 Practical information
The three articles are included in their original published versions. Rights to
use and reproduce them in this thesis were approved by each journal.
Concerning my contribution to each paper, for Paper (1), I was given a data
set that was collected 8 years ago in a 3-D tracking task designed by Frank
Papanmeier. Back then, Markus Huﬀ, Frank Papenmeier, Kerstin Wolf, and
Till Pfeiﬀer had the opportunity to collect tracking data from 120 children,
however, their research question was not elaborated. I researched the track-
ing and developmental literature, conﬁgured the hypothesis, analyzed the data
with intensive help from Markus Huﬀ and Frank Papenmeier, and compiled
the manuscript. For Paper (2), Frank Papenmeier, Annika Maurer, and Markus
Huﬀprogrammed the event completion task and tested FIFA referees in Switzer-
land. I joined the project afterwards and suggested further groups of experts
and non-experts to complete the experimental design. I was responsible for
literature research, hypotheses, and writing. Markus Huﬀ provided the result
section, however, the reviewers of the journal requested a generalized design
to meet the requirements of the proportional data, so I replaced his main anal-
ysis with a contrast analysis. I was solely responsible for Paper (3) including
research idea, research design, analysis of results, and publication, however,
many good ideas were generated in discussions with Markus Huﬀ. The stim-
uli of the experiment were suggested in a DFG project but were supposed to
measure eﬀects of gaze cues indicating motion direction in tracking environ-
ments. After two experiments that did not show any eﬀects of gaze cues on
motion perception, the applicants of the DFG project aborted the experimen-
tal series. I kept working on my own ideas for the stimuli and developed the
design further so that it met the needs of my research ideas (attentional control
and feature-based tracking).
Statistical Analyses
In this section, I shortly explain the inferential statistics we applied to the dif-
ferent data sets. In each experiment, we measured task performance or ob-
ject preferences (or both) as proportions, for example, participants may have
tracked 65% of the target objects correctly. Such a limited dependent variable
is a problem for ordinary linear regression because (a) a linear regressionmodel
can predict impossible values below 0 or above 1, and (b) the relationship be-
tween the dependent and independent variables is not linear but sigmoidal
(comparable to a ﬂattened S-shape). A linear approach is thus only justiﬁed
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when the data fall between the middle (linear) section of the curve (i.e., be-
tween .2 and .8). In that case, there is a linear relationship that a regression
can catch nicely. While this was the case in some of our experiments, we had
to use diﬀerent approaches in others to account for the distribution of the un-
derlying data.
Null Hypothesis Signiﬁcance Testing
The traditional approach to make inferences has been to frame the scientiﬁc
question in terms of two contrasting hypotheses. The null hypothesis (H0) rep-
resents no diﬀerence between the population parameters of interest, the alter-
native hypothesis (Ha) represents either a unidirectional (one-sided) or bidi-
rectional (two-sided) alternative. A test statistic is computed from the sample
data and compared to the hypothesized null distribution (µ 1 = µ 2). If the test
statistic diﬀers, one assumes that the sample data is not consistent with the
null hypothesis. The generally used but arbitrary cutoﬀ level α is .05, deﬁning
the probability to make a type I error, that is, to reject the null hypothesis when
it is actually true. Or stated diﬀerently, how often does one have to conduct the
experiment to get a sample that shows the observed eﬀect due to pure coinci-
dence. If the answer is: not more than once in 20 samples (5%) we believe that
there is a signiﬁcant eﬀect in the population, thus we reject the null hypothesis.
As mentioned above, the null hypothesis follows a speciﬁc distribution. If one
wishes to compare two sets of data and determine whether their two means
are equal, one assumes that the test statistics follows a Student’s t-distribution
under the null hypothesis. In the present work, these tests appear as indepen-
dent t-tests, that is, comparing two means of two independent samples, and as
paired t-tests, that is, comparing two means measured on the same statistical
unit (e.g. tracking performance before and after a given manipulation).
The ANOVA (Analysis Of VAriance) generalizes the t-test to more than two
groups, analyzing the diﬀerences among groups based on the variation among
and between them. That is, H0: µ 1 = µ 2=µ 3 = ...=µ k, where k is the num-
ber of groups. The underlying distribution of an ANOVA is the F-distribution.
ANOVA is an omnibus test statistic, meaning that all means are tested against
each other. A signiﬁcant result can thus only tell us that at least two group
means diﬀer, not which ones. A possible solution are post hoc comparisons
that look for patterns between subgroups, unspeciﬁed before the experiments.
When speciﬁc hypotheses, for example about the strength and direction that
6 Practical information
a manipulation has on performance, are formulated, not all pairwise compar-
isons as given by an ANOVA are of interest (all the facts above were learned
from: Moore, McCabe, & Craig, 2012). An approach that reduces the risk of
Type I errors (i.e. rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true) is to predeﬁne
a priori/planned contrasts. To further control the Type I error rate at the level
of the set of contrasts, it is possible to correct the α level for each contrast.
In this work, the most pessimistic estimation has been chosen: the Bonfer-
roni inequality. Next to the statistical advantages, a priori contrasts provide
straightforward interpretations and allow for the accommodation of complex
comparisons (e.g. testing the performance of group A against performance of
group B, C, and D). More details on the advantages of a priori contrasts are
discussed in Ruxton and Beauchamp (2008).
Mixed Eﬀect models
Instead of testing the mean of diﬀerent groups, it is possible to express the re-
lationships in the data in terms of a function, for example, modeling tracking
performance as a function of age: Proportion correct ∼ age + ε. Age would
be a ﬁxed eﬀect while ε represents the non-speciﬁc error term, that is, the de-
viations from the model predictions we cannot control with the experiment’s
design. For example, personal experience of the participant that may increase
tracking performance in the lab. In a mixed eﬀect model, the error term that is
normally an unsystematic part of amodel, can be structure by adding a random
eﬀect, here, for “participant”. The model can then account for idiosyncratic
variation that arises from individual diﬀerences. In statistical terms, we assign
diﬀerent intercepts to each participant, telling the model that there are multi-
ple responses, that is, individual variation, per subject. These error speciﬁca-
tions can be done with diﬀerent variables, leading to a close-to-fully speciﬁed
error term. Results of the model are usually interpreted as the likelihood or the
probability of receiving the collected data given themodel, thus, the Likelihood
Ratio Test is usually utilized to attain p-values. The (log-)likelihood of a model
given the data is estimated as the Akaike’s information criterion (AIC; Akaike,
1981). To obtain a p-value, one must compare two models with an ANOVA ap-
proach, one with the factor of interest and one without. For example, model
1: Proportion correct∼ age + training compared to model 2: Proportion correct
∼ age. If the diﬀerence between the likelihood of the models is signiﬁcant, we
conclude that the ﬁxed eﬀect “training” is signiﬁcant (see Bolker et al., 2009;
Pinheiro, Bates, DebRoy, Sarkar, et al., 2007, for in-depth statistical details).
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A generalized linear mixed model is an extension of the linear mixed model
that allows the response variable to be of a diﬀerent distribution, such as bi-
nary responses and proportions. The basic ideas are the same, however, in a
generalized linear model, a link function (here: logistic) is speciﬁed that con-
verts the expected value µi of the outcome variable, which is assumed to fall
within the exponential family of distributions, to the linear predictor. In Ex-
periment 1 we tested two generalized linear mixed eﬀect models against each
other with an ANOVA because the response variable was a proportion based
on a binary variable. A similar approach has been applied in Experiment 2 and
3 in which such a generalized, binomial model was the basis for an analysis of
a priori contrasts. More details and in-depth statistical understanding of gen-
eralized models can be found in McCulloch and Neuhaus (2001).
Bayes
The null hypothesis signiﬁcance testing (NHST) described above relies on the
calculation of a certain probability of a phenomenon occurring under speciﬁc
conditions (i.e. the p-value). Thewhole idea behindNHST is to ﬁnd enough ev-
idence to favor the alternative hypothesis. But especially when an experiment
is under-powered (e.g. due to a small sampe size as it was the case in Exper-
iment 2), the p-value may not be meaningful evidence. Bayesian statisticians
argue that NHST only allows the researcher to say: since my null hypothesis
is wrong, then my null hypothesis is wrong. NHST does not allow for a con-
ﬁdent statement that the eﬀect found is due to the alternative hypothesis; a
signiﬁcant p-value only allows for a rejection of the null hypothesis. It might
be the case that either the null nor the alternative are supported by the data.
With Bayesian statistics it is possible to compare two models at the same time:
Bayesian statistics can give an idea of how well the null and the alternative hy-
pothesis explain a phenomenon in certain conditions. This is done with the
Bayes Factor (BF), the a ratio of how likely one model will occur over the other
model.
In Experiment 2, we reported null-ﬁndings for a study design with a small sam-
ple size that may have been under-powered and, by that, may have led to a type
II error in the NHST statitics. We may have erroneously denied that there was
an eﬀect due to diﬀerent levels of expertise between the groups. Using Bayesian
statistics, we were able to show how much the null (no inﬂuence of experience
on causal gap ﬁlling) and how much the alternative hypothesis (experiences
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changes perceptual causal gap ﬁlling) contributed to the study. We backed up
the null hypothesis by a Bayes factor of 4.99, which is classiﬁed as a substantial
evidence in favor of the null model (only main eﬀects) against the alternative
model (including an interaction of expertise and condition).
Dynamic Paradigms
Multiple Object Tracking
TheMultipleObject Tracking Paradigm (MOT; Pylyshyn& Storm, 1988) is com-
monly used to investigate the architecture of visual cognition and dynamic
information processing under sustained attention conditions. In an unmod-
iﬁed version of the paradigm, the distinctive pattern of successes and failures
in tracking can be attributed to limits of specialized cognitive structures or at-
tentional resources. By modifying the paradigm with occlusions or viewpoint
changes, MOT can also be used to measure processes in memory and allows for
insights into the mental representation of dynamic objects. In a typical MOT
task, the participant is presented with a given number of identical objects, typi-
cally white circles on a black screen. A subset of the objects is marked as targets
in the beginning of each trial. Participants are asked to keep track of these tar-
get objects so that they can identify them in the end of the trial. The identical
objectsmove for a ﬁnite time on screen. When they stop, the participant identi-
ﬁes the tracked targets – or guesses them. Please refer to Figure 1 for a graphical
presentation of the diﬀerent sequences in a typical MOT experiment1.
Event Perception
Implicit causal inferences distort the perception of, or memory for, events only
seconds after viewing. Strickland and Keil (2011) used a simple paradigm to
study how the human brain ﬁlls gaps in a dynamic event.
1In classical MOT studies participants are asked to ﬁxate on a central location throughout
the trial to avoid body or eye movements. This however was not practiced in our studies due to
two reasons: (1) eyemovements are believed to aid tracking performance via extrapolation (Luu
& Howe, 2015) – however, this result is outperformed by literature indicating that extrapolation
does not occur during tracking (e.g,. Atsma, Koning, & van Lier, 2012; Keane & Pylyshyn, 2006),
and (2) unconstrained eye movements enhance the ecological validity of MOT performance,
that is, the performance measured in the laboratory with unconstrained eye movements is a
better predictor for human tracking performance in the real world.
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FĎČĚėĊ 1: A typical MOT experiment.
Their participants saw a person running towards a ball. In the complete condi-
tion, participants saw how the ball was kicked and how it ﬂew. In the incom-
plete condition, the moment of ball contact was omitted, either followed by a
logical, causal scene (e.g. the ball ﬂying) or an illogical, non-causal scene (e.g.
an injured player or cheering fans). The authors asked the participants whether
they have seen the contact picture or not. Results showed higher false-alarm
rates for the incomplete-causal compared to the incomplete-non-causal condi-
tions. Please refer to Study 2 in section 3.3, page 38, for further details of the
replicated experiments. See Figures 2,3, 4, and 5 for exemplary options. The
design allows manipulations of the ball contact moment (visible or cut out)
and of the second sequence (causal or non-causal).
10 Practical information
FĎČĚėĊ 2: Event completion sequence with visible ball contact.
FĎČĚėĊ 3: Event completion sequence with ball contact cut out.
Figures 2 and 3 show a complete and an incomplete ﬁrst part of a presented
sequence. Figure 4 and Figure 5 on the next page present the two possible
second parts of a sequence: a logical continuation of the ﬁrst part (e.g. ball
bounces down the ﬁeld, reaches teammate) or a non-causal continuation (e.g.
cheering fans).
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FĎČĚėĊ 4: Second part of the clip: causal sequence.
FĎČĚėĊ 5: Second part of the clip: non-causal sequence.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The study of perception has inspired research for more than a century but
still has not lost its relevance or attractiveness to cognitive psychologists,
neurologists, philosophers, and many others (see Hochberg, 1988, for a
review). The purpose of this introductory chapter is to discuss the role of
perceptual processes in the chapters that follow, trying to place them along
earlier and current research knowledge with a focus on mental represen-
tations, memory, attention, and top-down inﬂuences.
Perception is deﬁned as the awareness of environmental elements through phys-
ical sensations (e.g. color perception) but also as physical sensations that are
interpreted in the light of experience (fromMerriamWebster online dictionary:
Perception, n.d.).
The ﬁrst part of the deﬁnition describes the ecological approach of Gibson and
Gibson (1955) who proposed that sensation is perception. Information is di-
rectly processed from the senses, that is, from the bottom end of the visual
system. One famous example for such an automatic bottom-up perceptual pro-
cessing comes fromNavon (1977). He showed that observers have a global-over-
local precedence, meaning that the perceptual system always starts to process
a visual scene as a global structure before it eventually zooms in to integrate
details for a clearer picture (discussed in more detail in 2.1). Gibson and Gib-
son (1955) strongly believed in a pure bottom-up perception and argued against
the notion that past experience can inﬂuence present experience. According to
them, such an enhanced processing would allow the observer to perceive more
information about the environment than can actually be transmitted through
the receptor system. Facilitated perception in a bottom-up fashion, however,
may be possible when the observer organizes multiple stimuli into a (global)
group (e.g. Navon, 1977; Wertheimer, 1938; Yantis, 1992).
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Grouping may be simple in static environments but the level of diﬃculty in-
creases when the objects are moving. A comparable concept to global and lo-
cal processing in dynamic environments is processing moving objects based
on their retinocentric or allocentric coordinates. Such reference frames can be
constructed based on objects (object-based), the constellation of objects in the
environment (scene-based), or the viewer itself (egocentric, ﬁxation-based). A
fundamental question to understand the nature of basic representational pro-
cesses in a dynamic environment with more than one object concerns the type
of information used that contributes to a successful reallocation after an occlu-
sion or, similarly, a sudden viewpoint change. Study 1 presents the results of
an experiment that explored the development of two possible representation
frameworks used in object tracking: an object-based or scene-based perceptual
organization.
The second part of the deﬁnition of perception considers the constructivist ap-
proach: because the sensory (bottom-up) information is incomplete, humans
need to ﬁll in gaps through interpretation. They do so by “predicting” the scene
and compare those hypotheses against the incoming sensory information (Gre-
gory, 1980). Thus, how we perceive the world around and the way we organize
and interpret sensory input is a creation of reality in order to give meaning to
our environment: after all, the perception of an object without recalling and
linking it to stored information would be meaningless. And in fact, later re-
search showed that neural processes responsible for visual perception and vi-
sual working memory are intertwined (Harrison & Tong, 2009; Serences, Ester,
Vogel, & Awh, 2009) and interacting (e.g. Agam & Sekuler, 2007).
In order to ﬁll in gaps produced by the limited perceptual system, the observer
needs to draw on previous experiences. These are stored in memory, a gen-
eral term for the recollection of what was earlier experienced or learned as well
as a term for a mental information processing system that receives, modiﬁes,
stores, and retrieves informational stimuli (from Farlex Partner online dictio-
nary: Memory, n.d.).
For dynamic and more complex scenes (that involve e.g. relations between
stimuli or goal-related behavior), it has been proposed that individuals or-
ganize the continuous visual input into discrete actions (Zacks, Speer, Swal-
low, Braver, & Reynolds, 2007). For each observed object or event, a series
of bottom-up “hypotheses” and top-down “queries” are answered by mapping
stimuli to a memorized schema. This procedural system allows the observer
to make a suﬃcient interpretation with just a few structural levels (schemata).
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Prediction mechanisms rely on experience and may involve post-dictive recon-
structions that are not always eﬃcient. That is, the observer may compare the
current event to a previous event and weigh its plausibility in order to ﬁll in
perceptual gaps with causal content that may not be correct in the speciﬁc sit-
uation. For example, in the German Bundesliga, the “phantom goal” became
famous as an error in event perception. The side net of the goal had a hole
through which the ball entered the goal without actually crossing the line. Be-
cause a hole in the net is such a rare event, especially in such a high league,
fans, referees, and players were convinced that they had seen the ball crossing
the goal line in a typical and correct way. Only the camera behind the goal was
able to catch the truth.
Given that the mind ﬁlls in perceptual gaps with pictures based on knowledge
and context: How much is perception facilitated by, or impaired with, short-
cuts in more complex environments (such as a soccer match) that require se-
mantic knowledge of actions and events, as well as considering the behavioral
intentions of others? Study 2 explores how expertise inﬂuences the perception
of dynamic events in soccer. Similar to the viewpoint changes in Study 1 with
simple stimuli, the more complex visual stimuli presented to the participants
in Study 2 were discontinuous. By deleting only seconds of a continuous ac-
tion (kicking or throwing a ball), we measured the inﬂuence of experience on
perceptual gap ﬁlling processes.
Another cognitive process closely connected to perception is attention. It is de-
ﬁned as the act or state of applying themind to something and as a condition of
readiness for selective focusing of consciousness and receptivity (fromMerriam
Webster online dictionary: Attention, n.d.). In Reisberg (2013), attention is de-
scribed as the factor within the observer that decreases perceptual performance
in a visual tracking task when the number of objects increases. Attention is the
allocation of a limited resource that enables various operations, but it is also as-
sociated with intensity and clarity of perception, selection, and consciousness
(see Hatﬁeld, 1998).
Attention can be shaped by bottom-up and top-down mechanisms. Stimulus-
driven (exogenous) attention is inﬂuenced by the object’s properties and at-
tracts attention in a non-volitional, preconscious manner. Goal-driven (en-
dogenous) attention allows the observer to direct attention, for example, in
accordance with a current task or based on experience. For the Navon (1977)
example: perceiving a scene in a global manner is an automatic bottom-up
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process, while the perception of local properties (the zooming-in) requires ad-
ditional perceptual resources that are enabled via attentional processes.
What happens to perception when attention acts as a control mechanism?
Based on the signal enhancement approach, attention strengthens the rep-
resentation of relevant stimuli (e.g. Carrasco, Ling, & Read, 2004; Carrasco,
Williams, & Yeshurun, 2002). Another possibility is that attention reduces ex-
ternal noise to decrease the impact of distracting stimuli outside the focus (Lu
& Dosher, 1998). However, as explored and addressed in Study 3, both ap-
proaches may not be mutually exclusive. Of special interest in Study 3 is the
allocation of resources in a dynamic environment that requires sustained at-
tention, such as tracking multiple moving objects simultaneously. I present
research that shows how goal-driven attentional foci can aﬀect sustained spa-
tial attention, resulting in the conscious perception of features and cues during
a tracking task. From a theoretical point of view, I discuss attention in tracking
as a cause and as an eﬀect: next to a resource that causes spatiotemporal limita-
tions, the observed competition between location and feature representations
matches the idea of attention as an eﬀect, that is, a byproduct of intentional
perceptual processing.
Part I
AUTOMATIC PERCEPTUAL
PROCESSES
The ﬁrst part of this thesis is concerned with auto-
matic processes in dynamic perception. Chapter 2
sheds light on the developmental process of scene-
based (global) processing in dynamic environments
and demonstrates that the mind’s short-cut to per-
ceive multiple objects as a group can facilitate hu-
man perception eﬀortlessly from early age on. Chap-
ter 3 presents a study on automatic causal gap ﬁlling
– a mechanism that may have evolved to accelerate
visual perception but has its downsides in the obser-
vation of those kinds of events that do not comply
with experienced schemata and causality.
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Chapter 2
Study 1:
The development of dynamic
representations
In this chapter I review literature that provides further background studies
that were not mentioned in the original introduction (Paper (1)) of Study
1. We found that children from the age of 6 years on apply the same per-
ceptual organization strategy in an interrupted tracking environment as
adults: they use a global, scene-based approach. The global-over-local
precedence has been observed in children as young as 3 to 4 months for
static objects, but has never been tested with dynamic objects.
Human perception and their thought processes were researched early by Wil-
helm Wundt. By opening the ﬁrst institute for psychology in 1879 and by ana-
lyzing the human mind in a structured, experimental way, he marked the be-
ginning of modern psychology. Wundt deﬁned heuristics of perceptual organi-
zation, including the sensation of object connectivity when they are similar or
close to each other. Identifying a global pattern by grouping objects is a funda-
mental part of organizing the overwhelming visual input the brain has to deal
with. Study 1 explores whether such a scene-based organization is also applied
for moving objects – and if so, does this grouping ability during object tracking
depend on age?
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2.1 Perceiving static and dynamic objects
In static environments, Navon (1977) presented convincing evidence that ob-
servers can adopt a local (perceiving objects as single objects, probably one by
one) or global (perceiving objects as a group with a focus on the global pat-
tern) perceptual organization strategy. Navon used letters that were composed
of smaller letters (a big E composed of small Es in the congruent condition; a big
E composed of small Ss in the incongruent condition) and asked participants
to identify the big or the small letter as fast as possible. In the incongruent
condition, participants were slower when they had to name the small letters,
that is, global identity interfered with local identity - but this was not observed
the other way around. Results were interpreted as showing that perception of
coarse-grain global properties of an object or scene in an automatic manner
comes ﬁrst. He proposed that directing attention to the scene reveals ﬁne-
grain local properties but requires additional resources. Stoﬀer (1993) backed
up the theoretical ideas of Navon (1977), proving that attention has to change
between local and global representational levels – which is time-consuming.
He compared reaction times of participants who were cued to diﬀerent areas
of the screen after having adopted a local or global focus. Results suggested that
zooming to the local level took longer than perceiving the global level, again
indicating that local processing, compared to global processing, takes on ad-
ditional resources. In the same vein, Shiﬀrin and Czerwinski (1988) proposed
that attention changes in spatial extent, and thus changes its processing state
of global or local, depending on experimental conditions.
Findings of a similar study with 3 to 4 month-olds provided evidence that in-
fants show the same order of perceptual precedence: global before local (Ghim
& Eimas, 1988). Others wondered whether the conﬁguration of objects into
meaningful entities would last even if the objects appeared in a novel region.
The general ﬁndings: (1) infants are sensitive to common region; as adults, they
are able to use extrinsic factors (here: regions) to perceptually organize, and (2)
these processing units can further be of an abstract nature, a result that points
towards perceptual organization that follows context-based grouping princi-
ples (see Bhatt, Hayden, & Quinn, 2007; Bhatt & Quinn, 2011; Goldstone, 2003;
Hayden, Bhatt, & Quinn, 2008).
Is such a perceptual organization similar for dynamic objects? Yantis (1992)
used an object tracking task and found that adult participants who were pre-
sented with targets in a canonical formation (thus providing the possibility to
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form a virtual polygon) tracked the moving objects better than participants
who tracked randomly conﬁgured target objects. The grouping advantage of
the virtual polygon condition over the random condition was only observed in
the initial stages of the experiment, indicating that participants in the random
condition developed individual grouping strategies over time.
Local and global processing of static events seem, in a broad sense, compara-
ble to the use of reference frames in dynamic scenes. These can be constructed
based on objects (object-based), the constellation of objects in the environment
(scene-based), or the viewer itself (egocentric, ﬁxation-based). Liu et al. (2005)
and Huﬀ, Jahn, and Schwan (2009) wondered about the reference frame used
in tracking environments. Liu et al. (2005) speculated that only allocentric,
scene-based coordinates are used. Huﬀ et al. (2009) tested tracking perfor-
mance under viewpoint changes in a 3D-tracking environment and concluded
that the visual system compensates for minor rotations but not for large rota-
tions. Adults are known to use reference frames spontaneously or ﬂexibly ac-
cording to the situation or task (e.g. Iglói, Zaoui, Berthoz, & Rondi-Reig, 2009),
but less is know about children’s use of reference frames.
How do infants and children perceptually organize dynamic objects? Is the
eﬀective (global) scene-based perception of a dynamic scene learned or already
existent in early childhood? In a comprehensive study by Hespos and Rochat
(1997), infants of 4- to 8-months of age were tested in their ability to track and
anticipate the orientation of an object after an invisible spatial transformation
(from 60 to 150 degrees). Adults were found to rely on the available information
in circumstances of fewer perceptual cues (Gibson, 1966), compared to younger
infantswhoneed rich cues from the environment. InHespos andRochat (1997),
from 6 months of age, infants were able to track and anticipate the orientation
outcome for a variety of situations, hence, approaching the ﬂexibility of adults.
These ﬁndings show that children can use environmental cues to anticipate
the orientation outcome of a rotated object, but nothing is known about their
perceptual organization of dynamic multiple objects in tracking environments.
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2.2 Study 1:
Scene over objects
In Study 1, we hypothesized that the global-over-local processing approach and
the early-developed ability to track objects through brief occlusions are re-
ﬂected in a tracking performance of children that is comparable to those of
adults. Since a global perceptual organization is an essential building block
of the architecture of the visual system, we did not expect that the decreased
tracking performance would be explained by an interaction of age and view-
point changes. Hence, we only hypothesizedmain eﬀects for age and viewpoint
changes on overall tracking performance.
The design by Huﬀ et al. (2009) has been conceptually replicated to be used in
Study 1, an experimental study of age diﬀerences in tracking objects in a 3D en-
vironment with viewpoint changes. The viewpoint changes after a short occlu-
sion of all objects allowed us to test whether the participants adopted a global
scene-based or a local object-based perceptual organization strategy. Partici-
pants were asked to track 3 targets out of 8 objects. In contrast to a mark-all
tracking task in which the participant has to actively indicate all of the tracked
objects, here, in the end of each trial, one object ﬂashed. Childrenwere asked to
indicate whether the ﬂashing object was among the targets they had tracked,
or not. This resulted in a binomial independent variable (Correct/Incorrect)
that we analyzed by comparing generalized mixed eﬀect models assuming a lo-
gistic distribution, while specifying participants as the random eﬀect. In order
to test for the contribution of local object-based cues, we calculated a contin-
uous variable (object displacement) that presented the distance on the screen
between the location of the target right before and after the rotation. We com-
pared the ﬁt of the models with either both variables (viewpoint changes and
object displacement) to models with only one of the variables. The logic: if a
model with both variables does not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from a model with only
one variable, the model with one variable explains tracking performance suf-
ﬁciently. If they diﬀered signiﬁcantly, we would conclude that both variables
explain tracking performance best. This logic resulted in two models for each
variable that we called objects-over-scene and scene-over-objects.
2.2. Study 1:
Scene over objects
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Earlier studies  demonstrated  that  visual  tracking  of  dynamic  objects  is  supported  by both
scene-based and object-based  reference frames, depending  on  the  magnitude  of scene dis-
placement  (Huff, Jahn, &  Schwan, 2009; Liu  et al., 2005).  The  current  experiment tests if
this  pattern  also  applies  to younger  participants,  i.e. school-age children,  by comparing  the
effects  of abrupt  scene rotations  on  tracking  performance of  multiple dynamic  objects  in a
3D  scene  across  five  age  groups  (grade  1,  3,  5, 7 and adults).  Scene  rotations  have  two conse-
quences: displacement  of  (1)  the whole scene  and,  (2) individual  objects. Tracking  accuracy
of 123  participants was measured  across five  age  groups  (grades 1,  3, 5,  7, and adults). Either
1 or 3  targets moved  independently among a total of  8 identical  objects  for  5 s.  The  scene
remained  constant  or was  rotated  by 10◦ or 20◦ after 3  s.  Tracking  performance of  all  par-
ticipants  was  well  above chance level  (probability of  0.5)  and  an age-related  increase  in
performance was  observed.  Contrasting  the  two factors  revealed  that  scene  rotation  had
a greater  impact on performance than object displacement.  Further, the effect of  abrupt
rotations was independent  of  age.  These findings suggest that  allocentric reference  frames
support  attentive  tracking  across  abrupt  viewpoint  changes  and  that  scene-based tracking
is  already applied early in human  development.  Findings are discussed  in light  of new  stud-
ies that  link  MOT to grouping  processes  (local  and global).  We  propose  that  scene-based
or allocentric processing abilities  undergo a similar  development as, or are connected  to,
grouping  skills.
© 2015  Elsevier  Inc. All rights  reserved.
1. Introduction
The ability to  keep track of multiple moving objects within a scene is  critical to the successful negotiation of complex visual
environments. For instance, crossing the street requires several attentional skills (Dunbar, Hill & Lewis, 2001; Tabibi &  Pfeffer,
2007), but mainly to keep track of multiple moving objects. Although research has demonstrated a clear developmental
trajectory in children’s multiple object tracking with respect to the total number of objects that can be tracked, little is known
∗ Corresponding author at: University of Tübingen, Department of Psychology, Schleichstr. 4, D-72076 Tübingen, Germany.
E-mail address: alisa.brockhoff@uni-tuebingen.de (A. Brockhoff).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2015.10.004
0885-2014/© 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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about the mechanisms responsible for these changes. The goal of this paper is to better understand these mechanisms by
exploring how children’s tracking abilities are affected by reference frames and accordingly, global and local processing of
several moving objects.
Attention allocation in  complex dynamic environments is experimentally tested using the Multipe object tracking
paradigm (MOT; Pylyshyn &  Storm, 1988). While watching several identical moving objects, observers are asked to maintain
focus on a pre-assigned group of target objects. Developmental studies demonstrated that the number of objects children can
track simultaneously increases markedly between 3 years of age and adulthood (Dye &  Bavelier, 2010; O’Hearn, Hoffman, &
Landau, 2010; Trick, Audet, &  Dales, 2003; Trick, Hollinsworth, &  Brodeur, 2009; Trick, Jaspers-Fayer, &  Sethi, 2005). How-
ever, the majority of studies has focused on children over the age of 5, except for O’Hearn et  al. (2010) who  tested typically
developing 3- and 4-year-olds and people with Williams Syndrome on multiple object tracking (MOT) and memory for
static spatial location. Less is known about which maturing system is contributing to or is responsible for the observed
improvement. O’Hearn et al. (2010) suggest that the developing visuospatial working memory (see also Klingberg, 2006) or
attentional resolution (Wolf & Pfeiffer, 2014) play a role, whereas others see the number of tracked objects as reflecting the
limited capacity of the maturing attentional system (Alvarez & Franconeri, 2007; Trick et  al., 2005).  MOT  studies involving
young individuals with disorders (e.g. Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD), Williams Syndrome, Fragile X,  syndrome, and,
Turner’s syndrome) who typically showed a lower mean of successfully tracked objects (Farzin, Rivera, & Whitney, 2010;
Beaton et al., 2010; O’Hearn, Landau, &  Hoffman, 2005; O’Hearn et al., 2010; O’Hearn, Hoffman, &  Landau, 2011) suggest
that MOT  may  even be utilized as a screening tool to measure a  developmental delay in different developing groups during
childhood.
In addition to a developmental trend in tracking ability, tracking may change qualitatively with age and experience, for
example referencing objects in relation to other objects and the presented scene. MOT tasks presenting objects in 3-D scenes
enable the exploration of visuospatial attention during tracking, with regard to the question of whether reference frames
are used during MOT  tasks, and  if so, which ones. Humans use reference frames to transform scattered visual information
input into one stable and detailed representation. When constructing a reference frame, it is possible to use objects, the
environment, or the viewer as reference points (Howard, 1982). At present, there is little agreement on the form of reference
used during tracking. Liu et al. (2005) have speculated that MOT  mechanisms in 3-D scenes only rely on allocentric, scene-
based coordinates. Thus, referencing objects in relation to each other would make tracking robust against abrupt viewpoint
changes—that is, the displacement of objects by cuts from one camera perspective to another should not influence tracking
performance. To test this speculation, Huff et al. (2009) introduced scene rotations of 10◦, 20◦, and 30◦ to a MOT  task
that was adapted to 3-D. The authors hypothesized that allocentric representations are only necessary for a successful
relocation of objects in cases of large viewpoint changes. Minor rotations, however, change retinocentric coordinates only
minimally. Because tracking performance was significantly decreased in 20◦ and 30◦ conditions, but not for 10◦ rotations,
they concluded that  the visual system relies on the retinocentric framework and compensates for small displacements
when tracking multiple moving objects. The authors attempted to test for the involvement of retinocentric processes by
using the screen coordinates of objects and calculated their displacement in conditions with rotation. The extent of object
displacement was analyzed for trials with 30◦ viewpoint changes and two targets, finding no effect between large and  small
displacement for targets far and close to the center of rotation, respectively. Thus, not the displacement of an object but the
rotation of the whole scene determined tracking performance.
Scene-based processing presupposes the ability to integrate local sensory information into one global whole. The ability
to reference objects in relation to each other, perceiving them globally as one dynamic structure, overcomes the capacity lim-
itations of selective attention (Yantis, 1992) and makes tracking robust against abrupt viewpoint changes (Jahn, Papenmeier,
Meyerhoff, & Huff, 2012). In MOT, this ability was discussed in light of the target grouping approach by Yantis (1992) who
argues that tracking benefits from grouping the single targets into one higher-order object, such as three targets into a
triangle. Recent studies by Evers et al. (2014) and Van der Hallen et al. (2015) modified a MOT  task to explore grouping inter-
ference in normally developing children and children with ASD (autism spectrum disorder). Both research teams picked
up the approach by Scholl, Pylyshyn and Feldman (2001), namely that target objects in MOT  are units of attentional selec-
tion. They paired each target with a distractor by displaying a connecting line between them and compared the tracking
performance to trials in which objects were left ungrouped. If the performance in the grouped condition was  significantly
worse than in the ungrouped condition, one can assume that global processing, which means that objects are perceived as
connected to each other, interfered with the tracking task. And in fact,  global processing in MOT  was  measured based on a
weaker tracking performance in the grouped condition, supporting the idea that grouping may  shape sensory processing
throughout the whole life span (Carey &  Xu, 2001).  Another recent study by O’Hearn, Franconeri, Wright, Minshew, & Luna
(2013) compared adults, children, and matched participants with autism on a modified MOT task. The multiple objects were
grouped in two ways, first by arranging them (i.e. by varying the space between them), to imply a grouped element and sec-
ond, by letting them move together. This design allowed the authors to compare performance, for example, on  target–target
and target-distractor trials. They found children aged 9–12 years to show the same influence of motion-based, as well as
element-based grouping as adults. Processing of the scene rather than single objects may  evolve to enhance tracking perfor-
mance, for example, when target objects are perceived as connected. Scene-based, global processing has been observed in
various studies using dynamic stimuli and different samples of clinical and typically developing children but it has not been
explored whether this ability is under development (i.e. whether this ability partially explains the developmental curve of
tracking performance in children).
2.2. Study 1:
Scene over objects
25
A. Brockhoff et al. / Cognitive Development 37 (2016) 1–8 3
Fig. 1. Target designation, visual tracking and decision/marking phase.
Taken together, the current paper strives to answer the question whether tracking performance in children is determined
only by object-based (local) processes or also by scene-based (global) processes. We  assume that allocentric, scene-based
processing and a global perception of multiple objects as a single grouped element are closely related, if not the same in
a task in which the objects are displayed on a floor plane that is abruptly rotated in 3D (Jahn et al., 2012). The abrupt
rotation of the floor plane has two consequences: the displacement of the individual objects and the rotation of the whole
scene. If observers are tracking multiple objects in an object-based local manner, only the displacement of each individual
object should determine tracking performance (lower tracking performance the further an object is displaced). However,
if observers also utilize scene-based information such as grouping multiple objects into a higher-order object, the amount
of scene change (angle of abrupt scene rotation) should explain tracking performance over and above the displacement of
individual objects alone. Based on what we know about the effect of grouping in MOT  studies (e.g. Van der Hallen et al.,
2015), we expected to find scene-based effects across all age groups tested.
To shed light on how attentionally-demanding visuospatial skills mature with age, a more detailed analysis will focus on
the strength of each impact on different age levels. To our knowledge, this is the first study that tested different age groups
to see whether scene rotations impair tracking performance less with increasing age. Because adults are more experienced
in global processing, an alternative finding would be that adults’ tracking performance is even more impacted by scene
rotations than children’s performance.
2. Method
2.1. Participants
The sample consisted of 123 participants. Twenty-seven children were in grade 1 (age in years: M = 6.45, SD = 0.57), 31 in
grade 3 (M = 8.71, SD = 0.55), 23 in grade 5 (M = 11.51, SD = 0.49) and 23 in grade 7 (M = 13.34, SD = 0.50). In sum: 104 children
completed the experiment at the University of Education in Karlsruhe after written consent was obtained from parents.
Seventeen adults participated (15 from the University of Education in Karlsruhe and 2 from the University of Tübingen).
Three participants were excluded due to technical issues during the experimental session. The children received a small
present for their participation and the adults were given monetary compensation.
2.2. Stimuli and procedure
Stimuli were presented using the Blender game engine (www.blender.org) and custom software written in Python. They
were 8 small white, black-bordered 3-D spheres moving on a checkerboard floor plane (see Fig. 1). At the beginning of each
trial, the 8 spheres were randomly positioned on screen. After 2 s, 1 or 3 spheres flashed red 4 times within 1.6 s and remained
red for another 2 s. These spheres were the target objects. The target spheres turned white again and all spheres began to
move at a constant speed of 3◦/s for 5 s. The spheres moved in random directions and were allowed to touch or to overlap.
Reaching the boundaries of the checkerboard, the spheres were reflected in a physically consistent manner (comparable to
billiard balls), however, the spheres did not bounce off of each other.
The rotation of the scene was characterized by 3 conditions: the scene either remained constant, or it was  rotated by
10◦, or 20◦ (around the vertical axis through the center of the floor rectangle). It appeared abruptly (as if a camera cut in a
movie displayed the same scene from another person’s view) and did not influence the movement of the spheres. Rotations
occurred after 3 s. Half of the rotations were directed to the left, the other half to the right. Fig. 2 illustrates a simplified
rotation to the right and the two emerging variables we used for the analysis (see the next section for more details).
Following randomized movement, the spheres came to a stop and one turned red. The observer, then, had to indicate
whether the marked object was part of the original target set seen at the beginning of the trial. Demo videos can be found
here: https://homepages.uni-tuebingen.de/frank.papenmeier/mot-develop/.
Participants proceeded to the next trial by pressing the spacebar. Each participant performed 6 practice trials (2 levels
of target number × 3 levels of scene rotation). The final experiment was comprised of 72 trials (2 target numbers (1 or
3) × 3 levels of scene rotation (0◦, 10◦, or 20◦) × 12 repetitions). The order of conditions was randomized throughout the
experiment. The participants had the option to take self-paced breaks between the trials. The within-subjects design allowed
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Fig. 2. A simplified visualization of the moment of rotation with different foci: perceiving objects as individually displaced (left) or as a group of objects
rotated (right).
for controlling individual differences, reducing the associated error variance. The different grades (1, 3, 5, 7, and adults) served
as a between-factor.
2.3. Data analyses
The application of a mixed-factor ANOVA on the proportion of correct answers provided a first impression of the data. In a
further analysis, we fit logistic generalized mixed-models (glmer)  due to the non-linear response variable that was expressed
as a categorical variable with two levels (Yes/No). The aim was  to quantify age-related and inter-individual differences that
might influence the factors scene rotation and object displacement that, in turn, were thought to determine the variability in
the number of correct responses. Object displacement was calculated as the distance on the screen between the location of
the target probe right before and right after the rotation. We  constructed object displacement as a continuous factor. Because
a 0◦ scene rotation would automatically result in a displacement of 0 degrees of visual angle, only 10◦ and 20◦ trials were
analyzed within the glmer analysis.
The lme4 package for R (Bates, Maechler, Bolker & Walker, 2014) was used to perform the binomial logistic analysis. In
a first step, using likelihood-ratio tests, the fit of the model with only object displacement as a fixed effect was compared
to the fit of a model including both scene rotation and object displacement as fixed effects, in order to investigate whether
scene rotation has a beneficial contribution. We  called this the “Scene over Objects” logic: a significant result would lead
to the acceptance of the model with both effects. Thus, both scene rotation and object displacement would contribute to
successful tracking. A non-significant result would lead to the rejection of the model with both effects, indicating that object
displacement explains the variance sufficiently. In a second step, we compared the fit of the model with only scene rotation
to the fit of the model including both. We  tested whether object displacement has an additional explanatory benefit. This
“Objects over Scene” logic is similar to the “Scene over Objects” logic with the order of including the fixed effects into the
models interchanged. Participants, specified as a random effect, allowed a separation of between-subjects (inter-individual)
and within-subjects (responses to the variable of interest depending on individual differences) variance in the data.
3. Results
3.1. Repeated-measures analysis of variance
The mixed factor ANOVA has been executed with the between-subject factor age (grades 1, 3, 5, 7 and adults) and the
within-subjects factors number of targets (1 or 3) and level of scene rotation (0◦, 10◦, and 20◦) on the mean proportion of
correctly identified targets. As predicted from previous research, statistically significant main effects of age, F(4116) = 16.35,
p < .001, scene rotation F(4116) = 23.87, p < .001, and number of targets F(4116) = 138.94, p < .001 on mean proportion correct
were observed. The effect of level of scene rotation was  the same for all age groups, F(8232) = 0.55, p = 0.82, whereas age and
number of targets as well as scene rotation and number of targets appeared to interact, F(4116) = 4.58, p < .001; F(2232) = 4.79,
p < .001, respectively (see Fig. 2).
Based on established findings in the literature it is not surprising that an increased tracking load decreased performance
in young participants. Further, the influence of the number of targets was  higher in conditions with larger scene rotations.
Finally, the interaction of age, scene rotation, and number of targets was not significant, F(8232) = 0.73, p = 0.67.
3.2. Generalized mixed-effects models for object displacement and scene rotation
The repeated measures ANOVA provided a first impression of the data, suggesting an exponential, developmental nature
of tracking skills, with scene rotation having the same effect for all age groups. In a further analysis, we explored which
reference frame (allocentric or retinocentric) participants used across the age groups. Therefore, we ran a separate analysis
on all target probe trials with scene rotations of 10◦ and 20◦ and calculated the object displacement of the target probe.
The direction of the data (see Fig. 3) mirrors the predicted, developmental trajectory nicely, but also points to a lower
performance in trials with 20◦ rotation independent of object displacement. To better understand the different effects of the
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Fig. 3. Influence of age and number of targets on proportion correct, separated by scene rotation. Error bars indicate the 95% confidence interval of the
mean.
Fig. 4. Influence of object displacement and rotation on tracking performance over all target-trials. The red line and blue lines depict 10◦ and 20◦ rotation,
respectively.
two predictors (scene rotation and object displacement), tracking performance (correctness of response) was subjected to a
binomial glmer with the factors scene rotation (10◦ or 20◦) and object displacement (M = 24.53 pixels, range [0.00; 125.40]
pixels).
For better visualization only, we utilized the median as a cut-off score and displayed object displacement with two  levels
(small/large). Note that the factor was continuous in the analysis. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals (Fig 4).
Based on previous research results by Huff et al. (2009), we  surmised that object displacements are means to study the
use of retinocentric reference frames. We  assume that global and local processing (i.e. the extent of perceiving the objects
as a group) will determine how much influence the rotation of the scene or the displacement of target objects has on
tracking performance. To this end, we applied the “scene-over-objects” and the “objects-over-scene” logic for each grade
and the adults separately. A side-by-side comparison of the results of each model by grade, as well as exact p-values, can
be found in Table 1. Applying the scene-over-objects logic resulted in the acceptance of the model including scene rotation
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Table  1
Generalized mixed-effects models for object displacement and scene rotation.
Grade Scene-over-Objects !2 p Objects-over-Scene !2 p
1 5.20 .023* 0.09 .783
3  0.49 .288 1.19 .503
5  4.77 .030* 0.38 .532
7  9.17 .003* 0.002 .959
Adults 8.97 .003* 1.89 .163
Reanalysis of  Huff et  al. (2009) 13.87 <.001* 0.36 .549
* Significant at the p  < 0.05 level.
and object displacement. Thus, object displacement alone is  not sufficient to explain the variance. In a second step, we
applied the objects-over-scene logic. Results showed that  the model with only scene rotation provided the best fit for grade
1 (!2(1) =  5.20, p  =  .023), grade 5 (!2(1) =  4.77, p  = .030), grade 7 (!2(1) =  9.17, p = .003) and adults (!2(1) =  13.87, p < .001).
Surprisingly, for grade 3, the scene-over-objects logic accepted the model with object displacement as fixed effect and the
objects-over-scene logic accepted the model with scene rotation as fixed effect (!2(1) =  0.49, p =  .288). These findings stand
in contrast to those of all other age groups. Thorough analysis neither revealed extreme outliers, nor an increased rate of
guessing (calculated as proportion correct smaller than 0.5), or misunderstanding of the task (measured as participants
pressing only one key, i.e. saying “Yes” or “No” constantly). Therefore, and based on the consistent picture of all other grades
and adults demonstrated, we  can only assume these effects to be due to random variation. Taken together, scene rotation
was not only integrated into the tracking task but was a significant predictor of performance.
For the sake of completeness, we reanalyzed the original data published by Huff et  al. (2009). The displacement range
of an object and viewpoint change played a part in predicting performance in the original data set as well. Put in contrast
by using the scene-over-objects/objects-over-scene logic, we found again, that the scene was superior over displacement
of objects in  predicting performance (!2(1) =  13.87, p < .001), even when controlling for individual differences and varying
speed—providing further support for the importance of the scene over an object during tracking.
4. Discussion
It has been the subject of considerable debate which representations visuospatial attention accesses during tracking
processes (Huff et  al., 2009; Seiffert, 2005; Liu et al., 2005). Huff et al. (2009) left allocentric coordinates intact and still
found an impaired tracking performance. Although this points towards a retinocentric, viewer-based representation of
dynamic scenes, other interpretations are possible. The focus of the current study was  to replicate preceding results of
studies concerning the usage of reference frames during tracking—concentrating in particular on the development of tracking
abilities in younger participants in 3-D environments. The results presented here indicate that the impact of rotations is
similar across all age groups tested—independent of the range of object displacements. These findings are in line with recent
studies that linked global processing of objects to MOT  as well. Evers et al. (2014) suggested a reduced global processing bias
in participants with ASD compared to normally developing children (see also O’Hearn et  al., 2013). Grouping of targets and
distractors (paired by a connecting line) resulted in an interference of the tracking task, suggesting that forming object-based
connections (grouping) is a tracking approach observable already in young children. If children and adults track multiple
objects by utilizing scene-based processes such as grouping target objects to a higher-order object (e.g. a triangle), tracking
across abrupt scene rotations should not only be  influenced by the displacement of individual objects caused by the rotations
but also by the extent of the scene rotations as such.
4.1. Does sole rotation of the whole scene or the extent of the displacement of a target object influence tracking performance?
The first part of the analysis addressed the question of which factors affect tracking performance. We found our results
to replicate established findings in MOT research with main effects for number of targets, age, object displacement, and
scene rotation. But which factor produces more tracking errors? For further examination, we  introduced a new way of
modeling tracking performance in relation to object displacement and scene rotation. Interestingly, scene rotation was a
better predictor of tracking performance than object displacement (objects-over-scene logic). The finding that scene rota-
tion influenced tracking performance more than object displacement leads us to speculate that humans not only rely on
retinocentric changes, but also make use of scene-based, allocentric reference frames, especially during tracking tasks in
3-D environments.
4.2. Are viewer-based effects also observable in younger participants—and given that both rotation and displacement reveal
an impact, which one is stronger?
All groups showed a similar pattern of performance drop due to object displacement and scene rotation, which may  be
continuous throughout development. Assuming that tracking processes are retinocentric in nature, larger object displace-
ment should result in a higher number of errors. The current results only partially support this assumption. Scene rotation
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was a better predictor of performance than object displacements, suggesting a strong involvement of allocentric processes
during tracking in 3-D environments. These results rather coincide with speculations by Liu et  al. (2005) who  surmised that a
critical input needed for tracking multiple objects is a stable environment, not the objects themselves. The superior influence
of scene rotations was present in almost all grades and conditions tested, leading to the conclusion that scene-based, not
viewer-based effects are observable already in  children of age 6.
4.1. Future research
Future research may  determine (a) the extent of developmental effects on the use of reference frames in tracking and
(b), the connection of reference frames and grouping. A  field to apply this knowledge could be the design of perceptual-
cognitive training games in dynamic, virtual reality environments, to help improve tracking-speed and tracking-capacity in
order to reduce the risk of road accidents for children. It has been shown that age-related effects in tracking can be reduced
by training for older participants (e.g. Legault, Allard & Faubert, 2013).  Intelligently designed dynamic environments may
be used to teach tracking and visuospatial skills.
Logan (1995) included linguistics in tasks of spatial representations and proposed linguistic cues to play a role in  directing
attention. Trick et al. (2003) suggested a  relationship between tracking and enumeration. This could explain the considerably
large difference found between primary school children and grades 5 and 7: language and enumeration skills, as well as
tracking, all undergo huge improvement between childhood and young adulthood. Further research exploring these skill
combinations in depth will be interesting with regard to the development of underlying cognitive skills and reference frames
needed in tracking tasks.
But not only the application of reference frames should be specified in more detail. Generally, children are assumed to
be less efficient in  their deployment of attention (e.g. Plude, Enns, &  Brodeur, 1994; Trick & Enns, 1998)  whereas adults
can make use of more than one  reference frame simultaneously (Carlson-Radvansky & Jiang, 1998; Stein, 1992). Thus, the
gradual improvement of sustained attention and longer periods of extended concentration may  play a role, as well as visual
working memory and attentional selection of items.
The most reasonable approach based on current literature and our recent results would be to assume that allocentric and
retinocentric frames (or global and local processes) are at work simultaneously. It  is possible that  people develop a strategy
to track objects in  a global or local manner, possibly by activating different reference frames or using processing strategies
that are applied depending on the situation. Whether multiple intrinsic representations are accessed in a top down manner,
as well as when and if a strategy develops and why, this has yet to be determined.
5. Conclusion
By exploring developmental processes, we were able to show that  the magnitude of age-related changes is  consistent over
different ages and depends on the stimulus complexity (number of targets, range of displacement, and extent of rotation).
Concerning the hypotheses, the results indicated that (1) object-based effects are observable from early age on, but are less
pronounced than scene-based effects, (2) scene rotation and displacement of targeted objects have an influence on  tracking
performance, and finally, we showed that (3) scene rotation had a stronger impact than object displacement, leading us to
assume that tracking across abrupt viewpoint changes in 3-D  environments relies more on  allocentric than on  retionocentric
processes.
The findings of the presented experiment offer numerous theoretical and practical implications. Within the context of
perceptual developmental theories on grouping processes, our measure of children’s performance in situations of scene
or object shifts brings us closer to understanding how attentionally-demanding visual-spatial skills mature with age. The
limited tracking ability of children in grade 1, 3, and 5, relative to adults supports existing, findings suggesting that brain
areas responsible for MOT  develop and only become maximally efficient later in life (see Ryokai et  al., 2013; Dye & Bavelier,
2010; Trick et  al., 2003). The similar influence of scene rotation on all groups suggests that grouping (i.e. processing the
presented objects in a global manner), is already present in children as young as 6 years. By documenting a specific window
of time of the typical developmental trajectory of the use of  reference frames during tracking, we can learn more about how
children experience and  structure their complex environments. Our results, and maybe even our version of the MOT task that
was designed in  a game-like manner, may guide parents, teachers, clinicians, and researchers in identifying developmental
delays in scene-based motion processing.
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This chapter covers the more complex perceptual organization of events.
Here I present two experiments that explore an event completion eﬀect
elicited with soccer video clips. We tested three groups with diﬀerent lev-
els of soccer expertise on the event completion eﬀect (introduced in the
practical information in the beginning of the thesis). The eﬀect was ob-
served in all three groups independent of their level of expertise, that is, we
observed causal gap ﬁlling independent of a priori experience based on the
experts’ extensive exposure to soccer videos and real-life soccer matches.
A possible interpretation: the inﬂuence of higher cognitive processes in
the perception of simple action events may be overruled by automatic pro-
cesses that make sense of the world and map actions and features of an
event onto a known structure (schema).
The results found in Study 1 can be explained with a global representational
level, which would ﬁt the idea of tracking as an automatic and preattentive
mechanism. Pylyshyn and Storm (1988) argued that tracking of multiple ob-
jects requiresmore than one independent focus, thus, it can only operate preat-
tentively (see also Scholl, 2009). Pylyshyn (1994) and Sears and Pylyshyn (2000)
see the eﬀort, that is, the involvement of attentive processes, as the observer’s
need to periodically refresh the representation of target objects (i.e. the tar-
gets’ indexes as discussed later) as well as to rescue lost objects during motion.
Accordingly, the perceptual grouping eﬀects found in Study 1 were discussed
as due to global representations in visuospatial attention.
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However, the representation of objects based on their location in the observed
scene may just as well be stored in memory. A design with sudden viewpoint
changes (as applied in Study 1) may have activated an oﬄine ﬂexible memory
that stored the whole scene, including the target (and maybe the distractor)
objects in relation to each other. The oﬄine mechanism allows for brief gaps
during a stimulus observation. By that, the visual system can pick up tracking
after the viewpoint change or gap by using the constellation of the scene stored
in the oﬄine memory. This may be facilitated by the visual system further
storing a possible anticipated constellation of the objects, an anticipatory trace
of the scene.
Some have argued that spatial working memory is the same as spatial atten-
tion (Awh & Jonides, 1998; Awh, Jonides, & Reuter-Lorenz, 1998). Horowitz,
Birnkrant, Fencsik, Tran, and Wolfe (2006) proposed that the disappearance
of objects may invoke an oﬄine ﬂexible memory store that retains the cur-
rent state of the system as a whole and enables the reallocation of objects. In
addition, tracking studies found that people could track at least four objects
(e.g. Pylyshyn & Storm, 1988) which suggests an underlying capacity limit that
matches mental storage limitations found inmemory studies (see Cowan, 2001,
for a re-evaluation of numerous competing views on “the magical number 4” in
short-term memory). Some further assume that visual working memory and
visual attention may rely upon a common pool of mental resource (Gazzaley &
Nobre, 2012). The authors refer to “inward-directed” attention: selecting a tar-
get from visual workingmemory and from the environmentmay be the same as
internally and externally directed selective attention (based on Kuo, Rao, Lep-
sien, & Nobre, 2009). Additionally, Howard and Holcombe (2008) observed a
progressive decline in the precision of representations of tracked objects that
was similar to, if not consistent with, the results of visual short-term memory
tasks, in which Wilken and Ma (2004) observed an increase in errors made in
reporting the features of multiple objects with increases in set size. Howard
and Holcombe (2008) assumed that this similarity could be explained as due
to attentional capacity that acts as a processing bottleneck or as a ”manager” of
information input that may reach visual short-term memory.
Further support for the idea that attentive visual tracking is at least connected
to visual memory processes, if not the same, comes from ﬁndings by Huﬀ, Mey-
erhoﬀ, Papenmeier, and Jahn (2010) and Meyerhoﬀ, Huﬀ, Papenmeier, Jahn,
3.1. Cognition and perception 35
and Schwan (2011) who suggested that abrupt viewpoint changes elicit spon-
taneous updating of visual properties, implicating an eﬀect of visual inconsis-
tency on the encoding of properties and, in general, on the perception of con-
tinuous events. In a similar vein, Baker and Levin (2015) proposed the relational
trigger approach – however, they tested the perception of dynamic events. In
ﬁve studies the authors showed that these triggers served as a heuristic mech-
anism that updates and compares event properties.
3.1 Cognition and perception
A similar automatic process to oﬄine memory or relational triggers may be
operating on a daily basis in order to make sense of the world around us; deal-
ing with incomplete sensory information received from the visual system by
processing or ﬂexibly storing global aspects of a scene. The world around us,
however, is not a display of identical moving stimuli. Objects may have typical
characteristics (e.g. motion proﬁles), behave in a related or unrelated manner,
and most living things act goal-oriented. A theory of mind is needed to predict
the mental state, and accordingly the behavior, of others (Baron-Cohen, Leslie,
& Frith, 1985; Premack & Woodruﬀ, 1978). In addition, the observer needs to
consider the position of his own eyes, head, or whether his body is moving. All
these scene elements and factors require the observer to not only perceptually
but also to cognitively process a real world event. A process described as ar-
ranging stimuli received from the environment and organizing experiences in
the mind (Schultz & Schultz, 2015), as a categorical perception (Zacks, 2008),
and as a continuous prediction of what will happen next – based on the previ-
ous inﬂux of visual information and on prior knowledge – in order to facilitate
perception (Zacks et al., 2007).
The interplay of perception and cognition has been extensively studied. It all
started with Hermann von Helmholtz (1821–1894) who proposed that visual
perceptions are unconscious inferences (Helmholtz, 1866). According to him,
perception requires inferences based on knowledge to make sense of the frag-
mented and irrelevant data received from sensory signals. Gregory (1997) hy-
pothesized that such an inferential perception (or perceptual interpretation:
Gregory, 1980) bears the risk for cognitive illusions, a kind of illusion that,
in contrast to physical and physiological illusions, can be explained by low-
level physiological mechanisms, and arises from an interplay of perception and
knowledge. Gregory (1997) proposed that cognitive visual illusions are due to
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advanced development of our visual system (neural learning). Learned simpli-
ﬁed models help to speed up the interpretation processes, however, illusions
arise when the unconscious analysis of the scene based on learned models con-
ﬂicts reasoned considerations.
That learned models can even inﬂuence perception independent of displayed
ambiguity (conﬂict) in the scene has been shownwith the representationalmo-
mentum (RM) eﬀect. Freyd and Finke (1984) presented participants images of
a rectangular that rotated in a given direction. When they asked them to in-
dicate the ﬁnal position of the stimulus, the participants showed a tendency
to choose a position further rotated in the presented direction. The RM also
interacts with prior knowledge (stored in memory) of fundamental Newtonian
physics (e.g. movement of a linear path tested with infants: von Hofsten, Vish-
ton, Spelke, Feng, & Rosander, 1998) or of the stimulus’ typical motion (e.g.
object-speciﬁc eﬀects tested with typical and atypical pictures of rockets: Vin-
son & Reed, 2002). Vinson and Reed (2002) revealed in three experiments that
context and prototypical appearance of an object assert a powerful inﬂuence
on RM memory shifts: if an ambiguous stimulus was labeled “rocket”, the par-
ticipants showed a larger RM shift than when it was labeled “building”. In ad-
dition, it was more important that the stimulus looked familiar (i.e. displayed
a common prototype) than whether it pointed in a given direction. The au-
thors suggest that observers attend, recognize, and record the identity of the
stimulus object. Such a “recognition elicits conceptual knowledge from long-
termmemory that relates to that object’s expected motion in the context of the
displayed situations” (Vinson & Reed, 2002, , (p.14)).
3.2 Event perception
Jackendoﬀ (1991) proposed that the semantics of events and their parts can be
accounted for by models developed to represent objects and their parts. The
basic ideas of Helmholtz (1866) and Gregory (1997) (simpliﬁed models that
evolved from neural learning inﬂuence perception) are therefore also found
in studies on event perception. Equivalently, according to Bartlett (1932), a
“schema” is an active organization of past experience that can have a tremen-
dous eﬀect onmemory (see also Verfaillie & d’Ydewalle, 1991), especially in early
stages of processing (Biederman, Mezzanotte, & Rabinowitz, 1982; Friedman,
1979). Further, the term “situation model” is frequently used: it describes men-
tal representations that capture the relations between components of a scene
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(Johnson-Laird, 1983). Most of what we know about the perception of events
comes from psycholinguistic research1, investigating how people process writ-
ten or narrative texts.
A technique for studying the perceived structure of an event involves asking
observers to watch movies of everyday activities and to organize (”segment”)
them into meaningful units of activity (Newtson & Engquist, 1973). By using
segmentation techniques, Zacks et al. (2007) showed that humans perceive a
continuous and dynamic event as a sequence of (sub)events. For each event, we
identify discrete parts and attempt to ﬁnd their relations. According to Zacks
and Tversky (2001), this fragmented event processing reﬂects a deeper psycho-
logical reality, suggesting perception and knowledge to play an inﬂuencing role
in how events are encoded and represented in memory. This is the core prin-
ciple of the theory of event segmentation (EST; Zacks et al., 2007): it states
that the processing of events forms sensory representations that are used to
make predictions and to plan actions. EST is based on various theories on per-
ception, neurophysiology and language processing (Biber, van Dijk, & Kintsch,
1986; Carpenter, Grossberg, & Arbib, 2003; Fuster, 1991; Neisser, 1967). Zacks
et al. (2007) proposed further that processing is biased by event models; sets
of working memory representations that integrate visual, auditory, and other
sensory modalities. An observer will recognize a coherent movement pattern
that is consistent with previous observations, realize that there is a goal to the
movements and use this realization to predict future actions until the task is
near completion and prediction becomes more uncertain. When the coher-
ent movement pattern ceases, the statistical dependency is broken, and the
inference of the goal no longer has predictive value. At this point, perceptual
prediction declines, leading to the activation of the gating mechanism and to
an updating of the event model.
Event schemata are constructed of semantic memory representations, captur-
ing details of previously experienced events and storing speciﬁc information
about features, objects and agents of the event. Event schemata aﬀect the cur-
rent content of the event models with top-down processes, expanding their
eﬀective capacity by assembling predictive information about the future rele-
vance of certain features of events. This is similar to the idea of Conceptual
Semantics proposed by Jackendoﬀ (1991). According to his approach, there is a
1 Note that, in general, any ﬁndings obtained from psycholinguistic studies were not applied
primarily to specify theories of speech and text comprehension but rather to understand the
construction of mental models in human cognition (see Johnson-Laird, 1980, 1983, 1994).
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conceptual structure, a syntax, that guides the encoding of human understand-
ing of the world. Similar to an event schema in EST, the formation of a con-
ceptual structure is inﬂuenced by rules of inference, pragmatics, and heuristics
(e.g. cause-eﬀect relations). These rules are formed and applied individually,
as Jackendoﬀ (1991) insists, and to truly understand how a sentence/perception
is connected to the world, one must consider I-Semantics (the internal struc-
ture) of the reader/observer. He states further that schematization is not an in-
herent property of reality, but it is part of the psychological organization that
construes human reality. Therefore, I-semantics should cover psychological,
social, and biological contexts.
3.3 Study 2:
Internal structures and conceptual represen-
tations of events
The interaction of internal and external structures during the observation of an
event has not been researched yet. In Paper (2) we wondered about the role of
experience and expertise in the perception of soccer video material. In exper-
iment 1 (of 2) published2, we asked FIFA referees, soccer players, and novices
to watch two-part soccer clips that were manipulated. The clips either made
sense (the second part was connected causally to the ﬁrst part of the clip) or
not (second part did not match the ﬁrst part). What the participants did not
know: themoment in which the ball had contact with a player (i.e. themoment
when the ball was thrown in or kicked oﬀ) was cut. After each clip the partici-
pants received pictures (either presented in the clip or not) and were asked to
indicate which ones they had seen (yes or no).
Based on the text comprehension and event perception literature, we hypoth-
esized the following: If perceptual processing is biased by event models and
prediction mechanisms rely on experience, the perception of a dynamic event
may involve postdictive reconstructions that are not always eﬃcient. The ob-
servermay compare the current event to a previous event (learnedmodel; event
schema; conceptual structure) and weigh its plausibility to ﬁll in perceptual
2The second experiment discussed in the paper explicitly informed the participants about
the possible conditions and explicitly instructed them to pay attention to the contact moment
only. It marks a transition between Part I and Part II of this thesis. Results will be discussed at
the end of this chapter, preparing for controlled processes in the next one.
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gaps with causal content (here based on learned cause-eﬀect relations). This
has been demonstrated by Strickland and Keil (2011) whose experimental de-
signwe partially replicated. Strickland andKeil (2011) showed their participants
video clips of a person kicking a ball. Some of the videos were cut to eliminate
the actual moment of ball contact, that is, participants only saw a person run-
ning towards a ball and a ball bouncing down the ﬁeld. When asked to assign
pictures to the video clip just seen, they often believed to have seen the con-
tact moment in the clip. If they saw a person running towards a ball followed
by an unrelated clip, they were less convinced to have seen the picture of the
contact moment. The authors concluded that observers ﬁll in gaps with mean-
ingful events based on the causality of the clips, either with predictive (online)
perceptual processes or with post hoc assumptions, but both based on similar
events stored in memory.
However, there are quiet a few studies on the cognitive and perceptual skills
of experts that would lead to a diﬀerent hypothesis. Studies with chess players
have shown that novices diﬀer from experts in their perception of a chess scene
(Chase & Simon, 1973; Reingold, Charness, Pomplun, & Stampe, 2001; Reingold,
Charness, Schultetus, & Stampe, 2001). Gobet and Simon (1996) proposed that
expert chess players store their knowledge in templates that contain the suc-
cessive stages (patterns) of a possible game. Based on the idea that the visual
system is inﬂuenced by knowledge and therefore processes meaningful objects
in a scene selectively and semantically (see e.g. Chun & Jiang, 1998, 1999), Di-
dierjean and Marmèche (2005) tested professional basketball players in their
perceptual anticipation. In a ﬁrst experiment, an immediate recognition task,
the players compared two conﬁgurations of player positions presented one af-
ter another. When the second conﬁguration was diﬀerent, it was either an
expected constellation or a constellation that would have preceded the ﬁrst.
In the second experiment, a long-term recognition task, the players studied
game situations in the ﬁrst part of the experiment. Afterwards, they were asked
to recognize these constellations mixed-up with new ones that were not stud-
ied. Again, the interspersed new constellations were either a preceding con-
stellation of a known one, or a constellation that would have come afterwards.
In both experiments, experts diﬀered from novices which allows the follow-
ing conclusions: knowledge on successive stages of the game inﬂuences visual
perception as soon as the constellation was processed and experts may store
the perceptual input as well as an anticipatory memory trace. The idea of two
competing traces is also addressed in the framework of the boundary extension
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eﬀect (discussed in Paper (2)). Johnson, Hashtroudi, and Lindsay (1993) pro-
posed that source-monitoring errors occur when the reality monitoring has too
much inﬂuence (Johnson & Raye, 1981).
If we assume that the experts’ experience with the stimulus material mediates
visual perception and/or memory, we would expect performance diﬀerences in
favor of the novices. The experts performance would suﬀer from a competition
between perceptual and anticipatory (reality) traces (Didierjean & Marmèche,
2005), either online or posthoc, leading to (more) causal ﬁllings.
In general, if the processing of complex events involves an interplay of percep-
tion and cognition we would expect to ﬁnd performance diﬀerences between
the groups tested – but if the global approach to the perception of dynamic
stimuli also holds for complex events that require an understanding of seman-
tic relations, we would expect to ﬁnd no diﬀerences between the groups.
3.3. Study 2:
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Seeing the unseen? Illusory causal filling
in FIFA referees, players, and novices
Alisa Brockhoff*, Markus Huff*, Annika Maurer and Frank Papenmeier
Abstract
Humans often falsely report having seen a causal link between two dynamic scenes if the second scene depicts a
valid logical consequence of the initial scene. As an example, a video clip shows someone kicking a ball including the
ball flying. Even if the video clip omitted the moment of contact (i.e., the causal link), participants falsely report having
seen this moment. In the current study, we explored the interplay of cognitive-perceptual expertise and event
perception by measuring the false-alarm rates of three groups with differing interests in football (soccer in North
America) (novices, players, and FIFA referees). We used the event-completion paradigm with video footage of a real
football match, presenting either complete clips or incomplete clips (i.e., with the contact moment omitted). Either a
causally linked scene or an incoherent scene followed a cut in the incomplete videos. Causally linked scenes induced
false recognitions in all three groups: although the ball contact moment was not presented, participants indicated
that they had seen the contact as frequently when it was absent as in the complete condition. In a second
experiment, we asked the novices to detect the ball contact moment when it was either visible or not and when it
was either followed by a causally or non-causally linked scene. Here, instead of presenting pictures of the clip, the
participants were give a two-alternative forced-choice task: “Yes, contact was visible”, or “No, contact was not visible”.
The results of Experiment 1 indicate that conceptual interpretations of simple events are independent of expertise:
there were no top-down effects on perception. Participants in Experiment 2 detected the ball contact moment
significantly more often correctly in the non-causal than in the causal conditions, indicating that the effect observed
in Experiment 1 was not due to a possibly influential design (e.g., inducing a false memory for the presented pictures).
The theoretical as well as the practical implications are discussed.
Keywords: Expertise influences, Event perception, Dynamic scenes, Causal fillings
Abbreviations: CI, confidence intervals; EST, Event segmentation theory
Significance
The current work is, to our knowledge, the first to com-
bine a study of perceptual-cognitive skills with event
perception and it is, therefore, mainly of an explorative
nature. We took theoretical research out into the real
world and investigated the role of top-down factors on
event completion by testing three groups with a differing
level of interest and experience (novices, players, and FIFA
referees) on a simple event-completion task (Strickland
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Department of Psychology, Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, Schleichstr. 4,
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& Keil, 2011). Although there is considerable evidence
that expertise in sports domains is connected to superior
perceptual-cognitive skills, our results indicate no influ-
ence of these skills on event perception. They rather sup-
port a recent publication by Firestone and Scholl (2015b),
who concluded that perception may be largely indepen-
dent of top-down influences. Such a proposition not only
challenges our theoretical understanding of event percep-
tion, but also has substantive practical implications for
fairness in sports by strongly advocating the increased use
of technology instead of perceptual training programs for
match officials.
© 2016 The Author(s). Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the
Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
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Background
During the FIFA World Cup tournament in 2010, the
referees made many controversial calls that influenced
the outcomes of matches so tremendously that the then-
FIFA president apologized for the referees’ mistakes. In
response, the use of goal-line technologies was officially
allowed in 2012, which since have become more and more
common at the very top levels of the game. The current
study was inspired by a controversial goal that happened
in a Bundesliga match in 2013, a match in which no
goal-line technology was used. The ball went through a
hole in the side netting and everyone, including the ref-
erees, mistook it for an actual goal. This rare phantom
goal demonstrated the limits and biases of human percep-
tion. Such a phantom goal is even more surprising in the
light of numerous studies that reported experts to have
superior domain-specific perceptual-cognitive skills (e.g.,
Williams, 2000), an expertise that even leads to an advan-
tage in motion outside the expert’s area (e.g., Romeas &
Faubert, 2015). Vision and perception are shaped by one’s
individual experiences and knowledge: the mental rep-
resentations of events. Such representations are recon-
structed and updated through experience and knowledge
and provide the basis for understanding the world around
us (Zacks & Tversky, 2001). However, constant recon-
struction and updating of mental representations make
event perception effortful and, thus, fragile. Strickland
and Keil (2011) reported a (possibly consequential) bias in
event perception: the event-completion effect. Video clips
that indicated a causal implication (example sequence: an
athlete running towards a ball – cut – a flying ball) pro-
duced higher false-alarm rates for pictures displaying the
athlete kicking the ball than video clips that did not imply
any causation. The authors suggested that observers either
confused online predictions (the ball will be kicked and
will bounce down the field) with actually seen elements
of the scene, or relied on schema- or principle-based post
hoc inferences (a ball bouncing down a field must have
been kicked).
Perceptual-cognitive expertise
A number of studies have reported that expert athletes
show superior perceptual-cognitive skills compared to
novices in sport-specific tasks, including visual cue usage
(Abernethy, Gill, Parks, & Packer, 2001; Ward, Williams,
& Bennett, 2002; Williams, 2000), visual search strate-
gies (Vaeyens, Lenoir, Williams, & Philippaerts, 2007;
Williams, 2000), and recall and recognition of meaning-
ful patterns (Bell, Boshuizen, Scherpbier, & Dornan, 2009;
Lesgold et al., 1988; Reingold & Sheridan, 2011; Smeeton,
Ward, & Williams, 2004). In general, experts’ demonstra-
tion of perceptual-cognitive expertise can go beyond the
specific sports domain (Romeas & Faubert, 2015; Romeas,
Guldner, & Faubert, 2016) and can help, for example, in
learning complex neutral dynamic scenes (Faubert, 2013)
or to outperform novices in everyday tasks (e.g., crossing
a street as a pedestrian in a crowded inner city: Chaddock,
Neider, Voss, Gaspar, & Kramer, 2011).While the majority
of the reported studies intended to identify the excep-
tional perceptual-cognitive skills of experts by focusing
on pattern recognition, decision-making, or biological
motion perception, mainly aiming to create training pro-
grams or prevent incidents that result in injuries, the cur-
rent paper is interested in a fundamental understanding of
experts’ perception, or memory, of events.
Hypotheses
In the current study, we conceptually replicated the design
by Strickland and Keil (2011) and tested two expert
groups (football players and FIFA referees) and a control
group (students with no interest in football). We won-
dered whether the perceptual-cognitive skills of experts
would prevent the event-completion effect when observ-
ing familiar motion. Based on the currently most promi-
nent model of event perception, the event segmentation
theory (EST; Zacks, Speer, Swallow, Braver, & Reynolds,
2007), prediction errors occur and an event boundary
is perceived when certain event features change (e.g.,
situational features such as spatial location and charac-
ters: Zacks, Speer, & Reynolds, 2009). If online predictions
of experts are more detailed, it may be more likely that the
missing ball contact is actually reported to be perceived as
a missing situational feature in the schema, and, thus, not
perceptually filled in. More specifically, a more detailed
representation would result in a lower false-alarm rate in
referees and players.
We do have reason to hypothesize that the superior
perceptual-cognitive skills of experts could prevent the
event-completion effect since they may process visual
information not only qualitatively but also quantitatively
differently, but the opposite could be the case as well.
Mann, Williams, Ward, and Janelle (2007) analyzed eye
movements of experts and novices and revealed that the
skilled performers required fewer fixations of longer dura-
tion to gather relevant information, compared to novices,
who made many short fixations. Thus, novices consider
the potential influence of all available visual information
while experts concentrate on the relevant information by
perceiving the multidimensional complexity of the situ-
ation (further examples are in Haider & Frensch, 1996;
Hattie, 2003; North &Williams, 2008). Expertise was also
shown to allow for a more efficient switch of attentional
foci. Underwood, Chapman, Brocklehurst, Underwood,
and Crundall (2003) observed that the scan paths during
driving differ depending on the expertise of the driver.
Novices were not able to switch their focus of attention as
a response to potential hazards, while experts constantly
monitored other road users. In the current study, the
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hardwired event schemata of experts could actually lead to
a stronger bias if the ball contact is considered irrelevant
information in the representation of the event. Or stated
differently, novices may have a more detailed schema of
the event (e.g., a ball kick) because, in their lives, there is
no need for them to condense the schema for more effi-
cient processing. Referees, however, have to make 3 or 4
decisions in eachminute of the actual play time (Williams,
2013) and, thus, they benefit significantly from filtering
visual information rigorously. On the other hand, experts
may have a more detailed schema than a novice due to
frequent exposure and the ability to switch their focus
of attention if needed. However, based on the EST, this
again would result in a stronger event-completion effect.
If experts have a rather global observational approach to
familiar scenes, they may even have event models that
account for missing information and changes in visual
information. The missing ball contact may then not be
surprising; therefore, it may not be detected as an error,
and will, thus, not result in the perception of an event
boundary but in an event-completion effect. Finally, it is
also possible that there are simply no top-down effects of
cognition on perception as recently claimed by Firestone
and Scholl (2015b). The two authors carefully reviewed
hundreds of studies and extracted general (design) pit-
falls of each approach to study the effect of cognition on
attention. We will discuss our results with regard to the
two disparate but interrelated systems of perception and
memory.
Experimental overview
To ensure that we really tested perceptual-cognitive differ-
ences in event perception – and not declarative knowledge
and analysis skills – we intentionally used video clips of
dynamic events that did not require knowledge of the
game, depicting actions that definitely have been observed
by each participant before, independent of their level
of interest in football. We cut out scenes from a real
match, including corner kicks, kick-offs, free kicks, and
throw-ins. In Experiment 1, we conceptually replicated
the design of Strickland and Keil (2011) and presented
the participants with (1) the complete sequences (i.e.,
including the contact moment), (2) an incomplete causal
sequence (i.e., excluding the ball contact), or (3) an incom-
plete non-causal sequence (i.e., excluding the ball contact
with a non-logical follow-up; example sequence: player
about to throw the ball in – cut – a different player
being fouled). However, note that our restricted sample
of experts did not allow us to run a between-subject
design as was done in the original study. To ensure that
our design would not alert the participants to the pur-
pose of the event, we left out one condition: a visible ball
contact that was followed by a non-causal scene. In Exper-
iment 2, we further controlled the design by showing
video clips that either included or excluded a ball contact.
Participants were fully informed about the probabilities
of each clip type occurring (50 %) and were given a
forced choice of the two alternatives (ball contact seen:
yes or no). The latter inevitably brought in the aspect of
attentional control by “knowing what to look for”; how-
ever, it helped us to understand further at which point
of information processing the bias has its origin. We are
aware, however, that our (or any) design may not be
able to grasp the fine line between perception, memory,
and post-perceptual judgment. Our results will be dis-
cussed with a focus on the event-completion effect and
its occurrence in different groups. Any interpretation con-
cerning perception or memory has to be regarded with
caution.
Methods
Stimuli were presented on 15.4-inch notebooks using Psy-
chPy (Peirce, 2008). The participants were seated at a
distance of 60 cm from the screen. Footage of a soccer
match of the Young Boys Bern against the Grasshoppers
Zürich that took place on 23 March 2014 was used as
stimulus material. The footage was compiled out of three
camera perspectives. Clips of about 20 seconds each were
created. Each clip consisted of two parts shot from differ-
ent camera angles. The assignment of clips to conditions
was balanced across participants in each experiment. In
general, the two parts of each clip were causally linked or
not (Fig. 1c or d), and the ball release or contact (kick)
moment1 (Fig. 1b) was visible or not. Figure 1 depicts
example sequences.
In Experiment 1, we conceptually replicated the design
by Strickland and Keil (2011) and used the following com-
binations of video clips (see Fig. 1): complete (A–B–C) vs
incomplete causal (A–C) vs incomplete non-causal (A–
D).2 In Experiment 2, the basic idea of the design was
similar; however, we measured only the detection rate
of the contact moment and further added a condition
in which the ball contact (B) was visible in non-causal
sequences as well (A–B–D). In Experiment 1, each partic-
ipant saw seven response pictures (see Strickland & Keil,
2011) after each clip. Three pictures were selected from
the first part of each clip (a yes filler), three pictures were
related to the yes-filler items but came from other parts
of the game, such as other players preparing for a cor-
ner kick (a no filler), and the critical picture depicted the
moment of ball contact or ball release (contact). The par-
ticipants were asked whether they had seen the picture in
the clip: Yes (“press 1”) or No (“press 9”). See Fig. 2 for the
response pictures for the example sequences (Fig. 1). Fur-
ther, they were asked to rate how certain they were about
their answer (on a scale from 1, not at all, to 5, extremely).
In Experiment 2, we showed the participants 40 clips
and asked whether they had seen the ball contact moment
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aa b c
d
abc
a  c
a  d
Fig. 1 Example sequences (pictures). a First part of the clip. b Ball release/contact moment. c Second part of the clip: causally linked scenes. d
Second part of the clip: not causally linked scenes
(B in Fig. 1). Instead of response pictures (Fig. 2), we
gave the participants forced-choice alternatives: “Yes, I
have seen the ball contact” and “No, I have not seen the
ball contact”. The experiment was conducted as a mixed
2 (ball contact visible, within) × 2 (second part of the
clip: causal or non-causal, between) subject design. We
measured the sensitivity to the contact moments as d′
and response criterion c (see Experiment 2 for further
details).3
An expertise questionnaire tested basic declarative foot-
ball knowledge using 11 questions, for example, “In
which country did the last FIFA World Cup take place?”
(see Additional file 1: Appendix for a complete list of
questions).
Statistical analysis
In Experiment 1, we report expertise knowledge, propor-
tion correct, proportion of yes answers, and confidence
in the recognition test as separate dependent variables.
Because of the binary response variable (yes or no), we
analyzed effects on proportion correct and proportion
of yes answers with a generalized mixed effect model
(with a logit link), using the lme4 package (Bates, Sarkar,
Bates, & Matrix, 2007; Pinheiro, Bates, DebRoy, & Sarkar,
Fig. 2 Example response pictures. 1: Contact, 2: yes filler (selected from the first part of the clip), 3: no filler (not in the clip)
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2006) in the R environment (R Development Core Team,
2016). Participants were specified as the random factor
to control for their associated intraclass correlation. We
present the type IIWald χ2 test results fromGLMER. Fur-
ther, we provide the results of planned contrasts (based
on our hypotheses and the original study’s results). Addi-
tionally, the credibility of the found null effect and the
likelihood of the occurrence of the null and the alterna-
tive hypotheses are presented with Bayesian statistics and
JASP (JASP Team, 2016). In Experiment 2, we report the
sensitivity measure d′.
Experiment 1: Conceptual replication of the original study
with groups with different expertise levels
Method
Participants Three groups of participants were tested on
three different occasions. There were 42 novices (14 male
and 28 female students, age M = 25.76, SD = 6.81 years),
16 football players of a seventh German football league
(all male, age M = 24.81, SD = 3.64 years), and 18 refer-
ees from Switzerland appointed as officials for matches in
competitions organized by the Fédération Internationale
de Football Association (FIFA) (all male, age M = 32.2,
SD = 4.93 years). Two referees were excluded because
they retired from their active positions as official FIFA
referees. The students tested participated in return for
monetary compensation or course credits. The football
players were students of the University of Tuebingen’s
department of sports science and their participation was a
course requirement. The referees participated during one
of their regular advanced training courses and were not
compensated monetarily.
Design and procedure The first part of each clip was
between 11.6 and 15.1 seconds long. A keeper during a
kick-off was depicted in three clips, a throw-in in one
clip, a corner kick in three clips, and a free kick in two
clips. A clip was either shown completely or shortened by
the removal of the moment of ball contact (kick) or ball
release (throw-in). We deleted 1–4 frames; however, the
deletion for causal and non-causal clips was always exactly
the same. The second part of the clip lasted between 5.7
and 8.4 seconds. Each participant saw nine clips spread
equally across three conditions: complete first part with
causally linked second part (complete), shortened first
part with causally linked second part (incomplete with
causally linked sequence), or shortened first part with sec-
ond part that was not causally linked (incomplete with
non-causally linked sequence). See Fig. 1, combinations
A–B–C, A–C, and A–D. The experiment reported here
took 15 minutes. The participants received instructions
and immediately started with the event-completion task.
After each clip, seven response pictures (Strickland &Keil,
2011) were shown (see Fig. 2).
Results
Expertise knowledge We calculated the proportion of
correctly answered questions. The football players’ declar-
ative football knowledge was significantly higher com-
pared to the novices’ (M = .86, SD = .34 and M = .51,
SD = .50, respectively): t(50.83) = 10.70, p < .001. We
regarded the referees’ football knowledge as a precondi-
tion for their FIFA employment and did not test them on
the questionnaire.
Proportion correct We analyzed participants’ perfor-
mance in the recognition test. Because the critical contact
itemwas a target item in the complete condition and a dis-
tractor item in the remaining two conditions, we excluded
this item from this analysis. We calculated the proportion
of correctly answered questions and fitted a generalized
mixed effect model with the binary dependent variable
yes/no answers. Expertise was inserted as the fixed effect,
and participants were specified as the random factor.
The factor expertise was significant [χ2(2) = 17.621 and
p < .01]. Post-hoc Tukey comparisons helped to spec-
ify the difference between the three groups of expertise.
As can be seen in Fig. 3, the two expert groups outper-
formed the novices: for players vs novices z = 3.33 and p
< .01, and for referees vs novices z = 3.254 and p < .01.
We observed no differences between the players’ and the
referees’ performance (z = 0.06, p = .99).
Proportion of yes answers. We analyzed the effects on
the binary dependent variable (yes/no answers) with a
generalized linear mixed model (with a logit link), using
the lme4 package in the R environment. Participants were
specified as a random factor to control for their associated
intraclass correlation. We used the raw data and fitted a
Fig. 3 Performance in the recognition test (excluding the critical
contact item) as a function of expertise. Error bars represent the
standard error of the mean
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model including all main effects and interactions of exper-
tise, item type, and condition as fixed effects. We analyzed
the resulting model using type II Wald χ2 tests.
Our main finding is a significant two-way interaction of
condition and item type [χ2(4) = 11.52 and p= .021]. The
three-way interaction of expertise, condition, and item
type was not significant [χ2(8) = 6.91 and p = .546].
Further, there was a significant main effect of item type
[χ2(2) = 1262.00 and p < .001], and a significant inter-
action of expertise and item type [χ2(4) = 41.05 and
p < .001]. None of the other main effects and interac-
tions reached significance , p > .17. While the proportion
of yes answers in the non-causal condition was signifi-
cantly lower (as expected), it should be noted that the
false-alarm rate was still over chance level. However, our
findings are in line with the results found in the original
study by Strickland and Keil (Strickland and Keil 2011).
See Fig. 4a for the analyzed proportions in each expertise
group.
To investigate the interactive relationship of the two
categorical variables condition and item type, we calcu-
lated contrasts. The underlying glmer model was now
reduced (see Fig. 4b for the aggregated data used) and
did not include expertise anymore, since the given exper-
tise level (novice, player, or referee) did not interact with
condition*item type (non-significant three-way interac-
tion reported above). To prevent α inflation at this level of
the analysis, a Bonferroni correction (0.05/3 = 0.016) for
multiple comparisons was applied. Further insights into
the variability of the (log) mean difference between the
observed answers are given with 95 % confidence intervals
(CI).
As expected, two of the three contrasts produced sig-
nificant results. The number of yes answers (i.e., the
number of reports indicating that the contact moment
had been seen) in the condition with implied causation
(causal) differed significantly (z = 22.21 and p < .001)
from the number of yes answers in the condition without
implied condition (non-causal), with an estimated (log)
mean difference of 4.03, CI [3.60, 4.46]. The non-causal
incomplete condition also differed significantly from the
condition in which the ball contact was included (com-
plete condition), z = 16.51 and p < .001 (estimated
difference = 3.95, CI [3.52, 4.38]). The contrast of the
causal vs the complete condition was not significant,
z = 0.73 and p = 0.75 (estimated difference = 0.15, CI
[−0.36, 0.68]).
Bayesian statistics We calculated a Bayes factor anal-
ysis for the proportion of yes answers to the contact
items in the no causal implication and the conditions
with causal implication. The Bayes factor evidence for the
null hypothesis in a Bayesian repeated measures ANOVA
comparing a model that included the main effects of
condition (with causal implication or no causal implica-
tion) and expertise (novices, players, and referees) with a
model including additionally the interaction of these fac-
tors amounted to 4.99, which is conventionally classified
as substantial (Rouder, Morey, Speckman, & Province,
2012; Wetzels &Wagenmakers, 2012).
Confidence A repeated measures ANOVA was per-
formed with confidence as the dependent variable (see
Fig. 5). We observed a significant main effect of exper-
tise [F(2, 71) = 10.27 and p < .001]. Players’ and ref-
erees’ confidence was significantly higher than novices’
confidence , p < .004. Again, there was no difference
between players and referees (p = .501). Further, we
observed a significant main effect of item type [F(2,142)
= 27.20 and p < .001], indicating that confidence was
higher for the no-filler items compared to the contact
items and the yes-filler items , p < .003. The interac-
tion of item type and condition approached significance
[F(2,142) = 2.42 and p = .049]. In this context, however,
we observed no significant differences between the differ-
ent conditions with regard to the contact item responses,
p >= .247.
Discussion
To capture online perceptual performance errors, we pre-
sented video clips that implied causation (or not) and
asked the participants afterwards whether they had seen
certain pictures (or not). While overall performance (pro-
portion correct) was higher for experts than for novices,
all participants were prone to the event-completion effect
(analyzed with the proportion of yes answers). Further-
more, we measured confidence rating to examine whether
experts show illusionary superiority biases (observed as a
coping mechanism for stress and self-esteem protection
in referees; e.g., Wolfson & Neave, 2007). We observed
higher confidence ratings in the referee and the player
groups compared to the novices – however, they actu-
ally performed better, thus, showing an actual superior-
ity instead of an illusionary superiority bias. This was
expected based on the experts’ superior recall and recog-
nition of meaningful patterns and details (Bell et al., 2009;
Lesgold et al., 1988; Reingold & Sheridan, 2011; Smeeton
et al., 2004). The results of the present study replicate the
event-completion effect measured in the original study by
Strickland and Keil (2011). The results exemplify how the
human information processing system struggles with per-
ceiving and recalling details of an everyday life event. We
found these difficulties to be independent of task-specific
expertise, suggesting that on a certain basic perceptual
level, if presented with a simple action event, humans
equally chunk or segment continuous activity, resulting in
the representation of a series of discrete events (Newtson,
1973) – a process that allows for online and post-hoc
3.3. Study 2:
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Fig. 4 Proportion of yes answers. a Proportion of yes answers for each expertise level as a function of condition (complete, no causal implication, with
causal implication). b Aggregated proportions of yes answers as used in the contrast analysis. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean
inferences, and illusory causal fillings. However, before we
interpret these results further, we need to ensure that the
effect found is not due to the study instructions, which
may have biased the participants to assume ball contact.
Participants may have assumed they had seen contact
because they did not know that omitted contact moments
were an option.
The question remains whether the observed event-
completion effect is a phenomenon based on online pre-
dictions or rather the result of backwards mapping, an
effect known from text comprehension research (e.g.,
Potts, Keenan, & Golding, 1988). Although, backwards
mapping was originally used to explain anticipation pro-
cesses during text comprehension, its adaption to causal
Fig. 5 Confidence rating as a function of condition and expertise. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean
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fillings in event perception is straightforward: partici-
pants base their decisions of a recognition item at the
very moment of presentation and check if the picture is
a plausible cause of what they have already watched. In
other words, a contact picture would be a plausible, and
natural, cause of a video clip that showed a football player
approaching a ball.
Experiment 2: contact – yes or no?
In a detection experiment, we presented participants with
complete and incomplete stimuli with causal and non-
causal continuation and asked them to indicate whether
they had seen the contact moment or not. This may
prevent backwards mapping because participants “know
what to look for” before the presentation of the video
clip. Further, without recognition items (pictures), the par-
ticipants are less prone to picture-based biases, which
allows us to measure participants’ discrimination perfor-
mance in the non-causal and causal conditions. If the
event-completion effect is primarily a phenomenon based
on online predictions, participants’ discrimination perfor-
mance should be lower in the causal compared to the
non-causal condition.
Method
Participants Altogether, 32 students of the University of
Tuebingen (7 male and 25 female students, ageM = 23.16
years, SD= 4.61) participated in the experiment in return
for course credits or monetary compensation. Of these,
17 participants were assigned to the causal and 15 to the
non-causal condition. We excluded from the analysis one
participant who did not understand the task. Thus, 17 in
the causal and 14 participants in the non-causal condition
entered the final analysis.
Design and procedure Then 40 video clips were shown
either as complete clips or with the ball contact excluded.
The first part of each clip was between 1.4 and 15 seconds
long. The clips were either causally connected or not (see
“General method”). We always deleted four frames before
the ball contact frame, resulting in a deletion of 160ms in
both incomplete conditions (the presentation rate of each
clip was 25 frames per second). The second part of the clip
was between 1.2 and 6.3 seconds long.4 Clips consisted
of 14 kick-offs, 5 corners, 13 throw-ins, and 8 free kicks.
Participants received specific information on the proba-
bility that the ball contact was visible (50 %). Further, they
saw a process graphic of a matchstick man approaching
a ball and kicking it so that they knew what “ball contact
moment” or “moment of ball release” meant. The sug-
gested experiment has been conducted as a mixed 2 (ball
contact visible, within-subject manipulation) × 2 (second
part of the clip: causal or non-causal, order was balanced
between groups) design.
Results
We report sensitivity (d′) and response criterion (c) from
signal detection theory as dependent variables (Green &
Swets, 1966). Yes answers to clips depicting the release
moment (complete conditions) were counted as hits and
yes answers to clips not depicting the release moment
(incomplete condition) were counted as false alarms.
Finally, we aggregated the data on the participant level and
calculated separate independent sample t-tests for d′ and
c. Because d′ and c are not defined for hit rates and false-
alarm rates of 1.0 and 0.0, we adjusted such values to half
a trial incorrect or half a trial correct, respectively.
Sensitivity Sensitivity (d′) was well above chance (d′ =
0) and was significantly higher in the non-causal (M =
2.75, SD = 0.59) compared to the causal condition (M
= 1.44, SD = 1.15), t(29) = 4.08, p < .001. Thus, this
supports the hypothesis that participants’ online per-
ception was distorted by the causal continuation of the
scene.
Response bias We did not observe a statistically signifi-
cant difference between the non-causal (M = −0.09, SD
= 0.32) and the causal condition (M = −0.20, SD = 0.38)
with regard to the response criterion (c), t(29) = 0.88 and
p = .388.
Discussion
We observed lower discrimination performance in the
group of participants who saw the causal sequel compared
to the group of participants who were presented with
non-causal sequences. Thus, these findings support the
hypothesis that the causal continuation actually changed
participants’ perceptions. A (cautious) explanation of this
finding refers to EST (Zacks et al., 2007). According to
EST, participants’ perceptions are based on predictions.
For a non-causal continuation, these predictions fail and
participants perceive an event boundary. As a conse-
quence, participants’ representations of this moment are
more precise compared to the condition with non-causal
continuation in which predictions were not violated and
participants did not perceive an event boundary.
General discussion
The present study was interested in the interplay of cog-
nitive and perceptual processes in experts compared to
novices. The main objective was to study the appearance
of the event-completion effect in groups with different
cognitive-perceptual training. However, our results also
give us an idea of how internal schema-based systems
and external sensory input processing may result in an
automatic completion of events. The results reported here
allow a number of interesting implications.
3.3. Study 2:
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Theoretical implications for event perception
The current most prominent model of event perception is
EST (Zacks et al., 2007). EST is based on various theories
of perception, neurophysiology, and language processing
(Carpenter, Grossberg, & Arbib, 2003; Fuster, 1990; Van
Dijk, Kintsch, & Van Dijk, 1983). A fundamental prin-
ciple of EST states that the processing of events forms
sensory representations that are influenced by experi-
ence and knowledge. Event schemata affect the current
content of the event models with top-down processes,
expanding their effective capacity by assembling predic-
tive information about the future relevance of certain
features of events. When certain event features change
(e.g., situational features such as spatial location and
characters; Zacks et al., 2009), prediction errors occur
and an event boundary is perceived. Regarding EST, our
results could be explained with an error-detection mech-
anism that operates on a temporal buffer holding a given
number of causal snapshots (Wood, 2011). The error-
detection mechanism constantly checks whether online
predictions based on working memory representations of
the ongoing event are fulfilled. Transient increases in the
violation of predictions (Zacks et al., 2009) make the cur-
rent event model useless and in need of an update. As our
results suggest, one missing snapshot of an event (implied
causation condition) does not automatically trigger an
event update because enough predictions of the event are
fulfilled. Clip sequences that did not imply causality may
have activated an error-detection mechanism and trig-
gered event boundary perception processes. The original
EST model describes event models as a stable represen-
tation that can only be reset or updated based on the
current perceptual information available when the error-
detection mechanism opens the gate. Error detection may
also play an important part in the actual perception of
events: the comparable number of yes answers for contact
items and causal yes-filler items in our data implies that
the event-completion effect is nurtured by the sensitivity
of the error-detection mechanism. In other words, the
more prediction errors the error monitoring allows, the
more illusory causal fillings will happen. Importantly,
our data suggest that expertise does not influence event
perception. That indicates that top-down processes do
not influence the simple mechanisms of online prediction
and error detection as much as is assumed in the EST
(Zacks et al., 2007). This top-down component, however,
is largely underspecified in EST. Zacks and colleagues
write: “This claim is based largely on parsimony and
may need to be revised in the future” (Zacks et al., 2007,
p. 275). At least for our stimulus material with sim-
ple structured events, the idea of an unaffected gating
mechanism is in line with Firestone and Scholl (2015b):
there are no top-down effects of cognition on
perception.
Top-down effects and the locus of contextual biases
Did the participants in our studies actually see (falsely
perceive) or did they simply report to have seen (falsely
remember) the ball contact? The presented studies
applied a recognition and detection test to explore the
event-completion effect. However, as recently suggested
by Firestone and Scholl (in press), there is a great dif-
ference between seeing and recognizing. Any top-down
effect measured can be due to an influence on front-end
visual processing but equally likely be due to back-end
memory. In the current paper, we communicated a ten-
dency to define the event-completion effect as due to an
error that occurs in perception rather than in memory.
Although we do not have clear evidence for either involve-
ment, the results of Experiment 2 (in which we decreased
the possible memory biases due to backwards mapping)
do indicate that the effect is partly due to online percep-
tional processes. We were further biased by the majority
of results found in the literature that connect memory
to experience. As memory fades due to brain damage or
aging, representations become increasingly changed by
preexisting knowledge. Especially popular is that patients
with Alzheimer’s tend to falsely remember details, words,
or events that they actually did not experience (confab-
ulation: e.g., Tallberg & Almkvist, 2001). However, expe-
rience and expertise did not influence the appearance
of the event-completion effect. Thus, reversing the argu-
ment, our results could show that the event-completion
effect cannot be an error in memory, because then
we would have found differences between the expertise
groups.
In a recent paper (Firestone & Scholl, 2015a), the
authors discuss semantic (language) priming, universally
understood as an effect on memory (Collins & Loftus,
1975) that may have been mistaken for top-down effects
on visual processing in various studies. In semantic prim-
ing, reading a word such as “peach” lowers the thresh-
old for related fruits in memory and they will be pro-
cessed faster than an unrelated word. Language and event
perception are closely related: much of what we know
about our understanding of events comes from stud-
ies that asked participants to describe an event in their
own words. For example, with such a linguistic account,
Talmy (1975) was able to define the building blocks of
motion events. However, it may be possible that the
observed language structure does not only reflect how
we perceive event units, but could be a general reflec-
tion of the preferred global-over-local approach of the
human brain (e.g., Fink et al., 1996). If we assume that
the activation of related words is comparable to the acti-
vation of related event models in memory (allowing for
faster access to different scenarios and faster process-
ing of related visual details), our null findings would
again point towards a bias on the perceptual level. The
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wealth of experienced scenarios of the event should have
activated a broader spectrum of experienced content in
the experts, which should have resulted in differences
between the three groups due to differences in memory
activations. Firestone and Scholl (2015a) further proposed
that it is possible to distinguish memory and percep-
tion clearly in practice. This seems to be a bold pro-
posal since false memories (here, an error of commission)
can be elicited within 1/20th of a second (Intraub &
Dickinson, 2008). Intraub and Dickinson (2008) report
a constructive error in scene representation, the bound-
ary extension, in which observers falsely remember an
image that is shown beyond the edges of the previ-
ously encountered view. When the first item is presented
without a scenic structure, boundary extension does not
occur (Intraub, Gottesman, & Bills, 1998). They pro-
pose that boundary extension is the result of a source-
monitoring error (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993)
with a strong influence of a reality-monitoring error
(Johnson & Raye, 1981). The error happens when the
human brain has to distinguish between internally gen-
erated information (experience with certain structures)
and externally generated information (sensory input). The
authors suggest that the rapidity of such a boundary
extension error is advantageous rather than harmful; it
shows how the visual system incorporates fleeting views
of images with spurious boundaries into a coherent rep-
resentation of the world around us. The rapidity of the
error may further imply that perception and memory are
two processing systems of the same underlying cognitive
mechanism.
Our data could be explained as the result of a distinction
error between internally and externally generated infor-
mation. Disregarding the traditional distinction of false
memories and visual illusions and assuming an extraor-
dinary fast engagement of both during the processing
of visual input, the observed null effect of expertise in
our experiment may be the result of an imbalance of
weighted sources. The externally generated information
processing of experts may be more efficient and more
detailed; however, the internally generated information
outperforms sensory input due to the system’s need to
embed the event into known reality. Experiment 2 further
reflects the weight of the reality source. Here, partici-
pants knew precisely what would be tested in each trial
and were prepared to answer a specific question. Con-
scious awareness is needed to be able to report whether
the stimulus was visible or not (Lamme, 2003), but even in
such an enhanced state of target processing, the internally
generated source overruled the external sensory input,
resulting in decreased sensitivity for the detection of the
ball contact moment in causally linked scenes. For the
current design, the ideas mentioned above are pure spec-
ulations and may be regarded as such. Future research
could be concerned with whether expertise influences the
level (global or local) of event processing. For example,
Beaucousin et al. (2011) recorded event-related potentials
and reported that the meaningfulness of an object influ-
ences global and local information. They assumed that
knowledge about the world influences the global and
local levels of processing. Comparing the performance of
experts and novices on meaningful and non-meaningful
patterns would help us to understand better the early
stages of processing.
In addition, it would be interesting to see whether
experts compared to novices structure events differently,
measured as event segments indicated with a button press
by participants. Asmemory distortions can happenwithin
50ms (Intraub & Dickinson, 2008), behavioral measure-
ments may not be able to grasp the difference between
memory and perception (if there is any). To really answer
such a question, functional neuroimaging procedures are
advisable.
Practical implications
The present findings have a serious impact on the fair-
ness of the game. A red card may be based simply on two
single observations that perceptual processes have falsely
interconnected in a causal manner: player A approached
player B and player B got hurt. The match official may
be absolutely certain that they had seen a contact, but
it may have been an event-completion effect. The top
Dutch football league (Eredivisie), therefore, employs a
video referee who observes video replays of the game
to help the referees on the field with tricky decisions.
However, since many believe that the human element of
sports is lost when technologies are used, eliminating,
for example, the “enjoyment of debating mistakes” (Kelso,
2010), chances are rather low that other European foot-
ball leagues will follow the example of the Dutch. Even
in the presence of technology, the importance of the per-
ceptual and cognitive skills of match officials is, thus, not
reduced.
Limitations
It needs to be taken into account, however, that we aimed
to test basic perceptual processes and can, thus, speak
only about the organization of the mind when it is faced
with simple events. The perception of complex events
may nonetheless be influenced by domain-specific exper-
tise. For example, when presented with a deliberate dive,
novices may not be able to differentiate between whether
it was a real foul or a fake fall by the player. The cognitive-
perceptual excellence and the so-called intuitive skills of
an expert to analyze such an incident may be based on
a highly sensitive error-detection mechanism. Such ideas,
however, will require theoretical and empirical develop-
ment beyond the scope of this article. Left unknown is
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still whether memory or perception is responsible for the
effect.
Conclusions
In conclusion, the results of the present study demon-
strated a short-cut of the human information-processing
system to deal with missing information when faced with
causally linked video sequences: the event-completion
effect. We explored basic processes that may be biased
by an imbalance in external and internal source weighing,
based on the similarity found for three groups of expertise.
This indicates that the influence of higher cognitive pro-
cesses in the observation of simple action events may be
overruled by the human need to make sense of the world
and the need to embed an event into a known structure.
Bearing in mind that we tested referees who had
achieved the highest qualification level and who offici-
ated at international FIFA matches, it is fair to surmise
that the event-completion effect for simple events is hard-
wired. Perceptual training programs that focus on external
sensory input to prevent causal fillings of events will be
difficult to design. Finally, the observed effect illustrates
impressively that, without further game technology in the
future, football players, fans, coaches, and journalists do
not have to worry about losing the drama and the thrill of
being defrauded by the human brain’s biases.
Endnotes
1Note that we use the term contact moment through-
out the rest of the paper to refer to both the kicking and
releasing of the ball.
2Note that we present only one experiment event even
though there were two. However, the hypotheses and the
design were completely unrelated to the goal of this work
and will be analyzed and published independently.
3Note that a between-subject design was reported in the
original study but was not feasible in Experiment 1 due to
the small sample of referees and time constraints during
testing. In Experiment 2, we asked students to partici-
pate in the laboratory. Thus, using a between-design was
possible and, additionally, allowed us to ensure that par-
ticipants could not guess the purpose of the experiment
when seeing both critical conditions.
4Note that the length of the second part of the clip
was a natural consequence of the events happening in the
footage of the match and not an intentional manipulation.
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3.4 Explaining the results with the event horizon
model
The discussion of Paper (2) does not reﬂect the diversity of approaches that
were developed to understand event perception. At this point, one should at
least mention the event horizon model (Radvansky & Zacks, 2011) as a possi-
ble answer to the remaining question: why do participants in our study re-
member details on the course of actions better in non-causal sequences even
though the non-causal part elicited the perception of an event boundary? The
EST proposes an attentional gating mechanisms that can enhance processing
at event boundaries. However, many studies showed that experts outperform
novices in (trained) attentional tasks (e.g. Bellenkes, Wickens, & Kramer, 1997;
Green & Bavelier, 2003). For example, highly skilled soccer and basketball play-
ers beneﬁted from ﬁxating on fewer locations than novices (Helsen & Pauwels,
1993); also learned ﬁxation patterns and a focused gaze that can draw more
information from fewer ﬁxations are thought to characterize experts (Hender-
son & Hollingworth, 1999), as well as a greater breadth of attention that allows
soccer players to encode additional information (Williams, Davids, Burwitz, &
Williams, 1994). Hence, an attentional gating mechanism may not catch the
true reason for the null eﬀect found for level of expertise in our experiment.
Pettijohn and Radvansky (2016) encountered the same phenomenon in one of
their experiments. Instead of a declined memory due to global updating pro-
cesses at an event boundary, participants’ performance improved. They refer
to the Event Horizon Model (see Radvansky & Zacks, 2011) that describes how
the structure of an event inﬂuences the availability of information. Themodel’s
following components explain our ﬁndings as well, and do so better than the
EST: (1) events are segmented and diﬀerent event models are stored as sep-
arate traces in memory (e.g. perceptual and anticipatory traces), (2) causal
relations among the events are stored as well, (3) if the attribute retrieval is
noncompetitive between the stored traces, memory is facilitated, and ﬁnally,
(4) attribute retrieval is interfered when the traces are competitive. It becomes
clear now, that the anticipatory trace “won”, when it received enough support
from the available information structure (here: causal). In contrast, in non-
causal sequences, attribute retrieval was non-competitive. There were clearly
two diﬀerent non-competitive events happening and the perceptual trace was
facilitated. Components (3) and (4) make it clear that both directions are pos-
sible. The design of Study 1 did not include a control group (we did not test
3.4. Explaining the results with the event horizon model 55
a condition in which causally linked sequences without a visible ball-contact
were presented), thus we cannot say with 100% accuracy whether memory was
enhanced in non-causal sequences, or whether performance was increased in
causal sequences.
What have we learned? First of all, the processes involved in event perception
are fundamental and based on global representations of event segments. At
least for a basic scene that typically follows clear cause-eﬀect rules that every-
one has encountered before, the inferential heuristics of conceptual structures
do not diﬀer in experts and novices. Second, while the EST explains these fun-
damental processes well, and even allows for memory improvements based on
an attentional gating mechanism, it is not elaborated enough to consider (1)
the internal structures (or I-semantics) of the perceiver, and (2) the role of how
the available information is structured and presented (e.g. allowing for causal
relations among the stored events and, accordingly, for competition of stored
traces).

Part II
CONTROLLED PERCEPTUAL
PROCESSES
Perception can be directed or enriched by inten-
tionally focusing attention on certain areas (spa-
tial attention: Bressler, Tang, Sylvester, Shulman, &
Corbetta, 2008) or on features (Beauchamp, Cox, &
Deyoe, 1997). Such processes are thought to be con-
trolled by an individual who is consciously aware,
and who eﬀortfully draws on attentional resources
(Schneider & Shiﬀrin, 1977). Because anticipatory
traces can inﬂuence perceptual reports, it is diﬃ-
cult to isolate attentional processes in such dynamic
scenes that may comprise semantic relationships or
trigger cause-eﬀect heuristics (i.e. real-life video
clips). Therefore, Study 3 used the “simple” tracking
environment again to explore how intentional con-
trol of attention enriches dynamic mental represen-
tations with locally perceived object features.
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In this chapter I argue that the interplay of intention and perception elic-
its attentional processes. The idea came from literature on conscious and
unconscious awareness, which I present shortly, and I discuss two basic
ideas on attention (visual search and attention capture). Study 3 presented
within this framework involved four experiments that explored the eﬀect
of a task on the allocation of attention during object tracking. Obtained
ﬁndings will be discussed in light of existing assumptions about the role
of attention in MOT with regard to conscious and unconscious visual per-
ception.
In order to understand the world and navigate through it, humans formmental
representations. So far I have discussed how these are built with automatic pro-
cesses of perception – unintentional and eﬀortless processes that occur outside
the awareness of the observer (Uleman & Uleman, 1990), following a global ap-
proach in preliminary stages of perception. However, a cognitive process that
can select stimuli to be presented in mental representations is attention. In
contrast to James (1890, p.261) who was sure that “everyone knows what atten-
tion is”, the long history of the study of attention is full of debate and disagree-
ment and if I would had to draw conclusions from my extensive literature re-
search, I would rather agree with Pashler (1998): no one knows what attention
is. The study of attention is not only about ﬁnding an adequate explanation of
the phenomena, it is still about what attention actually is, and what its theories
ought to explain (see Fernandez-Duque & Johnson, 2002). For example, Posner
and Boies (1971) proposed three components of attention: the maintenance of
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a vigilant or alert state, the detection of signals for focused processing, and the
orientation to sensory events. Pashler (1998) saw three diﬀerent core aspects
of attention: the selectivity of attention that allows us to process some stim-
uli more than others, the capacity limitations we experience when trying to
do more than one task simultaneously and, the eﬀort we have to invest in sus-
tained processing of visual stimuli. Eﬀort and capacity are only two of the terms
often used synonymously for attention in literature: one also ﬁnds awareness,
consciousness, control, perceptual set, and arousal – just to name a few. Most
of these terms are used interchangeably in literature, but since attention covers
bottom-up as well as top-down processes, they can have diﬀerent meanings in
diﬀerent attention contexts.
Lamme (2003) focused on awareness and proposed diﬀerent models (two of
them are recreated in Figure 6) that theorize the terms to be related but not
synonymous. Both models assume that visual awareness is limited and that at-
tention and conscious awareness play a role in what stimulus can be reported.
In Model A, it is assumed that attention determines what becomes conscious;
attention is the same as consciousness. Model B however assumes that con-
sciousness and unconsciousness may be entirely separated from attentional se-
lection, that is, compared to Model A, more stimulus input reaches conscious-
ness – but attention is needed for them to enter awareness.
The separation of consciousness and unconsciousness, and the role of spatial
and feature attention inspired a new line of research that occupied a major
share of my doctoral phase. I wondered whether such a division of process-
ing levels as depicted in Figure 61 could explain the contradicting results in
tracking literature concerning the ability of the observer to process features
during multiple object tracking. It is a prominent opinion in tracking research
that the attentive processes during tracking are feature-blind visual indices that
stick to target objects (Pylyshyn & Storm, 1988; Shapiro, 2009); they are even
described as a pre-attentive “cognitively impenetrable” mechanism (Pylyshyn,
1999) (but see Oksama & Hyönä, 2004). Recent studies considered the role of
surface features during tracking and contradicted previous ﬁndings by showing
an inﬂuence of feature information, but favored automatic, pre-attentive pro-
cesses (e.g. Papenmeier, Meyerhoﬀ, Jahn, & Huﬀ, 2014). In Study 3, I attempted
to connect ﬁndings fromMOT, visual search, and attention capture, in order to
1Note that Figure 6 receives further attention in Part III (Discussion and Conclusion) in
section 5.3.3, page 113.
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FĎČĚėĊ 6: Conscious Awareness andAttention: 2Models adapted
from Lamme (2003).
examine whether tracking might also utilize a top-down component that reg-
ulates selective feature processing based on its relevance for the task. I tried to
reconcile diﬀerent aspects of attention that have been researched in less com-
plex, mainly static environments, in one dynamic paradigm. That this was not
an easy task to perform is reﬂected in the wide-ranging introduction of Paper
(3). Here, I would like to introduce Paper (3) by adding even more detail to two
of the main ideas.
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4.1 Visual Search and Features
Treisman and Gelade (1980) proposed the “Feature Integration Theory” (FIT)
which became one of the most prominent models in visual search. Based on
FIT, the purpose of (spatial) attentional selection is to bind diﬀerent features of
an object into a single representation. In their studies, they asked participants
to perform a visual search within arrays of colored letters of varying set-sizes.
When objects that diﬀered from distractors by one unique feature were targets,
the search rate did not increase as a function of the set-size. However, if the
searched target was a combination of features, the search rate increased the
more items there were in the array. This suggests that feature search operates
in parallel while conjunction search processes need to operate on items serially.
Accordingly, the FIT assumes a two-stage processing architecture in which the
ﬁrst stage is preattentive and registers basic stimuli features in parallel across
the visual ﬁeld, the second stage is attentional and processes items serially, one
by one. The FIT is widely accepted but has been adapted based on performance
in search tasks that could not be explained with the strict dichotomy of parallel
and serial processing. For example, Egeth, Virzi, and Garbart (1984) observed
that participants were able to restrict their search to a subset of items (here:
searching the red “O” only among the “O”s and exclude red “N”s). Further,
results of Wolfe (1992) indicated that observers can exploit multiple features,
searching a red vertical target among red and green horizontal distractors very
eﬃciently even though the target is apparently not deﬁned by a single feature.
The Guided Search (Wolfe, 1994; Wolfe, Cave, & Franzel, 1989) was developed,
building upon the FIT architecture but adding that serial attention allocation
can be guided by information.
What happens to object processing when task demands are added? In a visual
search task, for example, Lavie (1995) measured less activation of brain regions
when task demands increased – reﬂecting decreased processing of non-selected
information (Lavie, 1995). The author further observed that distractors’ inter-
ference only happened in low-load conditions, suggesting that an actual selec-
tion of information is only required when the capacity limit is reached. Lavie
(1995) used the Eriksen paradigm (e.g. Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) and asked par-
ticipants to search for a target letter in a multiletter display, measuring their
reaction time (RT). In contrast to earlier studies that manipulated display size
(e.g. Yantis & Johnston, 1990), Lavie (1995) manipulated load without aﬀecting
the salience or the quality of the stimuli. He maintained an identical display
4.2. Attentional Capture 63
but manipulated load by making the target search more complex: a correct re-
sponse was also dependent on the color feature (red or blue) of a closely ﬂank-
ing shape, or on the combination of both color and shape (circle or square), and
additionally on the identiﬁcation of the exact position. Participants only suc-
ceeded in the rejection of irrelevant information in the high-load conditions
(interpreted as decreased processing of incompatible distractors resulting in
less interference) – which indicates that the order of priority in the allocation
of selected attention is modiﬁable (see also Yantis & Johnston, 1990). In other
words, cognitive load determines how eﬃcient the attentional selection will
be and, most importantly, the degree of which irrelevant information is pro-
cessed. Other demonstrations of attentional modulation of competing stimuli
were found when the observer was required to divide attention among percep-
tual features. Attending to color or shape of an object resulted in the activation
of many visual areas; and evenmore regions, including the parietal cortex, were
found to be active when the observer was asked to switch between feature and
shape (Le, Pardo, & Hu, 1998).
4.2 Attentional Capture
Wolfe (1992) came to the following conclusion (p. 762):
“[...] there appear to be two aspects to parallel processing in visual search: a bottom-up,
stimulus-driven aspect and a top-down, cognitively- or strategically-driven aspect. The
bottom-up component directs attention to unusual loci including isolated, unique items
and borders. We may conjecture that this component is responsible for the subjective
experience of ’pop-out’ [...]. The top-down component allows for parallel selection of all
itemswith a given attribute [...]. It allows for goal-directed use of preattentively processed
information.”
Attention capture (including “pop-out” eﬀects) has been studied extensively
and it has been proposed that it is not necessarily a bottom-up eﬀect. The atten-
tional control setting (top-down) of the observer plays an important role. Mon-
sell and Driver (2000) reviewed the hotly debated problem of whether atten-
tional capture by task-irrelevant stimuli is determined by bottom-up, stimulus-
driven mechanisms or by top-down factors. Over the past two decades propo-
nents of both sides cumulated evidence that support each of their theories.
Supporters of the stimulus-driven hypothesis (e.g. Theeuwes, 1992; Yantis &
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Jonides, 1990) showed for example that a task-irrelevant onset stimulus cap-
tured attention in spite of intentions to the contrary (e.g. Franconeri, Simons,
& Junge, 2004; Theeuwes, 1995; Turatto & Galfano, 2000). A salient stimulus
captures attention regardless of whether it shared properties with the target or
not. In contrast, supporters of the contingent capture hypothesis (e.g. Bacon &
Egeth, 1994; Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 1992; Gibson & Kelsey, 1998) claim
that such a salient distractor object can only capture attention when the dis-
tractor’s feature matches the attentional control setting of the observer. It was
shown that the onset of a task-irrelevant stimulus failed to capture attention
when the goal was to ﬁnd a color target (e.g. Folk, Leber, & Egeth, 2002; Folk &
Remington, 1998, 1999; Folk et al., 1992).
That is, under given circumstances, only a color stimulus, consistent with the
attentional control setting, captures attention. Whether a stimulus captures
attention highly depends on the observer’s attentional readiness, or his atten-
tional control set (in the following referred to ACS).
Another area of prominent studies that integrate both bottom-up and top-
down aspects is the area of spatial cueing. Spatial cues (e.g. gazing eyes or
pointing arrows) with no predictive value attract attention to a spatial location
when presented brieﬂy and prior to a target presentation (see also Friesen &
Kingstone, 1998; Yantis, 1993; Yantis & Hillstrom, 1994; Yantis & Jonides, 1990).
In contrast, the same spatial cueing studies also support the notion of endoge-
nous control of spatial attention in which input is prioritized in accordance to
goals and intentions of the observer. When given correct information about the
location of an upcoming target, participants detected the presence of a stimu-
lus faster than when given incorrect information (Carrasco et al., 2004; Eriksen
& Hoﬀman, 1973; Posner, 1980; Posner, Snyder, & Davidson, 1980; Remington,
1980; Remington, Johnston, & Yantis, 1992).
4.3 Study 3:
Feature-based tasks in multiple object track-
ing
In Study 3, I explored whether one can actively change perceptual processes by
changing the level of attentional representation. In the tracking environment
used, I presented the observer with cartoon eyes that displayed (spatial) gaze
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cues: seven (moving) eyes looked at one (moving) singleton. By combining
an ACS based on features (gazing vs singleton) and status (target or distractor
object) with a tracking task, I showed successfully that features can indeed be
processed when they are actively attended. The design further included two
diﬀerent gazing behaviors. The eyes either stared (stalking) or looked at the
single object twice (ﬂirty). This was implemented to diﬀerentiate between at-
tention capture and feature processing. The allocation of attention was inves-
tigated with a novel approach. The dependent variable was not how successful
the participants tracked the objects (mean proportion), but how often partici-
pants marked the singleton (the neutral object) compared to its related group
(either gazing targets or gazing distractors).
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All eyes on relevance: strategic allocation of attention as a result of
feature-based task demands in multiple object tracking
Alisa Brockho↵ &Markus Hu↵
University of Tübingen
Multiple object tracking (MOT) plays a fundamental role in processing and interpreting dy-
namic environments. Regarding the type of information utilized by the observer, recent studies
reported evidence for the use of object features in an automatic, low- level manner. By intro-
ducing a novel paradigm that allowed us to combine tracking with a noninterfering top-down
task, we tested whether a voluntary component can regulate the deployment of attention to
task-relevant features in a selective manner. In four experiments we found conclusive evidence
for a task-driven selection mechanism that guides attention during tracking: The observers
were able to ignore or prioritize distinct objects. They marked the distinct (cued) object (tar-
get/distractor) more or less often than other objects of the same type (targets /distractors) – but
only when they had received an identification task that required them to actively process object
features (cues) during tracking. These e↵ects are discussed with regard to existing theoretical
approaches to attentive tracking, gaze-cue usability as well as attentional readiness, a term that
originally stems from research on attention capture and visual search. Our findings indicate
that existing theories of MOT need to be adjusted to allow for flexible top-down, voluntary
processing during tracking.
Keywords: Multiple object tracking, Multiple identity tracking, Attentional control,
Attentional resolution, Attention allocation, Goal-directed attention
In dynamic real-life environments, keeping track of rel-
evant objects can be a rather challenging task. For exam-
ple, in crowded inner-city pedestrian areas, multiple salient
cues (ads, blinking lights, etc.) attract visual attention that
might distract from keeping track of family members (e.g.,
children or the dog): stimulus-driven processes interact with
goal-directed tasks during attentive tracking. In the present
manuscript, we explore how these processes a↵ect the distri-
bution of visual attention in dynamic scenes and contribute
to the human ability of multiple object tracking (MOT).
Attention and focus
It is a well-known fact that attention is influenced ac-
tively or passively (James, 1890). We can actively exert con-
trol over the allocation of attention (top-down; e.g., Yarbus,
1967) or the deployment of attention happens passively as
a result of an event in the environment (bottom-up; e.g.,
Pratt, Radulescu, Guo, & Abrams, 2010). The question of
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how narrowly attention can be focused has been character-
ized as a question of attentional resolution. Based on dif-
ferent metaphors that described visual attention (including
attention as a spotlight: Posner, 1980; as a nonlinear filter:
Cutzu & Tsotsos, 2003; as a zoom lens: Eriksen & James,
1986), researchers wondered about the limitations of spatial
extent of focused attention and suggested that the area of
selection has a facilitatory-center-inhibitory-surround profile
(e.g., Cutzu & Tsotsos, 2003). A detailed discussion of all
approaches and findings in the area of attention selection, fa-
cilitation, and inhibition would go beyond the scope of this
work. However, a finding that is important for the studies
we report here is that the shape of the focus varies depending
on task and characteristics of stimuli (e.g., Eriksen & James,
1986; Laberge & Brown, 1986). Eriksen and James (1986)
built upon existing research methods in which participants
were asked to discriminate between the letters S and C as
quickly as possible. In their static display they manipulated
the number of cued positions and the discriminative di culty
with incompatible noise letters, and measured reaction times.
Their gathered data indicated that participants were able to
change the size of the attentional focus and drew upon ad-
ditional attentional resources when the number of cued po-
sitions increased. The authors interpreted their findings as
support for the zoom lens model.
Similar theoretical approaches were postulated later. Mor-
gan, Ward, and Castet (1998), and Morgan and Watt (1997)
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suggested that cues do not elicit a switch to a higher spa-
tial frequency passband, but act upon the scale of spatial fre-
quency analysis. Thus, focusing attention (e.g., with a cue)
allows processing with a smaller spatial range, resulting in a
decreased influence of distractors and increased target acuity.
Attention and cognition
Observed e↵ects of selective and focused attention in sev-
eral cognitive tasks also reflect a combination of di↵erent
mechanisms such as noise reduction, signal enhancement,
and decisional as well as intentional factors (Folk, Reming-
ton, & Johnston, 1992; Lu & Dosher, 1998; Morgan et al.,
1998; Yeshurun & Carrasco, 1998, 1999). The compelling
demonstrations of both early and late selection imply that
attention is located flexibly (see also Vogel, Woodman, &
Luck, 2005).
Several authors have argued further that pas-
sive/exogenous signals can only capture attention when
the observer has an optimal attentional control set (ACS;
Folk et al., 1992). Yantis and Egeth (1994) reported that
response times to singleton targets are highly sensitive to the
relevance of the singleton (see also Folk & Annett, 1994;
Hillstrom and Yantis, 1994; Jonides & Yantis, 1988). That
is, it highly depends on the observer’s “attentional readiness”
(top-down or goal-directed control, as described in Egeth
& Yantis, 1997) or its equivalent, the ACS (as used as the
generic concept for attentional readiness throughout the
rest of this paper; e.g., Folk et al., 1992; Folk, Remington,
& Wright, 1994) to find an L in an array of Ts (Joseph &
Optican, 1996). Others also recently argued that, although
exogenous cues might work to orient attention in space, the
strength of the e↵ect may be endogenously modulated by an
ACS that the observer adopted in line with a given goal or
task (Lupiáñez, Milliken, Solano, Weaver, & Tipper, 2001).
Attention and spatial resolution
The widely accepted view is that attention is used to con-
trol the allocation of limited perceptual processing resources
in various ways. The described studies present evidence that
attention can increase or decrease its resolution as a result of
spatial occurrences (e.g., crowding). Furthermore, attention
changes the range of spatial analysis (e.g., cueing). And fi-
nally, attention itself is modified by task and intention of the
observer (e.g., attention capture and control settings). Since
the first statement concerning spatial resolution has already
been explored in dynamic environments (e.g., Franconeri,
Jonathan, & Scimeca, 2010; Intriligator & Cavanagh, 2001),
the current paper is concerned with the e↵ects of a flexible at-
tention allocation and cue usability that result from feature-
based task demands in a multiple object tracking paradigm
(MOT; Pylyshyn & Storm, 1988).
Interestingly, while the common understanding of resolu-
tion (e.g., of a TV or a picture) rather describes howmany de-
tails the observer can see, attentional resolution during track-
ing is usually associated with locations and the selection and
separation of objects (see Intriligator & Cavanagh, 2001),
and not with the perception of object features. From a tech-
nical point of view, resolution is measured as how closely
lines can be resolved in an image, and the clarity of an image
depends in fact on its spatial resolution (and not as, often
erroneously believed, on the number of pixels per inch, ppi).
The current paper therefore adopts, and by that extends, the
term attentional resolution to describe how a task changes
attentional resolution to represent object features with more
clarity duringMOT. Following Luck, Hillyard, Mouloua, and
Hawkins (1996)—who proposed that there are multiple se-
lection mechanisms that operate at di↵erent processing levels
to control di↵erent types of interference and attentional over-
load (see Cave & Bichot, 1999, for a review)—we expect the
pattern of attentional resolution to change, depending on the
mechanism triggered by the demands of the task. That is,
we propose that a featural task demand will trigger and acti-
vate a feature level of attention that influences the allocation
and resolution of attention for object features in a dynamic
tracking environment.
Attention and MOT
A typical MOT experiment presents the subject with a
number of identical objects of which some are briefly flashed
to indicate that they are the targets to be tracked. Then, the
objects become indistinguishable from each other and move.
When the motion stops, the observer is asked to click on
the objects that were marked as targets before. The MOT
task has been originally invented to show that observers
track objects in parallel following a preattentive mechanism
(Pylyshyn, 1999). As described by Pylyshyn (2007), visual
attention uses indexes that stick to the moving targets, and
these indexes are attracted to moving objects in a bottom-up
manner.
However, the described indexes serve the purpose of pro-
viding a structure for guiding focused attention needed in
specific situation, for example, in situations of object crowd-
ing in which the observer has to prevent confusions. That
is, the basic MOT mechanism is a preattentive “cognitively
impenetrable” mechanism (Pylyshyn, 1999) but may pave
the way for top-down influences. Still, the role of visual at-
tention in tracking has been approached in several di↵erent
theoretical ways, and no agreement has been reached on the
issue. Cavanagh and Alvarez (2005) proposed that multifo-
cal attention covers the objects simultaneously and indepen-
dently. Alternatively, Alvarez and Franconeri (2007) sug-
gested that a limited attentional resource is allocated flexibly
toward objects, increasing local attentional resolution and en-
hancing tracking performance. Iordanescu, Grabowecky, and
Suzuki (2009) supported the flexible idea with their study on
the dynamic adjustment of the spatial distribution of atten-
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tion in an MOT environment based on spatial demands (e.g.,
crowding). They blanked out the MOT task and asked partic-
ipants to localize the position of targets on the blank screen.
Their results, namely that the accuracy of correctly marked
targets increased when the distance of the nearest distractor
decreased, indicated that the attentional allocation to indi-
vidually tracked target objects changes dynamically. That is,
close distractors lead to an increased attentional resolution
(e.g., to prevent confusions), or to a modulation of the local
attentional resolution, possibly by a top-down component,
as you will. Increasing or decreasing the attentional reso-
lution based on current demands has only been investigated
for spatiotemporal occurrences, like crowding or overlapping
objects, but has never been investigated for goal-related pro-
cessing of feature information.
Location, features, and MOT
Concerning top-down e↵ects for object features during
tracking, Feria (2012) was the first to study the e↵ects of dis-
tinct object features on tracking performance. The utilized
distractors were either identical or featurally distinct (in one
or two dimensions) from the targets; the number of distrac-
tors per trial was varied. Her findings indicated that the e↵ect
distractors have on tracking is top-down in nature: di↵erently
colored or shaped, or motionless distractors impaired track-
ing less than target-identical distractors—still, this was only
the case when tracking load was low. With her study she
generalized previous findings from visual search to MOT:
The e↵ect of a distractor object is dependent on sharing the
features of the target, indicating that the role of distractors as
well as distractor features may have been underestimated in
its influence on tracking performance.
Still, most theories on MOT have a strong focus on
spatiotemporal information as the only source used (see,
e.g., Cavanagh & Alvaraz, 2005; Oksama & Hyönä, 2008;
Pylyshyn, 1989). Nonetheless, a considerable amount of
tracking studies has found e↵ects that can be attributed to
information access to features during tracking (e.g., Cohen,
Pinto, Howe, & Horowitz, 2011; Drew, Horowitz, & Vo-
gel, 2013; Makovski & Jiang, 2009a, b; Oksama & Hyönä,
2008). While typically irrelevant for tracking (Makovski
& Jiang, 2009a, b; Pylyshyn, 2004), features are used
when spatiotemporal information is(made) unreliable (Bae
& Flombaum,2012; Papenmeier, Meyerho↵, Jahn, & Hu↵,
2013). This indicates again, that attention to di↵erent sources
of information (here: object’s feature or location) is some-
what flexibly.
MOT, features, and attentional resolution
With the present research, we explore the role of top-down
modulation of attention allocation and feature processing in
MOT. We hypothesize that an increased or decreased atten-
tional resolution can also happen as a response to a featu-
ral demand, shifting attention toward or away from a feature
singleton within an otherwise homogenous crowd of objects.
Following the idea of an ACS, we hypothesize that based
on its relevance for the tracking task, target and distractor
singletons will lead to changes in the allocation of attention;
that is, an intentional focus on feature singletons will lead to
a strategic use of helpful target singletons and an inhibition
of tracking-harming distractor singletons. While being aware
however that our study does not explicitly test attention cap-
ture, we are convinced that a task-related manipulation of
the relevance for features in a dynamic environment bares a
practical share to the induction of an ACS used in attention
capture settings. To understand the factors that control at-
tentional resolution and possible e↵ects of accessing object
features, it is important to be able to systematically vary the
locus of selection within a single paradigm. We present here
a new method of manipulating the attentional resolution to-
ward a single object feature in an MOT task. By using dy-
namic gaze cues (cartoon eyes with moving pupils), that cued
either a single target or a single distractor among the objects
by looking at them, we integrated minimal featural gaze cues
within an MOT task (see Fig.1).
The main objective was to enhance the attentional reso-
lution to allow for feature processing by influencing the al-
location of attention. In three of the four experiments pre-
sented here, seven dynamic cartoon eyes cued one neutral
pair of eyes by gazing at it. Such a “dual function” of ob-
jects—that is, the observer can process the objects by follow-
ing the spatial cues, or by processing featural distinctiveness,
or both—was inevitable in a dynamic cueing design. The
combination of gaze cues and MOT had an exploratory char-
acter with two possible outcomes: Either participants use the
cue itself reflexively, or they only focus on the di↵erent feat-
ural aspects of the objects, or both.
We implemented two gazing behaviors in order to control
for the possible di↵erence between feature encoding and cue
processing, and to avoid di culties in the later interpretation
of the results. The gaze cue we presented was either constant
(“stalking”) or intermittent (“flirty”). The stalking condition
presented stimuli with constant orientation toward the cued
object and thus gave the participants 8 full seconds to en-
code object features. The flirty condition however presented
a short gaze twice during a trial and we assumed that feature
encoding would be very di cult, that is, we hoped to observe
reflexive gaze-following e↵ects.
Attention and gaze
The rational behind introducing the gazing behavior of the
cartoon eyes was that gaze perception can direct attention re-
flexively, performed by an innate module (Eye Direction De-
tector; Baron-Cohen, Campbell, Karmilo↵-Smith, Grant &
Walker, 1995) and also known as joint attention, mainly stud-
ied in infants (e.g., Farroni, Massaccesi, Pividori, & Johnson,
4.3. Study 3:
Feature-based tasks in multiple object tracking
69
BROCKHOFF & HUFF
Figure 1. Example of the stimuli. Left: Eyes with neutral gaze. Middle: Eyes cueing one of the objects. Right: Eyes with
color cue (used in Experiment 4).
2004; Scaife & Bruner, 1975). Findings indicated that infants
followed the eyes of the speaker and turned their attention to
the looked-at object, a behavior that promotes the acquisi-
tion of language (e.g., Baldwin, 1992, 1993). The spatial
cueing paradigm and its variations (Posner, 1980; Posner &
Cohen, 1984; Posner, Nissen, & Ogden, 1978) showed that
gaze keeps playing a strong role for the orientation of atten-
tion throughout the life span. Friesen and Kingstone (1998)
studied the e↵ects of gaze cues on the orienting of attention
in adults. Presenting faces in the center of the screen whose
eyes either gazed right or left resulted in facilitated reaction
times when the target appeared in the gaze-cued area.
Gaze and attentional control
However, Driver et al. (1999) informed participants in one
of their experiments that the target was four times more likely
to appear at the noncued side. In contrast to the assumption
of an automatic, reflexive e↵ect of gaze, they found that par-
ticipants eventually shifted their attention voluntarily in the
opposite direction of the cue. Furthermore, a recent study
by Macdonald and Tatler (2013) provided insights into how
gaze cues are actually used in real-life scenarios. Participants
had to build a given structure with colored blocks, receiving
either ambiguous or unambiguous instructions. They found
that participants only used the gaze cues of an attending ex-
perimenter when instructions were ambiguous, that is, when
the gaze cue provided information that was helpful to solve
the task. This suggest a strong influence of task demands on
the e↵ects of gaze cues.
Experimental overview
In three of the four studies presented here we exploit the
property that spatial cues focus attention on an area in visual
space and that the allocation of attention has a large e↵ect
on feature detection and encoding (Treisman & Sato, 1990;
Theeuwes, Kramer, & Atchley, 1999; Treisman &Gormican,
1988). However, this has only been tested with static displays
and visual search so far.
In Experiment 1, participants tracked one round without
further information. Before the second round of tracking,
they received the task to identify the objects’ behavior (cue-
ing constantly or intermittently) and, additionally and more
importantly, to identify the cued object (target or distractor
singleton). Instead of measuring proportion correct, we mea-
sured the selection preference (proportion marked) for the
di↵erent object types displayed: targets, distractors, and the
singleton (cued distractor or cued target), to provide evidence
that facilitated feature processing based on task demands in-
fluences the allocation of attention flexibly among the ob-
jects. This approach is then used in Experiments 2 and 3 to
demonstrate that the e↵ect is truly task-based and not due to
inevitable learning. Using the same methodological design
with di↵erent stimuli, we show in Experiment 4 that the use
of featural gaze-cues is basically identical to color-cues, indi-
cating that cue usability in MOT relies upon the same flexible
and intentional attentional enhancement for object features.
General Method
Overview
In the experiments reported here, we used the MOT task
developed by Pylshyn and Storm (1988) in combination with
an identification task. In three of the four experiments, there
were two rounds of tracking. Round 1 was with no task or
further information. In Round 2 participants received infor-
mation on the objects’ behavior and the task to identify it
after each tracking trial. In Experiment 2, we added a third
round in which participants still knew about the eyes’ behav-
ior but were explicitly informed that there will be no identi-
fication task.
Stimuli
Two types of stimuli were used. In the first three experi-
ments, we used cartoon eyes that gazed at one of the target,
or one of the distractor objects (see Fig.1). In Experiment
4, we used the same eyes but instead of a gaze all objects
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except the single target or the single distractor were colored
grey (see Fig.1). The cue was either displayed constantly
(stalking) or intermittently (flirty); 500 ms before the motion
stopped, all objects went back to their neutral initial position.
Phase 5 (neutral eyes) was displayed until the end of the
trial in flirty trials. In stalking trials, the eyes switched to the
neutral position 500 ms before they stopped moving. Thus,
in both conditions it was not su cient to pay attention to
the cues at the end of the trial only. Correct identification of
the objects’ behavior and the cued object required sustained
attention throughout the entire trial.
Procedure
At the start of each session, participants received the
Reading the Mind in the Eyes test (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001;
Bölte, 2005). This was followed by instructions for one
round of tracking (64 trials). Except for Experiment 3 (track-
ing without an additional identification task), participants
then received specified instructions on the eyes’ behavior,
and a multiple-choice question appeared on the screen after
each trial. In Experiment 2, participants tracked an additional
round without a task. The tracking procedure was a standard
procedure, which is depicted in Fig.2, which also depicts a
flirty trial.
Exclusion criteria and data analysis
In each of the experiments described in this work, we
tested participants on their eye-reading skills with the Read
the Mind in the Eyes test by Baron-Cohen et al. (2001). It
seems counterintuitive that a test that measures the ability to
correctly judge an emotion from gaze is appropriate to use as
a baseline for the sensitivity to gaze cues that are directional
in nature. However, recent findings suggest that gaze direc-
tion and facial expression are not independently processed;
in fact, gaze direction is considered as an important cue in
the perceptual processing of facial displays of emotions (e.g.,
Adams & Kleck, 2003). Further, the Read the Mind in the
Eyes test is frequently used (as part of a test battery) in clin-
ical research and considered to be equally reliable for partic-
ipants in treatment as well as for healthy participants in con-
trol groups. Reflexive orienting to gaze cues can be reduced
or absent in people who su↵er from psychiatric disorders
(e.g., Asperger’s or autism; see Nation & Penny, 2008, for
a review). Thus, with relatively simple means, we attempted
to ensure a rough comparability of sensitivity to gaze cues
among participants. Additionally, data of trials in which the
participant did not correctly identify the condition (see Ap-
pendix A for chi-square tests of the di↵erences in propor-
tion correct), that is, failed to process the task, were excluded
from the analysis. Such an exclusion of data was justifiable
from a theoretical point of view: we needed to ensure that
attention is actually controlled by top-down processes (task).
Figure 2. Example of a Flirty trial. Left: gazing eyes.
Right: Shaded eyes. Numbers indicate the sequential dif-
ferences displayed. Note that the flirt moments (2 and 4)
appeared randomly at 2 of 3 predefined moments during the
trial. In Stalking trials, the cueing phase was constant and
lasted through sequences 2 to 4.
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Considering the goal of the study, namely to explore the in-
fluence of “active” task-related attention, we believe that an
inclusion of trials in which it is impossible to tell what ac-
tually happened during tracking (e.g., the participant only
tracked the objects without trying to identify the condition
and guessed, or the participant accidentally tracked a distrac-
tor and came to wrong conclusions when asked which ob-
ject has been cued) bares the risk to lead to false conclusions
based on unknown and uncontrolled factors in the analysis.
The planned contrasts were kept within one gazing be-
havior (flirty and stalking), that is, we only compared the
proportion of the selection of noncued objects versus cued
objects in flirty or stalking trials. In other words, we tested
a subset of possible main e↵ects for the type of object (cued
vs. noncued), and none of our comparisons involved both the
flirty and the stalking trials, nor Round 1 and Round 2 trials.
In the fifth contrast, though we analyzed the di↵erence of the
di↵erences of each behavior. However, due to di↵erences in
proportions correctly identified we did not give this calcu-
lation too much weight in the result section. Based on our
specific a priori expectations that noncued objects would be
marked less often than cued objects when the participants’
attention was influenced by task-demands, an omnibus F test
like a repeated-measures ANOVA and subsequent pairwise
comparisons would have resulted in an inflated Type I error
and were thus not the most appropriate analysis (seeMaxwell
& Delaney, 2004; Ruxton & Beauchamp, 2008). We chose
planned contrasts that derived from specific hypotheses (see
Table 1). We further applied Bonferroni corrections to re-
duce the risk of type I errors and to compensate for the fact
that our set of chosen contrasts was not orthogonal.
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Participants. Forty students (28 female, 12 male; mean
age M = 22.63 years, SD = 3.32), of the University of Tübin-
gen participated in return for course credit or monetary com-
pensation. All subjects had reportedly normal or corrected-
to-normal sight. Informed consent was obtained after the ex-
perimental procedures were explained to the subjects.
Stimuli and design. PsychoPy (Peirce, 2009) was used
to present stimuli on a 15.4-in. notebook. The experiment
was divided into three parts. The participants started with
a revised version of the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Bölte, 2005) that took them ap-
proximately 10 minutes to complete. Stimuli consisted of 37
photographs of human eye-regions, the first one being a prac-
tice trial. These photographs were taken from the revised ver-
sion of the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test (Baron-Cohen
et al., 2001) translated into German by Bölte (2005). Four
di↵erent adjectives were given. The participant indicated the
adjective that described the mental and emotional state of the
person displayed best.
Next, participants were given instructions for a MOT task.
Each trial started with the appearance of rectangular outlined
space against a black background. After 0.5 seconds, the
stimuli appeared. After another 0.5 seconds, four of the stim-
uli were marked as targets by flashing red for four times.
Each flash and each pause in between lasted for 0.2 seconds,
while the last flash lasted for 0.4 seconds. The stimuli were
eight artificial, cartoon eyes with a white sclera and black
pupils and had a diameter of 2.6 x1.3  (see Fig.1). They
moved at a constant speed of 8 . The duration of a trial was
8 s, and participants were instructed to select the target items
by marking them after each trial. All objects were able to
overlap during each trial and they bounced o↵ of the box in a
way that was physically correct. Gaze direction was manipu-
lated by moving the black pupils as follows: The eyes either
constantly stared (“stalking”) at a specified object or looked
at it shortly (“flirted”) for twice during each trial.
The two “flirt moments” were randomly chosen out of
three possible time points (in order to avoid predictability)
and lasted about 1.5 s each (that included movement of the
pupil toward the object, moment of glance, and the aversion
of the eyes). The specified object either belonged to the de-
fined set of targets or was one of the distractors. Each of the
four conditions (i.e., the four ways in which the eyes could
behave) occurred twice in each of 16 blocks, with two blocks
of practice (which were not further analyzed). Participants
tracked two rounds of 64 trials, so 128 trials in total. Round
1 was with no task or further information. In Round 2, par-
ticipants received information on the objects’ behavior and
the task to identify it after each tracking trial. The first round
of tracking took approximately 20 minutes to complete; the
second round took 25–30 minutes. Before the second round
of tracking, participants were actively engaged in attending
to the objects’ behavior during tracking (as in Hu↵, Papen-
meier, & Zacks, 2012). The research assistant handed out a
written description of the behavior and the resultant answer
options (translated):
In the third part of the experiment, you will track pairs of
cartoon eyes again. This time you not only have to track the
predefined targets, but also have to pay attention to how the
eyes behave. There are four options that will be given as a
multiple-choice after each tracking trial:
1. The eyes stared constantly at a target object.
2. They eyes stared constantly at a distractor object.
3. The eyes looked twice quickly at a target object.
4. The eyes looked twice very quickly at a distractor ob-
ject.
The research assistant stayed in the room to answer indi-
vidual questions of the participants in case necessary and left
72
Chapter 4. Study 3:
Attention, intention, and perception
ALL EYES ON RELEVANCE
before she or he started the second tracking round. The par-
ticipants were further informed that they would have to rate
how confident they were about their answers (5: maximally
confident–1: not at all). The tracking task with questions
took about 25 minutes.
Results
With an average of 25.07 correctly identified gaze expres-
sions in the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test, subjects in the
present study scored only slightly lower than the normal con-
trol group suggested by Baron-Cohen et al. (2001; 26.2–30.9
of 36 gaze expressions in total). No participant was excluded
from the analysis. Overall, participants tracked 2.87 of 4 ob-
jects correctly. There was no significant e↵ect for round; that
is, the participant did not track less or more objects in the sec-
ond round with the identification task than in the first round
without an additional task, t(39) = 0.53, p = .598, d = 0.08.
The main analysis focused on the mean proportions of ob-
ject selection preferences (object marked) on the two levels
of object status and the two levels of cueing behavior. We
operationalized the ACS as trials in which participants iden-
tified the eyes’ behavior correctly, resulting in the inclusion
of 64 % of the total number of trials of Round 2. The planned
contrasts were based on a linear mixed-e↵ects model, fit via
maximum likelihood, with participants as the random e↵ect
and the variables condition (Round 1, Round 2), object status
(Cued, Non-Cued) and cueing behavior (Flirty, Stalking). A
priori hypotheses were conducted using Bonferroni adjusted
alpha levels of .01 per test (.05/5). We report Cohen’s d as
e↵ect size measures. The planned contrasts for target tri-
als were not significant in Round 1, neither in the Stalking
condition, |z| = 0.697, p = .928, d = 0.01, nor in the Flirty
condition, |z| = 0.22, p = .999, d = 0.01. In Round 2, both
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Figure 3. Proportion marked of the di↵erent object types
displayed in both rounds for cued target and cued distractor
trials depending on cueing behavior. Error bars indicate 95%
within-subject confidence intervals.
contrasts reached significance, Stalking |z| = 5.40, p < .001,
d = 0.99; Flirty |z| = 6.14, p < .001, d = 1.37. The distractor
trials showed a similar picture for Round 1, but showed no
significant di↵erences between the selection of cued distrac-
tor and non-cued distractors. See Appendix B for complete
tables. Refer to Fig.3 for a graphical display of the analyzed
target distractor trial data.
In the first round, the participants did not process object
features, i.e. they did not show a selection preference for the
cued target. In contrast, in the second round in which the
cued single target was of relevance for both tasks (tracking
and answering the cueing behavior question), they selected
it significantly more often compared to the non-cued targets.
The same analysis was done for distractor trials. Here, we
would expect that the cued single object (one of the distrac-
tors) is either ignored strategically (i.e. marked less often
than the non-cued distractors) or not processed di↵erently at
all, since both, the tracking task and the question, could be
solved without guiding attention away from the four target
objects. Statistically, there is no significant di↵erence be-
tween the compared means.
Discussion
The first experiment introduced an ACS manipulation be-
fore the second round of tracking. Information and task
showed strong e↵ects on the selection preference for the cued
target but not for the cued distractor. Whether the objects
were flirted with or constantly stared at did not influence the
strength of the selection preference for cued- target trials. It
is important to note, that the results of Round 2 cannot be ex-
plained by strategically paying attention only to the very end
of each trial. First, 500 ms before the end of a trial all objects
were indistinguishable (i.e. the pupils turned into the neutral
position). Second, even if there might have been some strate-
gic processing in the Stalking condition, the randomly cho-
sen cueing intervals in the Flirty condition presumably im-
peded such a strategy. As the results of the Flirty and Stalk-
ing conditions in Round 2 were comparable, we propose that
the ACS did not just trigger a strategy that selects the relevant
information when asked for but rather changes the distribu-
tion of spatially distributed visual attention during the whole
trial. For the cued-distractor trials, we only observed a close
to significant inhibition e↵ect for the cued distractor: it was
marked less often than the non-cued distractors.
The research assistant stayed in the room to answer ques-
tions after the participant had received the instructions for
Round 2 and reported that the majority of participants had
questions about the explanations on distractor trials. Even
though participants scored well over the multiple-choice
guessing rate of 25 % (about 65 % of trials correctly identi-
fied), we wondered whether the influence of the ACS would
change with revised instructions. Considering the indistinct
e↵ect for cued-distractor trials and taking the concerns about
the instructions into account, we conducted a second experi-
ment in which we handed out an illustrated (as opposed to
the former written version) instruction to the participants.
Furthermore, a third round of tracking was added in which
no identification of the cueing behavior was required. That
is, in Round 3 the participants still knew about the behavior
of the di↵erent object types. If results of Round 3 resemble
those of Round 2, we could derive that knowledge (without
the task) is capable to amend the distribution of attention.
But if results of Round 3 rather resemble those of Round 1,
the di↵erence in processing of cued objects owes its exis-
tence to the task demands that decreases relevance for cued
distractors, and heightens relevance for cued target objects.
Experiment 2 was thus not only conducted to replicate re-
sults of Experiment 1 with modified instructions, but also to
consider and extract the di↵erent roles task and information
play in eliciting the previously observed e↵ect.
EXPERIMENT 2
Method
Participants. Thirty-two new students of the University
of Tübingen participated in return for course credit (24 fe-
male and 8 male, aged M = 22.42 years, SD = 3.64). All
subjects had reportedly normal or corrected-to-normal sight.
Informed consent was obtained after the experimental proce-
dures were explained to the subjects.
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Stimuli and design. The design of the experiment was
similar to Experiment 1, except that we added a third track-
ing round. Participants tracked 192 (3 x 64) trials in total.
The first and the second round were identical to the former
experiments: the participants tracked the first round without
a task, and the second round with a task. Before the third
round started, the participants were informed that the eyes
will move and gaze in the exact same way, but that they will
not be asked to identify the eyes’ behavior at any point during
Round 3. The participants also did the “Read the Eyes in the
Mind Test”. We excluded no participant based on the test
performance. The stimuli were not changed. However, we
revised the instructions that were now illustrated with a series
of screenshots and detailed descriptions of the real stimuli,
one for cued-target and one for cued-distractor trials.
Results
With an average of 25.35 correctly identified gaze expres-
sions in the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test, subjects in
the present study scored only slightly lower than the normal
control-group suggested by Baron-Cohen et al. (2001; 26.2
- 30.9 of 36 gaze expressions in total). No participant was
excluded from the analysis. There was no significant e↵ect
for round that is the participant did not track less objects in
the second round with the identification task than in the first
round without an additional task, t(31) = 0.55, p = .58., d =
0.09. Neither di↵ered the second from the third round, t(31)
= 1.05, p = .30., d = 0.18. Based on participants’ correct
answers, we included 66.2 % of the total trials of Round 2.
The planned contrasts were based on a linear mixed-e↵ects
model, fit via maximum likelihood, with participants as the
random e↵ect and the variables condition (Round 1, Round
2, Round 3), object status (Cued, Non-Cued) and cueing
behavior (Stalking, Flirty). A priori hypotheses were con-
ducted using Bonferroni adjusted alpha levels of .006 per test
(.05/8). The planned contrasts for target trials were not sig-
nificant in Round 1, neither in the Stalking condition, |z| =
0.77, p = .97, d = 0.18, nor in the Flirty condition, |z|= 0.44,
p = .99, d = 0.12. Also in Round 3 there were no significant
e↵ects, neither in the Stalking condition, |z| = 0.847, p = .96,
d = 0.20, nor in the Flirty condition, |z| = 1.10, p = .87, d
= 0.26. In Round 2, both target contrasts were significant,
Stalking |z| = 5.08, p < .001, d = 1.21; Flirty |z| = 3.87, p <
.001, d = 0.75. The distractor trials showed a similar picture
for Round 1 and Round 3 (no significant e↵ects). However,
in Round 2 the di↵erence in the selection of the cued distrac-
tor and the non-cued distractors was significantly di↵erent
from zero in the Stalking condition, |z| = 3.81, p < .001, d =
0.95. See tables in Appendix C. Refer to Fig.4 for a graphical
display of the analyzed target and distractor trial data.
Discussion
The second experiment replicated the design of Experi-
ment 1 and added a third round of tracking. The findings of
the preceding results are reflected in the current data. Under
the ACS manipulation, the single cued target-objects were
marked more often than the other targets when the partici-
pant was attentionally ready. This leads us to assume that the
demands of the identification task play a stronger role here
than knowledge about features alone.
In Experiment 1, we found a slight hint of an inhibition
of the single object when it was a distractor and constantly
cued (Stalking condition), which is why we introduced re-
vised instructions in Experiment 2 to ensure that participants
understood the concept of distractor objects completely. And
in fact, the e↵ects found for the cued-distractor objects in Ex-
periment 1 reached statistical significance in the current data.
Yet be aware that the distractor object was marked less often
(than the three equally available other distractors) only in the
Stalking but not in the Flirty condition. While Experiment
2 showed that the e↵ects of the ACS on object selection is
only observable when it is activated but is disregarded when
the participant is no longer asked to focus on features, it may
be possible that the e↵ects observed in Experiment 1 have a
learning component. That is, experience in tracking may re-
sult in better integration of object features and possible learn-
ing for helpful cues without further information. Experiment
3 replicated the design of Experiment 1 but participants were
not given any information or an identification task.
EXPERIMENT 3
Method
Participants. Twenty students (12 female, 8 male;
mean age M = 21.75 years, SD = 3.18), of the University
of Tübingen participated in return for course credit or mon-
etary compensation. All subjects had reportedly normal or
corrected-to-normal sight. Informed consent was obtained
after the experimental procedures were explained to the sub-
jects.
Stimuli and design. Stimuli and design was an exact
replication of Experiment 1 with the exception that partici-
pants did not receive any information or task before Round
2.
Results
With an average of 26.05 correctly identified gaze expres-
sions in the Reading- the-Mind-in-the-Eyes test, subjects in
the present study scored minimally below the range of what
is suggested as a normal control-group average by Baron-
Cohen et al. (2001; 26.2 - 30.9 of 36 gaze expressions in
total). No participant was excluded from the analysis.
Overall, participants tracked 2.87 of 4 objects correctly. In
contrast to the previous experiments, there was a significant
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Figure 4. Proportion marked of the di↵erent object types displayed in all three rounds for cued target and cued distractor trials
depending on cueing behavior. Error bars indicate 95% within-subject confidence intervals.
e↵ect for round. Participants tracked more targets correctly
in the second round, t(19) = 3.11, p = .006., d = 0.70. The in-
cluded contrasts were based on a linear mixed-e↵ects model,
fit via maximum likelihood, with participants as the random
e↵ect and the variables condition (Round 1, Round 2), object
status (cued, noncued) and cueing behavior (flirty, stalking)
as fixed e↵ects. A priori hypotheses were conducted using
Bonferroni adjusted alpha levels of .0125 per test (.05/4). Re-
fer to Fig.5 for a graphical display of the analyzed target and
distractor trial data. See Appendix D for full results.
All planned comparisons for target trials were non-
significant (see Appendix D). Results indicate that the selec-
tion preference of the participants was not influenced by gaze
cues, neither in the first, nor in the second round of tracking:
they did not mark the cued targets more often than the non-
cued target. This was also independent of the presented cue-
ing behavior (Flirty, Stalking). Equal to the target trials, the
gaze cue did not give rise to a selection preference for the
cued distractor. Whether the cue was provided as flirty or as
stalking did not make a di↵erence without an ACS.
Discussion
The third experiment was conducted to measure possi-
ble e↵ects due to learning, that is, a possible interaction of
tracking “experience” (Round 1, Round 2) and cue usability.
None of the planned comparisons yield significant results,
indicating that the participants did not process the gaze-cue
as an object feature during tracking. The data reported are
in agreement with previous findings stating that feature pro-
cessing is disregarded during MOT when spatiotemporal in-
formation is available constantly (Papenmeier et al., 2013)
and that singletons (in this case, the cued object) are not pro-
cessed di↵erently when they are of no relevance to the given
task (in this case, the tracking task) (e.g., Yantis & Egeth,
1994). We conclude that the use of features truly depends on
our previously introduced manipulation (ACS). In the final
experiment, we tested whether the ACS manipulation could
be generalized to color cues by simply coloring neutral car-
toon eyes for the length of a Flirt or the length of a trial
(Stalking). The cued object remained white, while other ob-
jects were gray. We intended to replicate the results produced
by the ACS e↵ect.
EXPERIMENT 4
Method
Participants. Twenty new students of the University of
Tübingen participated in return for monetary compensation
(mean age M = 24.15 years, SD = 3.48). All subjects had
reportedly normal or corrected-to-normal sight. Informed
consent was obtained after the experimental procedures were
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Figure 5. Proportion marked of the di↵erent object types
displayed in both rounds for cued target and cued distractor
trials depending on cueing behavior. Error bars indicate 95%
within-subject confidence intervals.
explained to the subjects.
Stimuli and design. The design of the experiment was
equal to the preceding Experiment 1. The participants
tracked two rounds of 64 trials and received questions af-
ter each trial in the second round. They were also tested on
their sensitivity to eyes (Read the Mind in the Eyes test) even
though the stimuli used for the tracking task were changed
to neutral eyes with motionless pupils (see Fig.1). The par-
ticipants were asked to track the objects that could, without
further description, be perceived as resembling the figure 8
on its side (infinity sign) rather than cartoon eyes. Instead of
taking a glance at the cued object, the noncued eyes were
colored in a light gray tone while the cued object stayed
white. In the stalking condition, noncued objects were col-
ored during the whole trial (to be more specific, until 500 ms
before the end of the motion), while in flirty trials the cor-
responding objects changed color twice, for the duration of
1.5 seconds (the exact duration of flirt moments in preceding
experiments). The answer options were adapted (translated):
1. One of the target-objects was white; the other objects
were gray.
2. One of the distractor-objects was white; the other ob-
jects were gray.
3. One of the target-objects changed its color to gray
twice.
4. One of the distractor-objects changed its color to gray
twice.
The participants received instructions with illustrations of
the real tracking situations, similar to the instructions of Ex-
periment 2 and 3.
Results
With an average of 26.75 correctly identified gaze expres-
sions in the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test, subjects in the
present study scored within the normal control-group range
suggested by Baron-Cohen et al. (2001; 26.2–30.9 of 36 gaze
expressions in total). The test was kept in the current experi-
ment to ensure that di↵erences do not arise due to a di↵erent
course of the experiment.
Overall, participants tracked 2.85 of 4 objects correctly.
We found a significant e↵ect for round. Participants tracked
more targets correctly in the second round, t(19) = 2.18, p =
.04., d = 0.49.
Only correctly identified trials were included in the anal-
ysis, resulting in the inclusion of 70.9 % of the total trials
of Round 2. The planned contrasts were based on a lin-
ear mixed-e↵ects model, fit via maximum likelihood, with
participants as the random e↵ect and the variables condition
(Round 1, Round 2), object status (cued, noncued) and cue-
ing behavior (flirty, stalking). Refer to Fig.6 for a graphical
display of the analyzed target and distractor trial data. The
according means and the results of the planned comparisons
are presented in Appendix E. There were no significant dif-
ferences between the selection of the cued-target objects and
the noncued targets in Round 1, target trials stalking, |z| =
0.03, p = .99, d = 0.01, flirty, |z| = 1.61, p = .43, d = 0.62;
distractor trials stalking, |z| = 1.07, p = .77, d = 0.30, flirty,
|z| = 1.04, p = .18, d = 0.58. This reinsures that the color fea-
ture of the objects alone was not weighted as a source rele-
vant enough to benefit tracking (in line with Papenmeier et al,
2013). Since color is known to be a preference for selective
attention, this was especially remarkable with regard to the
constantly visible white singleton among gray objects in the
stalking trials. In Round 2, the interaction of ACS and the
processing of color cues showed significant e↵ects as seen
before in Experiment 1, 2, and 3; target trials: stalking, |z|
= 5.39, p < .001, d = 1.11, flirty, |z| = 1.4.01, p < .001, d =
1.51; distractor trials: stalking, |z| = 4.59, p < .001, d = 1.47,
flirty, |z| = 2.12, p = .15, d = 0.63.
The results replicate what we have reported so far: The
cued distractor was marked significantly less often. Whereas
the cues on the target object in Round 2 worked indepen-
dently of cueing behavior, the cued distractor was only
marked less often than the rest of the distractors in the stalk-
ing condition compared to the flirty condition. Compared
to the graphical inspection of the previous experiments, the
current color experiment showed some slight indications for
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Figure 6. Proportion marked of the di↵erent object types
displayed in both rounds for cued target and cued distractor
trials depending on cueing behavior. Error bars indicate 95%
within-subject confidence intervals.
an automatic processing of abruptly occurring color cues in
Round 1 (see tables in Appendix E and Fig.6).
Discussion
The final experiment meant to generalize the e↵ect found
for gaze cues to color cues: Single cued target objects are
marked more often than the other targets during tracking
when the participant had an ACS (Round 2). Single cued
distractor objects are marked less often, but this was only
the case when the distractor was cued constantly compared
to only twice. The results of Experiment 4 were remarkably
similar to those of the previous experiments. They demon-
strate that an ACS e↵ect for single cued objects during a
tracking task can be obtained with gaze cues as well as with
color cues. The reasons why we shy away from claiming
complete interchangeability between the two types of cue-
ing (color and gaze) are the graphical results of Experiment
4. The results of the flirty trials in Round 1 hint to a di↵er-
ent processing of color cues, which could have been due to
its rather abrupt nature. As Yantis (1993) suggested, those
kinds of visual onsets may capture attention independent of
an attentional state of feature readiness.
A note on learning and task e↵ects
We wondered about the e↵ect of the identification task on
general tracking performance. To that end we calculated the
mean di↵erence of proportion marked for the three noncued
targets of Round 2 minus Round 1 (leaving out Round 3 of
Experiment 2) independent of condition and behavior and
applied two-sided t tests. The calculated di↵erences were
significantly di↵erent from zero in the first three experiments
(see Fig.7), Experiment 1: t(19) = -2.38, p = 0.03; Experi-
ment 2: t(31) = -2.58, p = 0.01; Experiment 3: t(19) = 2.58, p
= 0.02. The negative t values as well as the graphical presen-
tation suggest that the identification task had a detrimental in-
fluence on the overall tracking performance in Experiment 1
and Experiment 2. In Experiment 3, when participants were
not given the identification task in Round 2, they showed a
(positive) learning e↵ect. Interestingly though, Experiment
4 showed neither, t(19) = 0.09, p = 0.93. This could suggest
that the task to identify a specific color “behavior” does not
interfere with the tracking task at all. However, with regard
to the learning e↵ect in Experiment 3, it may well be as-
sumed that the e↵ect of learning is simply canceled out by
the detrimental e↵ect of the identification task.
Figure 7. Mean di↵erence of proportion marked of the three
non-cued targets of (Round 2 minus Round 1) compared to
zero (H0: no di↵erence between Round 1 and Round 2). Er-
ror bars indicate 95% within-subject confidence intervals.
General discussion
In the experiments presented, we explored how manipu-
lating the relevance of object features modifies the allocation
of attention in a MOT task. While it has been theorized that
the attentional resolution is increased and decreased based
on spatiotemporal occurrences like crowding or overlapping
objects, we assume that an intentional, task-based compo-
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nent can influence attentional resolution to access feature ob-
jects as well. Our research design has a practical share with
the concept of attentional capture and control settings (e.g.,
Egeth & Yantis, 1997; Folk et al., 1992) which lead us to
hypothesize that changes in attentional resolution will hap-
pen in a strategic manner, inhibiting distractor objects and
preferring target objects flexibly based on task-demands.
Theoretical accounts on tracking and features
The first interesting finding is reflected in the null-e↵ects
in the first round of each experiment: While it is well known
that in the MOT paradigm it is easier to track the targets if
they are easily distinguishable from the distractors, for ex-
ample by being of a di↵erent color (Howe & Holcombe,
2012; Makovski & Jiang, 2009a; Makovski & Jiang, 2009b;
similar: Oksama & Hyönä, 2008), our analysis of the se-
lection preference for singletons and nonsingletons does not
support this claim. However, Makovski and Jiang (2009a)
also stated that features are not properly conjoined during
attentive tracking because feature-location bindings are not
necessary to track successfully. They concluded that the
attentional tracking system has no access to bound target
representations. Nonetheless, the model of multiple iden-
tity tracking (MOMIT; Oksama & Hyönä, 2008) predicts
greater accuracy for distinctive targets because the observer
can recover from tracking errors more easily. Based on the
MOMIT, we would have expected that the target singleton
is automatically (i.e. Round 1 of the experiments) marked
more often, while the distractor singleton is confused less
with a target than the other distractors—but that was not the
case, not even in Experiment 4 with color singletons. This
does not necessarily contradict previous findings, since for
example Howe and Holcombe (2012) showed that the great-
est advantage of distinct features is observed when distractor
objects share absolutely none of the target features.
Our target and distractor objects shared the exact same
features, that is, white spheres with pupils that moved along
with the items and the singleton they cued (or as in Exper-
iment 4: colored gray) with the exception that the single-
ton displayed “neutral” pupils (or stayed white). Our results
suggest that focusing attention toward minimal featural dif-
ferences during tracking is, first of all, possible, and more
importantly, probably leads to a comparable advantage as if
tracking targets and distractors that are di↵erent in all featu-
ral aspects.
If we disregard the di↵erence between identity and fea-
ture and assume that the MOMIT (Oksama & Hyönä, 2004,
2008) applies to our stimuli, it would not explain our results
entirely either. The MOMIT proposes that an automatic, par-
allel low-level system collaborates with a serial high-level
attentional spotlight. When a target is at risk to fall below an
activation threshold, the spotlight is alarmed by the low-level
system, initiating an exhaustive search by the spotlight to re-
activate the representation of the particular object in the low-
level system. In order to explain our results, the model would
need a modification: The spotlight is not only controlled by a
low-level system but should also work in a top-down manner,
even inhibiting stimuli with features that have no relevance.
The FLEX account by Alvarez and Franconeri (2007) de-
scribes a mechanism for the reallocation of resources in spe-
cific situations, for example, when a distractor comes close
to a tracked target. They hypothesized that such interfering
events would enhance the attentional resolution at the spe-
cific location. While we did not control for eye-movements
in the current study, we found a way to approximate the pro-
portion of attention each target and each distractor received,
and observed attention shifts in favor of the identification
task (see also Yarbus, 1967). That means, participants were
able to find the singleton and/or follow the gaze cues (use
the color cues) and used the information to avoid confusions
with the cued distractor, or to have a “save” target (in the
cued-target trials). However, whether attention was enhanced
for targets and suppressed for distractors (as seen in Betten-
court & Somers, 2009, or Doran & Ho↵man, 2010) cannot
be determined with the current design. What we can pro-
pose is that, in principal, the shifted selection preferences
may reflect attentional resolution. Observers can modulate
the attentional resolution not only in accordance with spatial
demands (as previously suggested by, e.g., Franconeri et al.
2008; Intriligator & Cavanagh, 2001; Pylyshyn, 2004) but
also to access object feature information that based on task
demands.
Underestimated objects: Distractors
As in Feria (2012), the current study not only emphasizes
the role of distractors but also the role of distractor features
during tracking. Especially interesting is the finding, that the
singleton distractor is marked less often compared to other,
noncued distractors in stalking conditions compared to the
flirty conditions. In terms of existing tracking research, this
observation does not support the majority of findings and
could not reasonably be foreseen. In general, tracking capac-
ity is greater when no other distracting objects are present
(Horowitz & Cohen 2008; Horowitz et al. 2007) and de-
creases when the number of distractors increases (Betten-
court & Somers, 2009). Furthermore, by using a secondary
probe detection task, researchers found that the detection of
probes was less reliable on distractors compared to probes
on targets and on an empty background (see Pylyshyn, 2006;
Pylyshyn, Haladjian, King, & Reilly, 2008; Hu↵ et al., 2012;
but see Drew et al., 2009).
However, while these results point towards distractor in-
hibition during tracking, others reported that the role of dis-
tractors has been underestimated in its influence on track-
ing performance. Supporting findings of Alvarez and Oliva
(2008), who showed that the locations of distractors are rep-
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resented above chance level, Meyerho↵ and team (2015)
demonstrated that distractor displacements impair tracking
performance. In a recent study, Meyerho↵, Papenmeier,
Jahn, and Hu↵ (in press) compared di↵erent speed profiles
and reported an a↵ected tracking performance even when
only distractor objects varied in speed. They suggested that
the spatial configuration of targets and distractors, in contrast
to tracking for example only a virtual polygon of target ob-
jects (Yantis, 1992), is encoded in order to enhance the allo-
cation of visual attention toward target objects. While they
propose further that the distractor location is represented to
an extent that allows for the detection of crowding events (see
also Iordanescu et al., 2009), our data indicate that not only
distractor location is represented but also a specified distrac-
tor feature.
In our data, the feature representation on the distractor
object was at least pronounced enough to detect approach-
ing events and to allocate attention accordingly in order to
prevent confusions. Our findings nicely fit the results of
Drew et al. (2009). In their tracking study with moving
and stationary objects, they measured the electrophysiologi-
cal responses (ERP) of participants to task-irrelevant probes
that were located on targets, distractors, stationary objects,
or in empty space. The authors report the response to dis-
tractors as located between the (greatest) response to tar-
gets and the (weakest) response to background and empty
space probes. They concluded that distractors are not sup-
pressed, at least not on an early level of perceptual process-
ing. The idea of a hierarchy of attentional allocation (Drew
et al., 2009)—with distractors being secondary to the dom-
inant targets, but nonetheless processed—could help to ex-
plain why the singleton distractor is marked less often com-
pared to other, noncued distractors in stalking conditions but
not in flirty conditions. Given that the task triggered a feature
level of attention, which changed the distribution of attention
on the moving objects, distractors still received less attention
than targets due to the tracking task demands. The intermit-
tent flirty cue was simply too weak to be processed within the
limited amount of attention allocated to a distractor, while the
constantly visible stalking cue was stronger and thus needed
less resources to have an attentional e↵ect.
Intentional attentional control
However, it should be noted that we did not measure auto-
matic e↵ects that could be contributed to the featural single-
tons in Round 1. Features were only represented or at least
measurably used during tracking in conditions in which we
induced an ACS. Approaching the results in terms of atten-
tional control and goal- related processing of singletons, it is
easier to explain why targets were prioritized and distractor
inhibited. Folk and team (1992) proposed that a task-driven
selection mechanism guides attention and by that, the ob-
server is able to ignore or prioritize distinct objects. Ignoring
the distractor was harder to accomplish (i.e., demanded more
cognitive resources) in the flirty distractor condition because
participants had to keep track of four targets and figure out
whether a cue that only appeared twice was beneficial or not.
In the stalking distractor condition, the cue was constantly
visible, and confusions with the cued distractor were less
likely to occur. The same logic applies for tracking Round
1 (and Round 3 in Experiment 2). Without the task, no ACS
was activated and thus cued single objects had no relevance.
The spatiotemporal information was su cient to track the
objects successfully. This is what has been observed in pre-
vious studies and what has led to the conclusion that MOT is
a feature-independent, preattentive and low-level task (e.g.,
Hu↵, Jahn, & Schwan, 2009; but see Papenmeier et al.,
2013).
Costs of the additional task for the overall tracking per-
formance
Concerning the overall tracking performance, we were
certain that the additional identification task would draw
upon cognitive resources, resulting in a lower performance
in the dual-task conditions. However, based on our results of
the control experiment compared to the experiments in which
the manipulation was applied (Experiment 3 vs. 1, 2, and 4),
we can only assume that the costs of the second task are ba-
sically rather small, and, in case of the Experiment 4 (color),
congruent with small learning e↵ects in tracking. Consid-
ering Cohen et al. (2011), who maintained that feature and
location processing during tracking draw on the same, single
cognitive resource—a claim further supported by neurophys-
iological and functional neuroimaging studies (e.g., Corbetta
& Shulman, 2002; Sàenz, Buracˆas, & Boynton, 2003), that
found brain regions for attention to feature and location to
overlap—this is a surprising finding. In contrast to conclu-
sions made by Cohen et al. (2011), the small costs of the
additional identification task found in our data would rather
support the notion that tracking is either handled by an en-
tirely separate, encapsulated system from feature processing,
or some sharing of resources is possible without much decre-
ment. That is, when tracking a group of children of which
one is your own o↵spring on the playground, you will be
able to (attentionally) prioritize your own while at the same
time your tracking ability for the others will not be interfered
tremendously. Especially when the children’s features, for
example clothes, are colored di↵erently.
Our findings do not necessarily contradict the notion that
there is a trade-o↵ between locations and identities com-
pletely. Our findings simply bring us a step further to the
identification of the scope and limits of the involved re-
sources, suggesting that the identity of only one object can be
processed with negligible decrement to the overall location-
based tracking performance of the other objects.
Closely related to Luck et al. (1996), who proposed that
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di↵erent processing levels control di↵erent types of atten-
tional overload and interferences, Cohen et al. (2011) also
presented evidence that mental resources can be voluntarily
distributed across targets depending on task-demands (iden-
tity tracking or location tracking). The current study provides
additional evidence that attention allocation during MOT
has, or can be influenced by, a top-down component as well.
This was reflected in the strategically suppression of distrac-
tor objects to avoid errors.
Flexible gaze-cue usability
A final word on our choice for the stimuli is needed. First
and foremost, we used gazing eyes because we expected to
observe reflexive attention shifts to the gazed-at object, even
when the gaze cue was counterpredictive of the intended sac-
cade direction (which would have been especially disturbing
in cued-distractor trials; Kuhn &Kingstone, 2009). Gaze fol-
lowing is supposed to be reflexive and independent of cog-
nitive load (e.g., Driver et al., 1999; Friesen & Kingstone,
1998). This equally applies for objects within dynamic dis-
plays, indicating that attention induced by such cues can be
attached to moving objects and not only cue a spatial area
(Marotta, Casagrande, & Lupiáñez, 2013).
Yet, while there is compelling evidence for a highly au-
tomatic behavior as a response to gaze cues, recent studies,
including the presented one, raise some doubts (e.g., Koval,
Thomas, & Everling, 2005). Numerous studies suggest that
gaze cues can be used with a degree of flexibility (e.g., de-
pending on the observers goal: Bayliss, Frischen, Fenske, &
Tipper, 2007; Brooks & Meltzo↵, 2005; Johnson, Slaugh-
ter, & Carey, 1998; Macdonald & Tatler, 2013; Ricciardelli,
Carcagno, Vallar, & Bricolo, 2013). Particularly Böckler,
Knoblich, and Sebanz (2011) use the gaze-cue paradigm to
show that attention sharing (operationalized as mutual gaze
(i.e., at least two pairs of eyes/faces shift their gazes simulta-
neously) can modulate joint attention. They not only propose
that observing others sharing attention increases the signif-
icance of an ensuing gaze, but with a crucial condition in
which they tested whether gaze following was modulated by
the relevance of the looked-at-target to the observer’s current
goal/task, they concluded that certain contextual conditions
and top-down mechanisms a↵ect gaze-following behavior.
Our study provides further support for the possibility that
gaze cues are not necessarily followed reflexively indepen-
dent of cognitive load. Based on the non significant Round
1 results, we conclude that participants may have used the
gaze-cue flexibly and strategically during tracking in our
study. Still, it is di cult to determine whether they actually
followed the gaze cue or concentrated on featural di↵erences
only. One finding that would speak in favor of gaze-cue pro-
cessing is that the stalking and the flirty target trials showed
the same e↵ects. However, while this argues in favor of par-
allel processes one could also defend a serial account in com-
bination with the hierarchy of attention as proposed by Drew
et al. (2009) and discussed before. The participants would
have scanned the targets first before scanning the distractors.
The short duration of feature visibility in flirty trials (3 sec-
onds in total) may have been not enough to process features
and identify the behavior in distractor trials, since by the time
the participant reached the first distractor object, the featural
cue would have already disappeared.
On the other hand, the Experiment 4 (color cues) showed
that the same attentional control applies to color stimuli—but
still does little to clarify the specific issue of cue—versus fea-
ture use. While replicating the results of Experiments 1–3,
in Experiment 4 with color cues we found some indication,
even though not reaching statistical significance, of reactions
to an abrupt onset of the color cue in flirty trials in Round
1. As Yantis (1993) suggested, those kinds of visual onsets
may capture attention independent of an attentional state of
feature readiness. Therefore, it is di cult to arrive at a defi-
nite conclusion as to whether gaze cues were used or object
features were compared during tracking. We may have sim-
ply observed here that gaze cues were used intentionally but
did not work reflexively, while color cues elicited bottom-up
reactions that were actively suppressed and channeled in the
ACS condition. Possible future research could be concerned
with abrupt occurrences of salient features during tracking.
By further connecting MOT to other fields of research (e.g.,
attention capture), we may be able to solve some of the rid-
dles and misunderstandings that tracking studies could have
not disentangle up to now.
Benefits, drawbacks, and further applications
The presented novel variation of the standard MOT task
(Pylyshyn & Storm, 1988) kept the general structure of the
task but presented a feature singleton among identical ob-
jects, that was either among the targets or among the distrac-
tors—a design that has not been applied before. This allowed
us to explore various e↵ects at the same time, which may
simultaneously represent a benefit as well as a drawback.
Here, we focused on activating an ACS and observed the pri-
oritization or inhibition of the feature singleton. Nonetheless,
additional beneficial information could have been gained
from including a focus on the social aspect and/or includ-
ing a clinical sample. We believe that our modification of
the paradigm can be applied with clinical populations—for
example, through testing the ability to switch between par-
allel and serial processing, or testing patients with autism
or Asperger’s on their processing skills of dynamic gazes.
With this being said, an eye-tracking study will be of tremen-
dous use to further understand the modified paradigm. One
could determine whether color and gaze cues produce the
same results but are processed di↵erently. In other words,
gaze cues may produce involuntary saccades to the cued ob-
ject but could be actively suppressed by the observer in order
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to successfully track the objects. Furthermore, we may find
parallel processing (focus on the centroid of the targets) in
Round 1, and serial processing (target jumping) in Round 2.
Another option could be the use of single-pulse transcranial
magnetic stimulation (TMS) on the superior lateral temporal
cortex that is known to interfere with gaze direction tasks
(Pourtois, Grandjean, Sander, & Vuilleumier, 2004). This
interference was also found to be task-specific.
Although we did not find direct evidence for an automatic
distinctiveness e↵ect for the feature singletons, it is possible
that we failed to measure the e↵ect due to our experimental
design. Future experiments concerned with automatic atten-
tional shifts in MOT environments should consider contrast-
ing trials with and without singletons, that is, including trials
without distinct objects. Furthermore, the slightly di↵erent
results found in Experiment 4 (color), however not statisti-
cally significant, could be an indicator of reflexive attention
shifts in case of abrupt appearing cues. Future studies could
be concerned with bottom-up e↵ects of abrupt and gradual
appearing features in MOT studies, and its dependency on
an ACS.
Finally, we would like to highlight our decision for adapt-
ing the standard analysis of tracking capacity to our hypothe-
ses. In contrast to the majority, if not all, MOT studies, we
measured how often each of the eight objects was marked
and compared this selection mean of cued and noncued ob-
jects by condition. This gave us a far more vivid picture of
the attention distribution than a simple mean value of cor-
rectly tracked items. In fact, proportion correct showed no
e↵ects in our data (i.e., was not a↵ected by the cueing be-
havior displayed). We believe this approach to be promising
for future research (e.g., for studies concerned with the dif-
ferent role of targets and distractors). It is our hope that our
newly modified analysis will be in use in future studies in
order to gain more refined insight. However, it is important
to mention that our decision to include only trials in which
the participants correctly identified the eyes behavior and the
type of object that was cued, was a theoretical advantage (ex-
cluding trials in which we cannot be sure that the participants
was actively involved in the task), but a slight disadvantage
for interpretative purposes. Because the proportion of cor-
rectly identified trials di↵ered for the two gazing behaviors,
we only analyzed data within each behavior and each round,
and not across behaviors and rounds. Any statements con-
cerned with the strength of the e↵ect found in flirty com-
pared to stalking conditions are thus purely speculative. Fu-
ture studies focusing on ACS and MOT should find a way
to control the participant’s attentional engagement with less
consequences for data analysis. Regardless, the present re-
sults indicate a consistent pattern of attentional resolution in
tracking tasks that changes due to task demands.
Conclusion
Our results reveal a striking cued-target selection prefer-
ence and a cued- distractor inhibition when participants re-
ceived an identification task that engaged them actively in the
processing of object features during tracking. These e↵ects
were attributed to the activation of an attentional control set,
a term that originally stems from research on attention cap-
ture and visual search. We propose here that the allocation of
attention and a flexible attentional resolution is not only an
automatic reaction of the visual system to prevent confusions
when interobject spacing decreases but also managed by a
goal-related, top-down component. The introduced modifi-
cation of the MOT paradigm, as well as the unusual type
of analysis, o↵er various new options for future research in
di↵erent areas.
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Part III
Review
The last part of this thesis reviews and discusses the
results in relation to each other, particularly with re-
gard to their signiﬁcance for our understanding of
dynamic representations of objects and events. The
discussion is partially based on a process ﬂow dia-
gram that depicts the diﬀerent levels of perception
discovered as well as the diﬀerent inﬂuential factors
discussed.
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Chapter 5
General discussion and
conclusion
5.1 Summary of results
The three studies presented in this thesis produced the following main results:
1) Children as young as 6 years process multiple dynamic objects based on
the scene and the relation of objects. The results found may have been
intensiﬁed using an experimental design that involved abrupt viewpoint
changes – consequently, participants may have adopted a scene-based
strategy to recover tracked targets after the rotation of the (3-D) board
more easily. The preliminary processing stage of dynamic objects seems
to be congruent with the initial approach to perceive static objects: global
over local.
2) Processing dynamic scenes globally, that is, choosing core aspects instead
of ﬁne details of the scene to bementally represented, can also explain re-
sults of Study 2 that looked at event perception with omitted visual input.
In scenes that involve relations of stimuli and goal related behavior, one
needs to consider not only the visual input, but also the complexity of
the scene as well as how the available information is structured and pre-
sented. Results are explained as a “victory” of the anticipatory trace over
the perceptual trace. As shown in studies on representationalmomentum
as well as on basketball and chess constellations, an anticipatory trace
is automatically represented and stored along with the perceptual trace
when the object (e.g. typical motion) or the scene (e.g. typical sequence
in chess) is (well) known. In recognition tasks, the competition is biased
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towards the anticipatory trace when the observed scene is logical, for ex-
ample, ﬁtting a known cause-eﬀect heuristic (a ball that is kicked will
move somehow). In contrast, when the scene does not make sense, the
perceptual trace wins and the observer can report correctly the missing
information in the observed scene. The overwrite of the perceptual trace
by the anticipatory trace can happen extremely fast as indicated by the
results of an unpublished control experiment in which participants were
asked to segment the clips by pressing a button while watching. Surpris-
ingly, the anticipatory trace was even fast and/or robust enough to over-
write perceptual traces when the participants were asked to actively pay
attention to the contact moment. Theories of (event) perception should
integrate how information is presented and structured to account for the
competition of the two stored traces.
3) In order to observe attentional processes that are not “blurred” by infor-
mation structures (inevitable in real-world video clips), we relied upon
the MOT task in Study 3 again. Here, I manipulated the way in which in-
formation was ﬁltered and weighted by asking the participants to identify
object behavior (gazing and color) and object status (target or distractor).
(a) Results replicated ﬁndings of numerous studies showing that features
are not processed during tracking. (b) When participants did the iden-
tiﬁcation during tracking, they were able to weigh the incoming sensory
information based on their current task, that is, they integrated andmain-
tained feature information in their representations. (c) When features
were valued, it helped the participants to suppress identiﬁed distractors
during tracking. (d) When features were not of interest any more, partic-
ipants immediately put full weight on spatiotemporal aspects. However,
I assume that many features still reach consciousness but they simply do
not reach the threshold of awareness when they are not actively attended
to, and consequently, not valued (see Figure 6). (e) The strategic input
weighing eﬀect during tracking has been observed to be the strongest
with color cues, but it was also possible for the participants to identify the
object status even when only a minimal gaze cue (two small dots moving
in two white spheres) was presented shortly.
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5.2 Amulti-process approach to visual perception?
The question mark in the title reﬂects the general uncertainty that is quite
prominent in literature: it is hardly possible to deﬁne any deﬁnite processes.
Gordon (2004) summarizes the problem as follows (p. 217):
“To conclude (...), it can be asserted that there is as yet no satisfactory general
theory of visual perception. For example, no theory has adequately united a full
analysis of the environment and the cognitive aspects of seeing. No general the-
ory has thoroughly incorporated and explained the motor aspects of seeing. The
extent to which perception is determined by stimulation (involving bottom-up
processes) or knowledge (top-down processes) has not been agreed upon.”
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INPUT LIMITEDRESOURCE Weight
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goals
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knowledge
situation
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salience
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seeing is perceiving
predicting is perceiving
CONSTRUCTIVIST
REPORT
FĎČĚėĊ 7: Visual perception as a dual process: Perceptual pro-
cessing on diﬀerent perceptual levels.
Figure 7 incorporates the diﬀerent ideas and theoretical considerations ad-
dressed in this thesis in one diagram. Basically, it follows the general order
that lays the foundations to understand perceptual processes in diﬀerent the-
ories (see Gordon, 2004, for an overview): sensory input, ﬁltering through a
limited resource, information processing, and action (or report). Based on the
current work, one needs to include the following processes to account for the
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obtained results1: input weighing, awareness, and competition for representa-
tion. Furthermore, the included integral parts have a top-down and bottom-up
component that may be given more or less priority based on the given situa-
tion or strength of the signal. In this work, I have argued that both, bottom-up
and top-down processes, can be important to represent a dynamic scene. Such
an integration the constructivist and ecological approach is possible when one
considers perception as a cyclical activity. Therefore, Figure 7 also includes the
cyclical approach of Neisser (1967), who assumed that perception is a continu-
ous process with no deﬁnite starting or ﬁnishing point.
However, I do not dare to claim that Figure 7 automatically generalizes to sit-
uations and conditions outside the speciﬁc experimental designs in this work.
Perception of dynamic objects and events is not that simple: one needs to ac-
count for numerous internally and externally inﬂuencing factors; diﬀerent con-
ditions result in diﬀerent perceptual approaches. It is possible that the human
brain has numerous ways (useful or useless) to represent objects and events;
ways that evolved through a trial-error principle. Still, there are neurobiologi-
cal constraints that should not be disregarded and that result in resource lim-
itations or give rise to competition of representations. In the following, I will
describe Figure 7 with regard to each component, as well as dorsal/ventral and
bottom-up/top-down systems and attentional processes, along with their role
in each of the presented papers and future research.
5.2.1 Limited resources
The sudden appearance of a gorilla can go unnoticed when the observer fo-
cuses all of his attention on a challenging primary task like counting basketball
throws (e.g. Simons & Chabris, 1999). The eﬀect was named inattentional blind-
ness and is thought to reﬂect the limited capacity of the perceptual-visual re-
source. This and similar experiments reveal that the human perceptual system
continuously monitors only relatively few, speciﬁc visual properties. One may
say that such an experiment deﬁnes the quality of the limited capacity. The
paradigms presented in this work, however, rather quantify the limitations by
suggesting that tracking capacity reﬂects a ﬁxed number of object-based “slots”
(e.g. Awh, Barton, & Vogel, 2007) and by suggesting that scene encoding pro-
cesses are limited to a number of meaningful (sub)events (Zacks et al., 2007).
1Note that deﬁnitive statements in respect to the order of individual perceptual processes
can not be made based on the experiments presented. Further research is needed to determine
the order of processes, especially for the competitive traces.
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Limited object tracking
In MOT, people can track at least four objects e.g., Pylyshyn and Storm (1988)
– a limit similar to the mental storage capacity found in memory studies (see
Cowan, 2001) discussed in Chapter 3. I will brieﬂy present the diﬀerent ap-
proaches that can be found in literature to describe the relationship of a limited
mental resource and tracking.
With a neurological approach, one can explain the nature of the resource-
limiting tracking performance with an assigned pool of neurons that reacts to
targets (e.g., Culham et al. (1998), see Horowitz and Cohen (2010) for a com-
plete list of relevant references). When target load increases, the number of
neurons that can react to each target decrease which reduces the quality of the
representation (tracking as a parallel process: Pylyshyn & Storm, 1988; Yantis,
1992).
d’Avossa, Shulman, Snyder, andCorbetta (2006) proposed thatmental resources
may, alternatively, be constrained by a temporal, that is, a serial or “a limited
capacity, time-multiplexing processor rather than multiple, parallel processes”
(p. 3409). The idea: a single attentional focus has to be moved among the
targets (serially), reducing the quality of the representation when the number
of targets increases. The results of a study by Howard and Holcombe (2008)
support the application of serial and parallel processes during MOT tasks. The
authors assume that some attributes are updated in parallel, while others (e.g.
object identities: Oksama & Hyönä, 2004) are processed serially.
While there is widespread agreement that some kind of limitedmental resource
is involved in tracking processes (see for example Alvarez & Franconeri, 2007),
no agreement can be reached on the nature of perceptual, attentional, or cogni-
tive processes underlying tracking. A main share of theories considers limited
attention resources to be the cause of tracking errors. MOT and attention is
discussed extensively later in section 5.3.3.
In the current work, I especially focused on the debate concerning the role of
spatiotemporal aspects and objects features (see section ?? and Study 3 for a
review of the debate) and hypothesized that there must be a secondary ﬁner
ﬁlter that is responsible for the ambiguous results found in literature.
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Limited event perception
In event perception, the information in our environment almost always exceeds
the capacity of the working memory system. It is assumed that the limited
working memory capacity inﬂuences the representational process by picking
only informative moments to be retained (Levin & Saylor, 2008). Based on the
EST, the capacity of the working memory can be further augmented by the
use of previously stored knowledge (Zacks et al., 2007), called event schemata.
These schemata consist of semanticmemory representations of shared features
and events, and also store information about the sequential structure of an ac-
tivity. The EST states that event schemata inﬂuence a current event model
that in turn ensures a stable representation of a current event by perceptual
processing accordingly. In Study 2, we observed illusionary gap ﬁllings that
cannot be explained suﬃciently by the EST. If event schemata integrate ex-
perience and knowledge, we would have expected to ﬁnd diﬀerences between
referees, players, and novices. For our results, it seems rather plausible that,
due to the limited mental capacity, only informative moments are processed.
However, this approach also does not explain our results completely because
this would imply that the ball-contact moment was an informative moment in
some conditions but not in others. In section 5.2.4, I therefore propose that
the information structure inﬂuences which perceived event moments can be
reported. That is, whether the event segments ﬁt in a causal or non-causal
manner inﬂuence what can be reported after watching them.
Little is known about the nature of the limitation of the mental capacity in
event perception. Future research may test individuals’ ability to process and
segment diﬀerent events simultaneously. For example, one could expose par-
ticipants to a situation in which they follow a conversation and observe a card
game (diﬀerent streams), or expose them to two conversations or two activities
(similar streams). It may be possible that observers are limited to processing
only one stream at a time, or only diﬀerent or only similar streams in parallel.
5.2.2 Weight
Weighted object tracking
The “magic number four” that is often assumed to reﬂect limited resources does
not appear to be ﬁxed. With the right display conditions (e.g. reduced object
speed) inMOT tasks, Alvarez and Franconeri (2007)were able to raise the target
5.2. A multi-process approach to visual perception? 101
number up to eight objects at once. As shown in Study 1 in Chapter 2, multi-
ple objects can be compressed by higher-order structures. Such an eﬀect has
been observed in literature before; targets were organized and automatically
grouped by symmetry or common fate (Wang, Zhang, Li, & Lyu, 2016), feature
(Erlikhman, Keane, Mettler, Horowitz, & Kellman, 2013), or simply structured
as a rigid polygon (Yantis, 1992). Papenmeier et al. (2014) observed that the reli-
ability of spatiotemporal information determines whether feature information
is processed or used (in an automatic manner).
While such automatic grouping or preferential processes could still be explained
as having evolved as short-cuts due to limited resources, the results of Study 3
cannot. Here, observers were able to integrate knowledge about the objects’
properties and motion behavior to strategically enhance tracking performance
for the cued target and reduce the confusion of targets with the cued distractor.
Participants were given highly reliable spatiotemporal and feature information,
that is, they were not forced to rely on one or the other due to external circum-
stances (e.g. reduced frame rate) but due to internal control (i.e. the identi-
ﬁcation task). Still, the relevance of the processing object features played an
inﬂuential role in whether participants actually processed them. Even when
participants tracked one round with the identiﬁcation task and knew about
the helpful properties, they did not continue to process them in addition to the
tracking task when no identiﬁcation task was given.
As others before, I conclude that MOT is a task that involves both attention-
bound and pre-attentive processes that in turn constitute the object-tracking
capacity (see also Bello, Bridewell, &Wasylyshyn, 2016). The current work adds,
however, that the capacity is not fully exhausted with a simple tracking task;
the task still allows the participants to weigh the information input and pro-
cess objects and features strategically. Attention and weighing are discussed in
more detail in 5.3.3 where I refer to the biased competition model of selective
attention in eﬀect models (Desimone, 1998).
Weighted event perception
In real life scenarios with more complex stimuli and more detailed situational
information, as presented in Study 2), such a weighing ﬁlter must be running
constantly in order for us to function properly. However, less is known about
the inﬂuence of expertise (i.e. top-down processes) on event perception. In
Study 2), we showed that the vulnerability of cognitive-perceptual processes
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to illusionary event ﬁllings is similar in experts and novices when observing
well-known events. Future research should work with stimuli and properties
that speciﬁcally trigger knowledge in experts in order to observe weighing dif-
ferences. I hypothesize that experts “know where to look” in more complex
tasks, thus, they will process stimuli based on their relevance, while novices
will rather depend on the reliability of presented information.
Concerning the idea of situation and feature, or object- and scene-based pro-
cessing, one possible experiment to contextualize our results could be to dis-
rupt a higher-level form of event organization (e.g. with misordered events). It
may be possible that the reliability of the coarse event structure automatically
determines the weight assigned to smaller subparts of events like the ball con-
tact moment (idea inspired by face perception research of Young, Hellawell, &
Hay, 2013).
Left unanswered is the question whether the failure to report the gaps arises
from perceptual or memory processes, nor did Study 2 help to determine when
exactly event perception involves prediction and comparison, and when it does
not. Hymel, Levin, and Baker (2016) tested the event perception of participants
with disordered event sequences and deduced that viewers can perceive ele-
ments of events without necessarily testing expectations and hypotheses about
the observed sequences (as would have been predicted by the EST, Zacks et
al., 2007) – unless task-speciﬁc demands (like detecting misorderings) require
them to do so. Such an automatic “default” processing mode of events may
follow similar, or the same, principles as the automatic scene-based tracking
of multiple objects observed in Study 1, while the relevance of task-speciﬁc
demands can inﬂuence the hierarchical organization of the perceptual levels
in order to detect misorderings or, as observed in Study 3, to process object
properties.
5.2.3 Processing
Dual-mechanisms frameworks as described in section 5.2.2, namely, (1) event
perception depends on the awareness of prediction errors (Zacks et al., 2007)
and (2) processing sequences is an inherent dimension of event perception
(Raisig, Welke, Hagendorf, & van der Meer, 2010), are frequently found in lit-
erature. As participants in our lab were always asked to report what they had
seen, it makes sense to go beyond the area of perception and look at execu-
tive functions as well. An interesting dual-mechanisms concept for executive
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functions that nicely ﬁts the ideas discussed is a division in proactive and reac-
tive processing. Braver (2012) proposed a dual-mechanisms of control (DMC)
framework in which individuals can proactively organize their cognitions in or-
der to inhibit distractions and maintain a goal. In contrast, the reactive control
mode rather works as a “just-in-time” mechanism that mobilizes the identi-
ﬁcation and execution of goal-relevant actions only when absolutely needed,
probably relying on bottom-up short-cuts. Assuming a similar functioning to
the DMC framework in event perception, the perception of an event may in-
volve two types of processing: (1) a default or reactive mode in which parts
and subparts of the ongoing event are not actively attended, expectations are
not tested, and details cannot be reported, and (2) a proactive mode in which
participants are consciously aware of the current state of the on-going event,
continuously maintain a representation of goal-relevant information, and mo-
bilize resources to identify the event and relevant parts. Whether participants
can actually report a seen event correctly afterwardsmay still be independent of
their applied processing framework. The overall global information structure
could aﬀect the competition of perceived sensory traces and predicted antici-
patory traces (discussed in the next section), leading to biased reports.
The DMC framework of Braver (2012) also mirrors the concept of attentional
control settings described in Study 3. The applied design in the tracking study
is assumed to evoke a top-down ﬁltering of sensory input due to the identiﬁca-
tion task. The participants still processed spatiotemporal information (in order
to solve the tracking task), but put weight on the feature information as well.
By proactively attending to the objects’ behavior and status, they were able to
report consciously their observations after each trial. As demonstrated in the
second experiment of Study 3, in which the participants were told that the ob-
jects would show the exact (possibly helpful) behavior pattern but that there
would not be an identiﬁcation task after each trial, the signiﬁcance of object
features is as important as the proactive or reactive control setting of attention.
In general, together with ﬁndings of (Papenmeier et al., 2014), results of Study
3 support Model B presented in Figure 6, page 61. Many stimuli reach the mind
but the eye sees only what the mind is prepared to comprehend (Davies, 1951),
that is, what is conscious. Attending to the conscious stimuli (or features) al-
lows them to reach the threshold of awareness, thus, they form a representation
(for competition) and can be reported.
One may assume that the weighing of relevance and reliability provides the
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structure for the actual processing part, similar to what has been called “bot-
tleneck” or ﬁltering in literature. But, as I see it, weighing is more advanced
than a simple ﬁlter since it does not only provide bottom-up and automatic
“tricks” like grouping, but also includes a top-down structure that adapts ﬂex-
ibly to current needs. Next to internal needs, like proactively and strategically
attending to object features, the weighing process can also be inﬂuenced by ex-
ternal circumstances like speed of moving objects and their spatial distance to
each other (inter-object spacing, e.g. Franconeri, Jonathan, & Scimeca, 2010).
More research could specify the relation of limited resources, weighing and pro-
cessing: for example, when and how the weighing process intervenes, whether
weighing is also inﬂuenced by processing output (initiating a cyclical process),
or how many components (like reliability and relevance) can be assigned to
the weighing process. Clearly deﬁned goals and tasks may be important for
the weighing to occupy limited resources eﬃciently – as we have observed in
Study 3, Experiment 3, in which a better instruction led to improved trans-
parency and decreased confusions of cued distractors. Optimistically assuming
an interaction of ﬂexible weighing and proactive/reactive (or conscious/uncon-
scious) processing provides more feasible and more intuitive explanations and
may help to explain ambiguous ﬁndings in the dynamic-perception literature.
Future studies in tracking may eventually move beyond questions of how re-
sources are limited and start discussing fundamental questions on what the
resources are and how we can use them for maximum beneﬁt in everyday life.
5.2.4 Competition
Baker and Levin (2015) propose that relational triggers induce comparisons be-
tween currently visible visual properties and those encountered and encoded
in the past. This enables the observer to intelligently allocate limited resources
to new features and to withdraw resources from stable, well-known features.
The authors further state that the observer not only associates the ongoing
perception and activates previously seen visual properties, but also activates
a predictive process that anticipates future properties and events. In Chap-
ter 3, section 3.3, I presented a study with basketball novices and experts by
Didierjean and Marmèche (2005) who explained the errors made in the recog-
nition task by assuming two competitive traces that are stored simultaneously.
They explained that experts made more errors because they immediately pre-
dicted the follow-up constellation of the depicted actual constellation and had
trouble afterwards to distinguish between the actual perceptual trace and the
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anticipated trace. Similarly, Johnson et al. (1993) and Johnson and Raye (1981)
assumed a competition of source and reality monitoring to explain the bound-
ary extension eﬀect.
In Study 2 we observed illusory gap ﬁllings when participants watched a well-
known, simple activity: the kick or throw of a ball. While one could explain
their reporting errors in the causal condition with the selection of only infor-
mative moments to reduce the amount of incoming information for the limited
mental resource, such an approach does not explain why the participants were
able to report to have seen the contact moment in the non-causal condition.
How could they know when the ball-contact moment was an informative mo-
ment to select for storing? Following the idea of Didierjean and Marmèche
(2005) and Johnson et al. (1993), I propose that we may have observed a com-
petition of stored traces and identiﬁed an inﬂuential factor: the information
structure. The outcome of the competition was inﬂuenced by the information
structure: When the informationwas presented in a causal manner, the partici-
pants’ recognition report was biased towards the stored anticipatory trace – but
when the observed scene was linked in a non-causal manner, the participants
relied on the stored sensory/perceptual trace. Such an approach is somewhat
connected to the conceptual semantics proposed by Jackendoﬀ (1991): a syn-
tax, that is, a structure guides the encoding of human understanding of the
world, making inferences based on heuristics, and is connected to the internal
structure of the perceiver.
Somewhat far-fetched but still worth speculating about is the connection of vi-
sual information structure in event perception to lexical structure in sentence
processing. Pustejovsky (1991) showed that the lexical speciﬁcation of a verb’s
event-type (e.g. “she hammered the metal” (a process) vs “she hammered the
metal ﬂat”(a transition)) can be overruled “as a result of syntactic and seman-
tic compositionality of the verb with other elements in the sentence” (p. 56).
That is, the internal structure of the event not only changes the meaning of
a word but is also an important representation for general lexical semantics.
Applied to Study 2, this would mean, that the causal/non-causal information
structure overruled the “meaning” of the ball-contact moment and by that may
have changed the overall representation reﬂected in the report of the recogni-
tion task.
Future research in event perception should clarify how the perception, or the
report of perceived events, changes due to the information structure. First,
a two-part experiment in which participants ﬁrst watch event sequences and
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do the recognition task and second, watch the event sequences and segment
them while doing so, would provide clarity concerning the debate of “report
vs perception” and by that may be able to show when the overriding due to
information structure happens exactly . Second, further research is needed to
verify the inﬂuence of stored anticipatory and perceptual/sensory trace and its
relation to schemata and event models suggested in the EST.
The current work does not provide any indication of active competitive traces
in tracking. For one thing, most of the researchers argue that extrapolation
is not applied in MOT because observers rely solely on “location-only”, that
is, only on the positions of the tracked objects (see Lukavskỳ & Děchtěrenko,
2016, for an up-to-date summary of studies and accounts). Hence, there would
be no anticipated trace to compete with the perceptual trace. On the other
hand, ﬁndings on extrapolation MOT are mixed and it would be interesting to
explore whether a given higher-order information structure inﬂuences tracking
performance and/or the report of an object-constellation.
Is the competition of traces the same as weighing? The way I understood the
concept of competing traces by Didierjean and Marmèche (2005) is, that traces
can only happenwhen the stored traces are fully “equipped” or fully anticipated.
Thus, the traces are a result of extensive ﬁltering, weighing, and processing, a
procedure that may be cyclic in nature to ﬁnd the best possible interpretation.
The next section describes the outer circle of Figure 7 that is based on Neisser
(1967) and, in a broader sense, on the EST by Zacks et al. (2007).
5.2.5 Bottom-up and top-down levels
What and where?
In Chapter 1 I compared the constructivist (inferential) approach (e.g. Gregory,
1980) to the ecological (direct) approach (e.g. Gibson & Gibson, 1955) of per-
ception. Data presented here advocate that these two seemingly contradictory
approaches can co-exist if a current goal or the structure of the available infor-
mation allows or demands it.
Such a possible dual-process approach is in line with Norman (2002) who re-
viewed the two theoretical approaches with regard to their parallelism to dor-
sal and ventral systems. The idea of two visual systems stems from research
by Schneider (1967) in which ablation of the cortical visual system of a group
of golden hamsters lead to incapability of pattern discrimination but left the
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ability to orient towards objects intact, while disconnecting the superior col-
liculus lead to the opposite eﬀect. According to the researcher and quite a few
other studies on cortical and subcortical systems (e.g. Ingle, 1967; Trevarthen,
1968), the ventral pathway answers the question “What is it?”, the dorsal path-
way answers the question “Where is it?” (see e.g. Mishkin & Ungerleider, 1982;
Mishkin, Ungerleider, & Macko, 1983). Thus, the ventral system is responsible
for recognition and identiﬁcation by comparing input with stored representa-
tions, while the dorsal pathway’s primary function is to individuate and analyze
visual stimuli to guide the observer’s behavior in the given environment.
Norman (2002) contrasted the ventral and the dorsal system and identiﬁed
their diﬀerences. For example, the dorsal pathway responds to low contrasts
at coarse spatial frequencies (contrast sensitivity) and to static shapes, but the
perception of complexmotion is processed by the ventral system (Ferrera, Rudolph,
&Maunsell, 1994). Further, the ventral system is responsible formemory-based
processes and uses stored representations to identify objects and events. Ad-
ditionally, Norman (2002) also explained how diﬀerent reference frames arise
due to the diﬀerent purposes of the two pathways. The dorsal one aims to (in-
ter)act with the environment, that is, it needs absolute metrics (e.g. to grasp
something). As a result, an egocentric reference frame is the primary choice
of the dorsal system. On the other hand, the ventral system focuses on object-
centered information to organize, recognize, and identify objects and events.
Therefore, an allocentric reference frame, or scene-based processing with rela-
tive metrics is applied based on purposes of the ventral system.
Scholl (2009) compares MOT to visual search. Visual search can interfere with
scene encoding because both processes rely on ventral pathways, that is, “an
identiﬁcation-based form of attention” (see p. 71). In contrast, MOT may rely
heavily on dorsal (individuation-based) attention because visual search and
tracking hardly interfere with each other (Alvarez, Horowitz, Arsenio, DiMase,
& Wolfe, 2005). Accordingly, we observed an automatic scene-based tracking
approach in Study 1 that was probably executed without conscious awareness,
thus via the dorsal system. The participants “ﬁltered” the sensory input through
automatic grouping which seems to be a fundamental perceptual strategy. The
dorsal pathway picks up visual information quickly and mainly unconsciously,
presumably being able to carry out the performance of well-ingrained actions
or behaviors on its own (i.e. many of our daily activities).
Such an automatic processing of visual information may also apply to Study
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2 in which participants processed a well-known event/motion pattern inde-
pendent of (presumably top-down) expertise. However, here, it was important
“how” the information was presented and structured, a component that has
been overlooked so far. Since the ventral pathway relies on long-term memory
to compare current visual information with experienced representations, it is
possible that the observed cause-eﬀect relationship triggered the ventral path-
way to increase processing speed by supplying heuristics. Norman (2002) pro-
posed that the ventral and dorsal pathway can act in parallel. Similarly, Figure
7 presents diﬀerent subcomponents that are roughly divided into bottom-up
and top-down processing that act in parallel and may interact when needed.
Scholl (2009) ascribed the inability of the observer to encode surface features
of objects during tracking to the reliance on the dorsal pathway. Yet, the data
presented in Study 3 point towards the use of feature information during a
spatiotemporal-based task – thus, favoring rather a cooperation of both, the
dorsal and the ventral pathway that is triggered by speciﬁc situational demands.
Unidirectional or iterative?
Most theories of perception suggest some form of interaction between see-
ing and interpreting or perception and prediction (including Helmholtz, 1866;
Neisser, 1967). Di Lollo, Enns, and Rensink (2000) summarized existing ap-
proaches and considered two options:
On the one hand, one could see the communication between lower and higher
levels as an unidirectional process. The perceived attributes of a stimulus are
gathered and maintained while processing ascends to higher levels. That is,
when all bottom-up stimulus information is gathered, the process is completed
and the outcome is transferred to the next higher processing level. On the other
hand, the process could be iterative through constant exchange of neuronal sig-
nals among diﬀerent levels. Many ascending and descending pathways allow
for an iterative-loop system that can reduce noise and helps to verify hypothe-
ses. Di Lollo et al. (2000) argued that many current theoretical approaches
could be augmented with notions of iterative reentrant processing – that is,
theories could proﬁt from neurological ﬁndings that propose that the brain has
a back-projecting (i.e. reentrant) architecture that connects sensory modalities
with unimodal associations (Pandya, Seltzer, & Barbas, 1986). If memory pro-
cesses operate early to organize sensory data into meaningful percepts based
on current expectancies and experiences, perception requires such a reentrant
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mechanism that consolidates memory while linking multiple other networks
in the brain (see Luu et al., 2010, for more neurophysiological details).
One such cyclical approach to perception comes from Neisser (1967). Accord-
ing to the “perceptual cycle”, perception is a cyclical process with no start or
ﬁnish point. Observers constantly analyze and sample the perceptual world
(bottom-up) and react to stimuli that are relevant to them. These reactions
activate given models (or schemata) that observers try to verify with a search
for expected features. Accordingly, our perception is led by what we expect to
ﬁnd as well as what we have already found. The schema directs the percep-
tion to certain parts of the information that is available to us, and the found
information itself continually modiﬁes and changes the schema. Neisser sees
perception as a complex process at all levels: cognitive, physiological, interper-
sonal and socio-cultural.
Howwould such an approachwork for the presented data? Di Lollo et al. (2000)
stated that many ﬁndings can be explained with a unidirectional process, and
so can the ﬁndings of Study 1 and Study 2. Participants relied heavily on the
bottom-up part and sampled the given information. However, the tracking
study in Study 3 involved a top-down task that required to adopt a schema (or
an attentional control set) that inﬂuenced the perceptual process to sample a
speciﬁed part of the available information and to constantly search for a veriﬁ-
cation of the schema (e.g. is the target I am tracking a cued object?). While I
agree with the authors that many ﬁndings follow a simple unidirectional pro-
cess, I can easily imagine that participants went through cycles during each
tracking trial to ensure that they could identify the objects’ nature afterwards.
Neisser (1976) also had an interesting view on attentional processes. He re-
garded attention as a skilled activity that is not limited in its capacity. The
selection of stimuli would then be based on the immediate situation and on
the anticipation of what may be relevant. Neisser did not state it explicitly,
but his view rather sees attention as an eﬀect triggered by demands of the cur-
rent situation, than as the cause for a selective perceptual output. While event
perception is thought to rely mainly on memory processes – event models are
basic units of long-term memory (Ezzyat & Davachi, 2011) and are represented
in working memory to make relevant information to the immediate context
available (Speer & Zacks, 2005; Zacks, 2008) – MOT is often discussed as an
attentional process. In the next section I will shortly present cause and eﬀect
theories of attentional selection and speculate on their use to explain tracking
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results. Very brieﬂy, I will comment on the role of attention in event percep-
tion.
5.3 Theories of Attentional Selection
As already indicated in the beginning of Part II of this thesis: attention has
many denotations, connotations, and subtypes. The lack of clarity in the liter-
ature may have caused researchers to rather propose their own theories than to
extend or falsify existing work. With regard to the two models that represent
the most contrasting concepts of the many models proposed in the literature
(Figure 6 on page 61, Lamme, 2003), it seems plausible that the numerous views
and theoretical approaches to understand attentional processes classify as ei-
ther “cause-oriented” or “eﬀect-oriented”. Viewing attention as the “cause” of
various cognitive phenomena assumes that attention is a speciﬁc mechanism,
made of interacting subcomponents in the brain, and a pool of resources that
is allocated to a task (order in line with Figure 6, model A). Viewing attention
as an “eﬀect” conceptualizes attention as an epiphenomenon of multiple inde-
pendent cognitive systems, that is, as a byproduct of information processing
among multiple systems (order in line with Figure 6, model B).
5.3.1 Cause Theories
An often used metaphor in cognitive psychology that is a good example for a
“cause-oriented” theory is the attentional spotlight metaphor (e.g., Cave & Bi-
chot, 1999; Posner, 1980; Posner et al., 1980). Posner et al. (1980) suggested
that a spotlight scans the environment serially and draws attention to stimuli
within the ﬁeld of view in an endogenous manner. Stimuli outside the central
view are brought into the center via an exogenous system (e.g., reﬂexive orien-
tation to a color singleton or gaze-cues). The delay between onset of a cue and
the increase of an electrophysiological response at the cued location has been
thought to measure the time needed to re-allocate the attentional spotlight to
the new location (Müller, Teder-Sälejärvi, & Hillyard, 1998). However, by at-
tempting to measure the maximum width of the attentional spotlight, it was
found that unattended stimuli also produced brain activity (less than attended
stimuli though) (see e.g., Castiello & Umiltà, 1992; Tong, 2004; Wojciulik, Kan-
wisher, & Driver, 1998). Attention could thus be split, or divided, urging the
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adoption of a multifocal metaphor that describes how multiple spotlights scan
localized regions of the visual ﬁeld.
Closely related to the spotlight metaphor is the idea that attention depends
on a limited resource that is allocated to selected perceptual units in accor-
dance to a general purpose (task or goal) (e.g., Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Kahne-
man, 1973). The amount of resource allocated is thought to aﬀect attentional
quality, measured as task performance (Pashler, 1998). Thus, the attentional
resource actively modulates information processing. Attentional phenomena
can then be explained as a ﬂexibly graded sharing of a single resource or ca-
pacity, for example dual-task interference (Christie & Klein, 1996), or mental
rotation (Carpenter, Just, Keller, Eddy, & Thulborn, 1999).
The limited resource idea explained phenomena that the spotlight metaphor
could not, because it allowed to modulate the attention intensity to account
for a second task. However, some tasks do not interfere with each other (e.g.,
diﬃculty insensitivity: Navon, 1984), while some modality changes lead to in-
terferences in the other task even when the diﬃculty stays exactly the same
(e.g., structural alteration eﬀect: Wickens, 1991). Empirical ﬁndings like these
led tomodels that favor multiple resources instead of a single one. Accordingly,
an interference between tasks only occurs when both tasks draw upon the same
resource “reservoir”.
5.3.2 Eﬀect Theories
Eﬀect theories of attention are all about the competition for limited perceptual
processing. Instead of focusing on the properties of a central executive system
responsible for the modulation of spotlights and the management of resources,
eﬀect theories attempt to answer which stimulus will win the competition, that
is, which stimulus will rise above the threshold and reach awareness. Attention
and awareness are seen as a result of emerging brain processes (see Dennett
& Kinsbourne, 1992) and thus are only byproducts of information processing.
Krauzlis, Bollimunta, Arcizet, and Wang (2014) proposed that attention arises
as a byproduct of value-based decision making that requires to properly esti-
mate the current state of the environment and their actors – a complex task that
involves the interpretation of many sources, including features of the external
world as well as internal status aspects like goals, needs, and prior knowledge.
The central premise of this idea is: attention’s selective ﬁltering is due to weigh-
ing of input (a process that could be based on Bayesian inferences, similar to
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what is described in Rao, 2010). Krauzlis et al. (2014) further says that such
context-dependent decision making is based on a competition between possi-
ble interpretations of the current scene. Each weighted possible interpretation
can be seen as a candidate template that competes to be the “best-matching”
template.
Support for the “eﬀect-view” comes from studies with patients suﬀering from
parietal lesions andhemispheric neglect (see Fernandez-Duque& Johnson, 2002).
They react more slowly to targets in non-cued locations, a ﬁnding that would
be explained with deﬁcits in the disengagement of the attentional spotlight,
thus it would be a problem of spatial information processing - which is not
located in the parietal cortex. The eﬀect-oriented approach would argue for a
competition of weights that have preferences for stimuli in the undamaged area
compared to neural representations in the damaged (parietal) area. This would
also explain the ﬁnding that a better than normal perception for the unaﬀected
area was observed (Seyal, Ro, & Rafal, 1995): there is no competition of the le-
sioned area. Figure 8 shows the distinction of ﬁndings that can be associated
with attention as a cause or as an eﬀect.
CAUSE
managing resources
modulating spotlights
competition
for representation:
attention capture
pop-out
competition
for resources:
multifocal attention
Attention EFFECT
decision process
threshold
competition of
stimuli to reach
awareness
competition of
representations to define
the situation
FĎČĚėĊ 8: Attention as a cause and as an eﬀect: an overview.
It has been criticized that eﬀect theories describe attention as a pure bottom-up
byproduct while humans can indeed suppress salient stimuli and assign priori-
ties to less salient stimuli intentionally. A biased competition model of selective
attention (Desimone, 1998) evolved that allows top-down factors to modulate
bottom-up processes. That is, the observer holds feature and spatial informa-
tion of an object in mind and can bias the competition of which one, that ist,
which representation (feature or location), reaches the threshold of awareness
individually, based on task or goal (top-down modulation: DeWeerd, Peralta,
Desimone, & Ungerleider, 1999). Studies with preparatory attention to “good”
stimuli (e.g., expected features) revealed an enhanced activation of brain ar-
eas for the expected features, that is, to “winning” (Reynolds, Chelazzi, & Desi-
mone, 1999), while attending to a “poor” stimulus lead to response suppression,
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that is, to “losing” (Chawla, Rees, & Friston, 1999).
5.3.3 Attention in MOT: mixed cause-eﬀect models?
Performance limitations in tracking tasks are usually attributed to a common
underlying mechanism that has spatial and temporal limitations. Scimeca and
Franconeri (2015) added limitations ascribed to the shape recognition system to
the discussion. A main share of theories considers limited attention resources
as the cause of limited performance. However, in recent work by Papenmeier
et al. (2014), performance limitations were attributed to a competitive weighing
system (position vs color) – an idea similar to the competitive traces approach
described earlier in connection to event processing. The paper by Papenmeier
et al. (2014) laid the groundwork for the above presented Study 3 that took the
idea a step further: observers do not only use the trace that provides the most
reliable information (e.g. Papenmeier et al., 2014, manipulated the reliability of
information with frame rate reductions), they can also strategically put weight
on the trace that helps to solve the task (here: identify the objects’ behavior and
status). It may be time to integrate both eﬀect and cause theories of attention
to fully understand dynamic tracking. In this section I will shortly explain the
diﬀerent accounts and propose theoretical extensions.
Spatial, temporal, and shape: limits of tracking
The ﬁrst paper that presented the MOT paradigm (Pylyshyn & Storm, 1988) as-
sumed that the underlying tracking mechanism was based on a parallel set of
object location pointers (called Fingers of Instantiation or “FINSTs”) that ad-
here to the moving objects like “sticky pointing ﬁngers”. FINST only allows for
encoding the spatial location of the object, not properties or features (Pylyshyn,
2004). FINST is broadly described as a ﬁxed-resource theory of visual capacity
limits (e.g. Bae & Flombaum, 2012): attention has slot-like representations; pro-
cessing more objects than available slots is not possible (Drew & Vogel, 2008).
The FINST-theory matches a more recent idea that has been called attentional
priority map (see Scimeca & Franconeri, 2015; Serences & Yantis, 2007): a set
of locations in the visual ﬁeld are marked for enhanced processing via cortical
representations. Franconeri et al. (2010) suggested spatial interference to be
the only factor that limits performance. The decrease in tracking performance
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when the number of targets was increased is assumed to reﬂect interfering cor-
tical representations of two nearby targets (Franconeri, 2013). While this may
just as well be interpreted as two competing representations and thus may be
closer to the eﬀect than the cause account of attention, Franconeri (2013) pro-
posed that two close targets are tracked less well because the suppressive sur-
round of one target overlaps with the spotlight oriented on the other target and
vice versa.
Close to the FINST, but more ﬂexible, is the account by Alvarez and Franconeri
(2007). How many targets can be tracked is determined by ﬂexible indexes
(FLEXs instead of FINSTs). The ﬂexible part: there is no limit to the number
of FLEXs; still, a ﬁnite resource sets the spatial and the temporal resolution of
each FLEX. That is, the ﬁnite resource is divided between the inﬁnite FLEXs, re-
sulting in decreased performance (less resolution) for each target (FLEX) when
the number of targets (FLEXs) increases (similar account: the normalization
model of attention proposed by Reynolds & Heeger, 2009).
Oksama and Hyönä (2004, 2008) tried to explain their ﬁndings on “Multiple
Identity Tracking” (MIT; objects were not identical but drawings of animals
and things) with only one available representation slot, or accordingly, one
spotlight. In their MOMIT model they propose a serial switching theory: each
target is attended one by one, that is each target position must be updated
frequently which gets more diﬃcult with more targets (Howe, Cohen, Pinto,
& Horowitz, 2010). Target positions are registered and when the targets are
re-attended (in a serial manner), objects that are closest to the last-registered
positions are assumed to be the target. That is, more targets mean that the
(one) attentional spotlight must cycle through the objects faster.
Instead of an attentional resource, somehave proposed the visual system’s shape
recognition system as an alternative (see Scimeca & Franconeri, 2015, for a re-
view of relevant studies). Observers may encode the target position to form a
polygon (see Chapter 2: scene-based processing). Encoding more than 4-5 tar-
gets into a polygon when the objects move may decrease performance. Further,
themaintenance of the shapemay become diﬃcult in some dynamic situations
(e.g. crowding).
The MOT paradigm is completely saturated with explanations on how it may
work in speciﬁc situations. What is missing is an overarching approach that
allows object tracking to be a ﬂexible and penetrable process. For me, there is
no doubt that tracking can be, and usually is, low-level motion processing. The
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brain always seeks the path of least resistance and, as shown in Study 1 and 2,
the ﬁrst stage of visual processing is guided by global mechanisms that auto-
matically groups objects in order to save resources and/or energy. Switching to
local/feature-processing requires additional eﬀorts. However, if you ask some-
one to follow a car on the motorway, he will be able to tell the color of the car
while tracking others cars to avoid accidents. The existing MOT theories that
deny the observer’s ability to track featuresmay be too stronglyworded andmay
be based on too many simple and isolated experiments in laboratories. Study 3
shows that observers can strategically chose which path they give more weight.
That is, in situations in which it is (for whatever reason) important to process
features, the observer can. This would be in line with the biased competition
model of selective attention in eﬀect models (Desimone, 1998). The observer
himself represents both feature and spatial information and can decide, strate-
gically, which representation reaches the threshold of awareness. MOTmay be
best solved by relying on spatiotemporal information – which is why putting
weight on non-helpful feature information decreases performance – but that
does not mean per se that the observer cannot process features.
Whichmodel of conscious awareness and attention (Figure 6, page 61) explains
feature processing in MOT?While model A describes that only attended visual
input reaches consciousness, results by Papenmeier et al. (2014) suggest that
most of the given information reached consciousness and that the “sorting by
reliability” comes later, thus favor model B. Study 3 shows that the observers
can actively chose whether they attend to object features or not (see especially
Experiment 2), that is, while the spatial and feature visual input reaches con-
sciousness, the observer chooses whether he attends to the feature objects or
not. Attended information streams can be reported, unattended cannot. Study
3 adds a new aspect to the existing MOT literature: the relevance of represen-
tations.
5.3.4 Attention in Figure 7: a multi-layered process?
I surmise that attention plays a determining role in the interplay of inputweigh-
ing, awareness, and competition for representation. In my opinion, allowing
attention to be both, a cause and an eﬀect, solves many confusions found in
the literature. Here, attention as an eﬀect rather than a cause supports the un-
derstanding of top-down processes in visual perception. While, for example,
automatic grouping can be explained as caused bymanaging resources through
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attentional modulation, feature processing in tracking cannot. A more suitable
explanation for top-down processes is that diﬀerent available representations
areweighed and later compete to reach conscious awareness in accordancewith
the given situation. In Study 2, it is the competition of anticipatory and per-
ceptual representations to deﬁne the situation, where the top-down compo-
nent arises from cause-eﬀect heuristics. In Study 3, participants emphasized
features intentionally due to task demands, hence boosted the “winning po-
tential” of a representation that united both feature and location information.
A competition for representation may always take place – whether it is a com-
petition for resources (attention as a cause) or for awareness and deﬁnition
(attention as an eﬀect) – but while the anticipation of the paths of more than
two objects in tracking has not been observed yet (see Luu & Howe, 2015)2, a
competition of anticipatory and perceptual traces can happen in the observa-
tion of static images (e.g. Didierjean & Marmèche, 2005) and real-world video
clips (Study 2), as long as the given object or scene can assume diﬀerent modes,
is easy to recognize, andwell-known (a rocket can be expected tomove, a build-
ing cannot: Vinson & Reed, 2002). Study 2 added the role of logic and causality,
that is, how the available visual information is structured, as a factor that in-
ﬂuences the outcome of a competition between anticipatory and perceptual
traces.
5.4 Some philosophical ﬁnal remarks
General opinions have changed many times in the past seventy-ﬁve years be-
tween the position that perception is “encapsulated” (Pylyshyn, 1999), that is,
independent of cognitive processes (bottom-up) and one that sees perception
as a cognitive-penetrable process (top-down). Considering experiments out-
side psychology, including literature, visual arts, and humanities, the rate of
observed “opinion tendencies” would be multiplied (see Konecni, 2015).
In this work, I propose that cognitive, higher-level processes in perception are
possible but are not an all-or-none phenomenon. There is no clear borderline
2Note that a recent line of research proposed that observers shift their attention to the reti-
nal position an object is expected to occupy after a saccade (Rolfs, Jonikaitis, Deubel, & Ca-
vanagh, 2011; Rolfs & Szinte, 2016). That is, the focus of attention may be anticipatory, but the
eyes may lag behind (but see Gallagher, 2015). This could explain why some studies did not
ﬁnd anticipation in tracking: the design may have been inexpedient (e.g. Atsma et al., 2012,
who asked paricipants to detect a probe that was presented on or away from the objects future
path). An in-depth discussion of this approach would go beyond the scope of this work.
5.4. Some philosophical ﬁnal remarks 117
betweenmemory, perception, and cognition, and the involvement of top-down
eﬀects depends on many factors that are yet to be explored. In these last two
sections I try to give the reader an idea why it is so diﬃcult to ﬁnd a one-for-
all theory of perception – and why it may be fruitful for psychological research
that there is none yet.
5.4.1 Utilitarian perception
With regard to the obtained results and after my extensive literature research,
I side with the utilitarian theory of Ramachandran. Ramachandran (1990) pro-
posed (p. 24):
“(...) (P)erception is essentially a “bag of tricks”; that through millions of years
of trial and error the visual system has evolved numerous short-cuts, rules-of-
thumb and heuristics which were adopted not for their aesthetic appeal or math-
ematical elegance but simply because they worked (hence the “utilitarian” the-
ory).”
Perceptual processing may apply many diﬀerent strategies to encode and un-
derstand a dynamic scene. Observing eﬀects ascribed to a given manipula-
tion may depend on numerous factors, each triggering a diﬀerent “trick in the
bag”. Instead of ﬁnding one overarching theory that explains diﬀerent percep-
tual processes (shape, pattern, motion, static, etc.), Ramachandran (1990) sug-
gested that one should ﬁrst identify the problems that perception was designed
to solve. Hementions six important aspects that should be integrated in an ap-
proach to understand perception:
1) A biological system, like the visual system, works because it is based on
computing approximate solutions quickly. The solutions are adequate for
the given perceptual problem, but usually not optimal.
2) Due to the environmental (natural constraints), there are often too many
ways of solving a problem and using a theoretical (i.e. computational)
approach cannot distinguish between them.
3) Biological constraints (the “neural machinery) are often disregarded in
theoretical approaches.
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4) Identifying constraints (e.g. number of targets to track) is an incomplete
account. A constraint does not tell us much about the working of the
mechanism.
5) Nature is opportunistic and adopts ad hoc solutions.
6) The brain solves perceptual problems by applying multiple mechanisms
in parallel. The authors mention two reasons: (a) by using multiple sys-
tems, none of the systems needs to be “perfect” and is therefore easy to im-
plement in neural hardware, and (b) simultaneous use of diﬀerent mech-
anisms ensures rapid processing and an easier suppression of noise.
Of course, this is a pessimistic view: it implies that we may never fully under-
stand each and every perceptual process or that, at a minimum, we have to
deal with countless contradictions and inconsistencies until we eventually do.
Ramachandran (1990), however, ﬁnds that confusion and contrary approaches
are beneﬁcial; they usually precede an understanding of a function.
Thiswork further deﬁned ﬁne grains of existing constraints. As onemay deduce
after reading Ramachandran (1990), this has not been simple. For example, in
Study 3, I quickly found a working combination of number of targets, speed of
objects, length of trial, number of trials, and wording of instructions. In each
of the published experiments, I asked participants to track one block without
an additional task before they had to identify the objects and their behavior in
a second block. However, in an unpublished control experiment, I skipped the
ﬁrst block and directly asked participants to do the identiﬁcation task during
tracking – and found no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the allocation of at-
tention to the cued target or distractor object. It seems that one factor for the
observation of ACS eﬀects in dynamic perception is a certain amount of experi-
ence with the environment. In reality, this may be comparable to novice drivers
who cannot mentally represent the traﬃc around them and see special features
(e.g. a street name sign) simultaneously – however, after a while, a driver can
suppress or prioritize such additional information based on given needs, goals,
or tasks. The latter is important, because as shown in Experiment 2 of Study
3: simply being familiar with the environment does not automatically result in
feature processing if the tracking task can be solved without it. A possible in-
terpretation: MOTmay be based on the dorsal pathway (low-level processing),
but when it is learned, it is possible to consult the ventral pathway in order to
represent details. The ventral and dorsal pathway can work together. For ex-
ample, while learning a given action, for example in playing tennis, the ventral
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system may work together with the dorsal system (i.e. conscious activation of
muscle movement). When the action is well-learned, the dorsal system is suf-
ﬁcient (Williams, Davids, & Williams, 1999). In addition, both pathways can
overlap in their roles, for example in the perception of size (Norman, 2002) –
the two system simply solve the task in a diﬀerent manner. Similar ideas of
dual-processing could also apply to MOT.
On the other hand, when we asked the participants in Study 2 to watch out
for the ball contact moment, a similar concept to the ACS idea in Study 3, we
still observed causal ﬁllings. As Ramachandran (1990) assumed in the second
aspect listed above, this may have happened due to environmental (natural)
constraints. One ﬁnding cannot be generalized to similar ﬁelds, because the
brain has too many options to choose from and it may do so in a non-logical or
“quick and dirty” manner.
5.4.2 The human need for simplexity
Although at ﬁrst glance the three studies do not seem to describe the same
thing, they do: they all reﬂect the multidimensional nature of perceptual pro-
cessing. What my research taught me is that we may have to disagree in order
to agree. There is not one theory for human perception. There is not one theory
for human attention. And if there were, “a general theory of vision may indeed
be so abstract and complex that few workers now alive would be able to under-
stand it” (Gordon, 2004, p.226). Even the deﬁnitions of cognitive mechanisms,
the proposed organization of the visual system in terms of independent parallel
systems (as I myself have done in Figure 7), or assuming that the brain works
like a computer (Marr, 1982) are only desperate attempts to squeeze count-
less perceptual tricks and processes that co-exist, interact, and overlap into a
construction of thought, an artiﬁcial environment comparable to language and
symbols, that humans create in order to make sense of the complexity.
Stewart and Cohen (2000) called such a tendency of simple rules to emerge
from underlying disorder and complexity “simplexity”. The authors contrast
simplexity to “complicity”, a more subtle system that applies completely diﬀer-
ent rules but produces the same structural patterns. Complicity emerges from
a dynamic and interactive environment with too many factors to grasp with a
reductionist approach. Even worse, the authors claim that, if the human brain
would be simple enough for us to understand it in its whole complexity, hu-
mans would be too simple to do so (a paradox worth thinking about). The
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combination of simplexity and complicity produces a constant picture of fea-
tures from the wealth of complexity and randomness, or a “collapse of chaos”.
They furtherwonderwhy humans try to ﬁnd a fundamental generalizing princi-
ple, a simplexity theory, but do not apply a reductionist analysis in other areas.
As an example they mention the neck of a giraﬀe and the trunk of an elephant:
both body parts serve the same purpose (not to kneel down for feeding and
drinking), but we still gave them diﬀerent names.
Why do we accept multidimensionality in other biological areas but not for
theories of visual perception? Still, the search for a general theory of perception
led to the discovery of many general properties of vision and real progress has
been made concerning the preciseness and the scientiﬁc rational of theories.
Unfortunately, the more we learn, the less we know.
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